


-4>r 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 



i^ 



THE 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 



ADMINISTRATIONS 



WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 



1789-1801. 



WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT 



BOSTON: 
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY 

1857. 






Entered uccording to Act of Congress in the year 1857, by 

AVILLIAM HENRY TKESCOT, 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Soirth Carolina. 



CAMBRIDGE: 
ALLEN AND FAENHAM, PK INTERS. 



TO 



HON. EDWARD EVERETT, 



Dear Sir, — 

Since the time when Massachusetts and South Carolina, Virginia 
and New York, gave to the public service of a common country 
such men as Washington and Adams, Jay and Pinckney, that 
country has travelled fast and far. Its territory has exjjanded, its 
influence extended, its character matured, and its place in the world 
has become pi'oudly assured. 

But the spirit which informed their counsels has departed, and 
the language of their unselfish patriotism would be profaned in the 
party controversies of the day. What is to be the issue of this mis- 
erable dissension, God only knows. But whether this great empire 
is to outlive its angry disputes, and again move onwards in the unity 
of the spirit and the bond of peace, or whether tlic grand fabric is to 
be resolved into separate republics, each carrying out God's purpose 
in its special civilization, it cannot be amiss, in this day of hard 
thoughts and bitter words, to go back to our old days and to our 
ancient rulers for that sober wisdom, which, imited or sejiarate, can 
alone secure our prosperity. 

It ought not to surjirise you, and I am sure it will surprise nobody 
else, that, fresh from the contemplation of the temperance, judgment, 
and patriotism of those great rulers, I should find a natural associa- 
tion between your character and that of the wise and virtuous men 
who created and adorned our early history. 

A* 



VI DEDICATION. 

It has been, sir, your good fortune to liave filled the same liigli 
office which has been illustrated by the names of Jay and Jefierson, 
Marshall and Madison, Clay and Webster and Calhoun. It was the 
good fortune of your country, that, during your official life, you were 
called upon to justify the history of her past growth, and vindicate 
the strength and justice of her position towards the world. You 
did both in language which has become history. You linked the 
eager present with the venerable past, and developed the policy of 
to-day from the principles and practice of our earliest statesmanship. 

To whom, then, could I dedicate these pages with more propriety 
than to him who has so thoroughly represented the traditionary 
policy of our wisest and greatest statesmen ? And I venture to hope 
that it will not diminish the slight value of this honest tribute to your 
public character, that, justified by circumstances which I at least 
can never forget, I can subsci'Ibe myself, in a spirit of sincere and 
and respectful affection. 

Your friend, 

WM. HENRY TEESCOT. 

Baknwell Island, S. C, } 
Nov. 10, 1857. i 



PREFACE. 



This volume is the sequel to one which I ventured to 
publish in 1852, under the title of " The Diplomacy of 
the Revolution," and I hope soon to complete the 
series by a similar one, in reference to the remaining 
periods of our diplomatic history, in accordance with 
the division suggested in the first chapter of this book. 

An attempt to appreciate the progress of interna- 
tional law, as illustrated in the diplomatic history of 
the world from the peace of Westphalia, undertaken 
with no view to publication, required the study of the 
special diplomatic history of each of the great Euro- 
pean powers, and of the United States. The diplo- 
matic history of almost every European state has been 
written, whether well or ill, by some one of that great 
body of historical students in the Old World to whom 
the materials have been accessible ; and outside of their 
labors, and in illustration of them, there exists an 



VJll PREFACE. 

immense mass of memoirs, state papers, and negotia- 
tions, bearing on the same subject. But there was no 
corresponding summary of our own diplomatic history. 
The only work of the kind, " The Diplomacy of the 
United States," by Theodore Lyman, Boston, 1828, 
although an accurate, laborious, and useful book, is not 
written from the point of view which I wished to 
occupy ; and I therefore found it necessary to study the 
diplomatic history of the United States for myself, as 
thoroughly as the materials would permit. Finding the 
study one of great interest to myself, I have thought its 
results might not be without interest for others. 

I have published this volume separately, because the 
twelve years which it includes have a character of their 
own, and the accession of Mr. Jefferson, reversing that 
policy, makes the commencement of his administration 
a proper starting-point for the next period of our 
history. 

The materials which I have used are the official col- 
lections of state papers relating to our diplomatic his- 
tory, in Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence, from the 
Declaration of Independence to the Treaty of Peace ; 
The Diplomatic Correspondence, from 1783 to 1789, 
published by Congress, in 7 vols. 8vo. ; The Secret Jour- 
nals of Congress, Foreign Affairs, from the Meeting 



PREFACE. IX 

thereof to the Dissolution of the Confederation l^y the 
Adoption of the Constitution ; The American State 
Papers, Foreign Affairs, 4 vols, folio, from the Adop- 
tion of the Constitution to the Treaty of Ghent ; and 
the Lives and Letters of such of the distinguished 
actors in our political history as have been published. 
Among these I feel bound to refer specially to the large 
and valuable publication of the Letters and Works of 
John Adams, prefaced by a biography of great inter- 
est and value, and, considering the relation of the 
author and the subject, of singular and honorable im- 
partiality. Besides these, I have had the MSS. col- 
lections of General Thomas Pinckney and General 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the one minister to Eng- 
land and Spain, and the other minister to France. 

As there were no discoveries to make in our diplo- 
matic history, I have made none, and whatever value 
these pages may have must attach to the connected 
and impartial narrative which I have endeavored to 
construct. 

"Whenever I have quoted a public state paper \\ath- 
out a special reference, it will be found under its proper 
date in one of the above published collections ; and 
for the facts of our general history, a knowledge of 
which I have assumed in the reader, the authority will 



X PREFACE. 

be found in any of the general histories of the United 
States. 

I cannot conclude this preface without acknowledg- 
ing my sense of grateful obhgation to Professor Bowen, 
of Harvard University, for the kindness with which he 
undertook, and the care with which he has accom- 
phshed, the troublesome task of correcting the proofs of 
this volume as they came from the press. 

In the body of this work, by inadvertence, a reference 
to the Life of Gouverneur Morris, by Dr. Sparks, as 
authority for certain facts in Mr. Morris's ambassa- 
dorial career, was omitted. The reference belongs to 
the chapter on the French negotiations. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 
INTRODUCTION. FKOM 1783 TO 1789 .... 1 



CHAPTER II. 

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY "WITH ENGLAND . . .63 

CHAPTER III. 

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH FRANCE . . . .129 

CHAPTER IV. 

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH SPAIN AND ALGIERS . 225 

CHAPTER Y. 

CONCLUSION 275 



ERRATA. 

Page 112, 3d line from bottom, for included read excluded. 
Page 127, line 17, for a contemporary statesman, read contemporary statesmen. 
Page 171, 3d line of note, for creditable to Mr. Pinckney, read creditable to Mr. 
Pickering. 



DIPLOMATIC IIISTOEY. 



CHAPTER I. 

FROM THE TREATY OF PEACE, 1783, TO THE ADOPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1788. 

The Diplomatic Hi.story of the United States may be 
divided into three periods, — from "Washington to Jeffer- 
son, from Jefferson to the Declaration of Mr. Monroe, 
and from that Declaration to the present day.* This 
division is, of course, to some extent arbitrary, but still 
correct enough for the purposes of a continuous and 
general narrative ; and each of these periods may be 
fairly considered as the illustration of a special condi- 
tion of public necessities, and as the natural manifesta- 
tion of an independent principle of our foreign policy. 

* The character and circumstances of this famous Declaration will 
be discussed in its jiroper place in the history of the period to which 
it belongs. I use the term here simj)ly as a convenient description 
of that period, when the consequences of our foreign policy, from the 
accession of Mr. Jeflersou to the Treaty of Ghent, were, to borrow a 
compact and comprehensive French phrase, resume, in the official 
acts of the government. 

1 



4 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

The condition of the country at the inauguration of 
General Washington's administration was, in many 
respects, anomalous. It was a transition leading to a 
great change, and required an activity of diplomatic life 
that has not since been either necessary or possible. 

In the first place, the independence of the colonies 
had not abruptly cut all connection with Europe ; and 
as the colonial policy of the great maritime states had 
always been considered questions of European concern, 
the powers of the old world did not at first recognize 
the extent of that independence. They still fancied 
themselves directly interested in the politics of the 
United States. And it is safe to say, that the admis- 
sion of an American minister into an European con- 
gress would have appeared a more natural diplomatic 
proceeding in 1788 than at any later period of our 
history. 

Again : there existed at that time, in Europe, an ex- 
aggerated idea of the immediate importance of Amer- 
ican commerce. It was a time when great interests 
were about to take the place of great men, but while 
they were still felt through the action of governments, 
rather than in their own strength. Governments, there- 
fore, everywhere strove by treaties to secure commercial 
advantages ; and the correspondence of Franklin, Adams, 
and Jefferson, who represented the country abroad from 
the peace of 1783 to the adoption of the constitution, 
bears testimony to the anxiety of many maritime 
powers to conciliate and secure these supposed advan- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 3 

tages. The indissoluble commercial connection be- 
tween England and the United States had not then 
established itself; and the general idea was, that the 
independence of the colonies had broken up an old and 
rich commerce, the fragments of which were to be 
obtained by early and liberal conventions. 

In the third place, the treaty with France was one of 
mutual guarantees, and many of its clauses were open 
to interpretations involving the United States in the 
stormy and changeful politics of that unhappy empire. 
The circumstances of France soon, indeed, compelled 
her to insist upon that construction of the treaty most 
favorable to her belligerent rights, and the government 
was plunged into an harassing controversy both with 
England and France. The task of the administration 
was, in negotiating such treaties as were absolutely 
necessary for the interests of the country, to avoid all 
political engagements ; and, in carrying out faithfully 
such treaties as had already been negotiated, to shun >: 
all action that might compromise the neutrality of the / 
country. In other words, its object was to establish 
by diplomacy what had already been achieved by arms, 
— the perfect independence of the United States ; not 
their isolation from the great affairs of the world, but 
the right to determine for themselves how far their 
interests were implicated in European politics, and how 
far they would permit themselves to be made parties to 
any European agitation. Situated as were the Euro- 
pean states, they were not always arbiters of their own 



4 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

interests ; and there existed on their part a strong dis- 
position to apply the rule of their own conduct to the 
new republic, and compel a participation in a common 
fate. To resist this pretension, and thus perfect the 
work of the Revolution, was neither an easy nor a safe 
achievement ; and it was accomplished only after many 
disheartening trials, and through the long, patient, and 
painful negotiations which gave character to this period 
by the treaties with England, Spain, and France. 

With the accession of Mr. Jefferson, opened a new 
state of affairs. The commerce of the country, in its 
gradual increase, had demonstrated that its natural 
channels could neither be created nor changed by treaty 
stipulations, and the idea of the importance of treaty 
connections with America had lost much of its original 
force. The progress, too, of the great revolution which 
convulsed the old world until 1815, was fast absorbing 
the attention of the European powers. And during 
this period of unequalled importance and excitement, 
it became very clear that the interests of the new 
republic were, and for some time must be, entirely dis- 
connected from the ruling interests of the European 
confederacy. The Revolution having given us an inde- 
pendent national existence, and the administrations of 
Washington and Adams having vindicated our perfect 
independence of national action, it remained for Mr. 
Jefferson and his successors to complete this work. 
So long as the United States were bounded by terri- 
tories belonging to European powers, they were at any 



\ 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. O 

time subject to foreign and extrinsic influences, and 
liable to be drawn into the consequences of political 
action not always proceeding from their own interests ; 
and the full independence of no maritime country could 
be considered established in face of the belligerent pre- 
tensions of the European nations, during this period 
most extravagantly pressed, and, so far as force went, 
most powerfully supported. The two leading ideas, 
therefore, of this second stage of our foreign policy 
were : first, the necessary territorial extension of the 
United States, which would leave their independence 
of action uninfluenced by the neighborhood of Euro- 
pean colonies ; and next, the recognition of their equal 
right to the great maritime prerogatives of an independ- 
ent and commercial people. As far as circumstances 
permitted, the first was carried out in the purchase of 
Louisiana and Florida; and the second developed in 
the long controversy terminating in the war of 1812. 
And, though this war did not effect a technical solution 
of the vexed question of neutral rights, yet it was a 
declaration that no infringement upon our full equality 
of maritime privileges could be ventured without 
instant war with a nation, who, by a brilliant series of 
naval achievements, had manifested at least its ability 
to hold its own. 

"With this period, the minority of the United States 

terminated. The necessary conditions of an active and 

healthy life were fulfilled, and the United States stood 

before the world with their territories compact, their 

1* 



b DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

national interests clearly defined, and their political 
intelligence alert, practised, and ready for the exigency 
of any future question. 

With this period, also, the founders of the republic 
withdrew from participation in the daily life of the 
nation. They had labored fearlessly and faithfully 
through the dangers of the war, — through the darkness 
and despondency of the Confederation, — through the 
perplexed and hazardous discussions of the Convention. 
With rare courage and temper and wisdom, they had 
laid broad the foundations of a great country ; and, with 
singular good fortune, had been permitted to perfect 
the government which they had initiated. For more 
than a quarter of a century, the men who framed the 
constitution were allowed to administer it; and, having 
thus formed it in infancy and moulded its youth, they 
retired, one after another, from the scenes of their great 
achievements, leaving to a new generation the respon- 
sibility of its mature manhood. But, as if to conse- 
crate with the grace of their final benediction its fore- 
most step, it was granted to Mr. Monroe, the last of 
the venerable company, to inaugurate, by his famous 
Declaration, the vigorous commencement of our national 
life. From the date of this Declaration, our foreign 
policy, if it has not taken a higher tone, has at least 
expressed itself in a more systematic development. To 
this period belong the settlement of the French claims, 
so ably conducted by INIr. Rives ; the Treaty of Wash- 
ington, so admirably negotiated by Mr. Webster; the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 7 

Oregon Question, adjusted by Mr. McLane ; the An- 
nexation of Texas, in great measure due to the active 
resolution of Mr. Calhoun ; and those masterly discus- 
sions of national interests and international law which 
have made the state papers of Mr. Everett and Mr. 
Marcy proud and perpetual records in our national his- 
tory. 

I propose, in the present volume, to write the history 
of the first of these three periods.* It was a time of 
trial and trouble, but it was illustrated by great names 
and honorable labors ; and the whole superstructure of 
our after history rests upon the foundation of its calm 
and patient sagacity, its simple and unfaltering truth- 
fulness. 

To comprehend fully, however, the position of the 
country at the inauguration of General Washington, it 
will be necessary briefly to review the condition of our 
foreign relations during the five years which elapsed 
between the treaty of peace of 1783 and the adoption 
of the constitution in 1788. 

It would be almost as easy for a man in the vigorous 
and varied activity of his matured life to realize faith- 
fully to himself the uncertainty and weakness of his 
infancy, as for a citizen of the United States at the 
present day to reproduce the condition of his country 

* For that period, which, commencing with the Declaration of In- 
dependence, terminated at the treaty of peace, 1 783, I may be 
permitted to refer to " The Diplomacy of the Revolution," by the 
author of this volume. Appleton, 1852. 



O DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

at the date of that treaty which secured its independ- 
ence. In every element which contributes to the glory 
and strength of national existence, — an efficient govern- 
ment, compact territory, flourishing finances, a pros- 
perous commerce, dense population, and an effective 
military and naval force, — the United States of America 
were, in 1783, singularly deficient. They had, indeed, 
unparalleled resources ; a soil whose prodigal bounty 
was fed by the inexhaustible mines and lavish valleys 
and fruitful hills of an untouched continent; majestic 
rivers whose currents rolled in proud anticipation of a 
priceless commerce, and broad bays whose arms spread 
wide to welcome the freighted argosies of the world. 
The spirit of their people was free, bold, and venture- 
some ; shrewd in enterprise, quick in resolution, and 
possessing unbounded faith in themselves and their fu- 
ture. Above all, they had, and honored in their coun- 
cils, not a few of those "kingly spirits of history," who, 
when they receive full and obedient recognition from 
the people, are the highest manifestation of national 
life, and the surest guarantee of national character. 
But this rich soil, with its treasures of corn and coal 
and cotton and gold and lead, was to be won and 
worked. Forests were to be felled and cities to be 
builded, harbors to be created and rivers to be rendered 
navigable. The spirit of the people was to be devel- 
oped by labor, and even the great men who had by 
seven years of suffering achieved independence, were to 
be perfected by a wider and more difficult experience. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 9 

For it must not be supposed that the treaty of peace 
secured the national life. Indeed, it would be more 
correct to say, that the most critical period of the coun- 
try's history embraced the time between the peace of 
1783 and the adoption of the constitution in 1788. 

It is now almost impossible to understand how the 
Articles of the Confederation, which constituted the rev- 
olutionary government, lasted through the struggles of 
that difficult time.* The central power was clumsy in 
its construction, uncertain in its action, and very feeble 
in its execution. It certainly did not either lead popu- 
lar sentiment, or develop a consistent scheme of na- 
tional policy. The indomitable spirit of the people 

* For the history of the Confederation, the only authority with 
which I am acquainted is " The History of the Formation and Adop- 
tion of the Constitution of the United States," by Mr. George T. 
Curtis, of Boston. The first volume of this work only has been pub- 
lished, including the period of the Confederation. As the great 
party divisions of our political history have taken their rise in difier- 
ent constructions of the constitution, and as every one brings to the 
study of that instrument a mind more or less biased by early, and, of 
necessity, prejudiced convictions, it Is of course Imjiossible to pro- 
nounce an opinion on this work until It Is completed. Inferring 
some of Mr. Curtls's opinions from his argument in the Dred Scott 
case, I can anticipate a wide difference on many important points. 
I can say, however, with truth and great pleasure, that so far the 
work is a credit to the graver literature of the country. It is con- 
ceived in a spirit of candid, philosophical inquiry, and executed 
in a manner honorable to the taste, learning, and honesty of its 
accomplished author. 



10 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

conquered by endurance the chief obstacles to success, 
while the necessary unanimity of action and opinion 
was preserved by the individual influence of the great 
men who appeared together in the different colonies, 
and commanded, each in his sphere, the confidence of 
his immediate section. The subordination of the gov- 
ernment to the individual ability of its instruments was 
most striking in the foreign relations of the country, and 
the diplomacy of the Revolution was the result rather of 
the wisdom of Franklin, Adams, and Jay, than of the 
prolonged and perplexed deliberation of the Conti- 
nental Congress. Efficient and sufficient, however, as 
might be the articles of the confederation for the pur- 
pose of giving validity to the diplomatic transactions 
which resulted in the treaty of peace, the provisions of 
those articles rendei-ed the government absolutely im- 
potent for the continued administration of the foreign 
affairs of the new commonwealth. And the inquiry 
made by the Duke of Dorset, in reply to the advances 
of the American commissioners towards the negotia- 
tion of a commercial treaty with Great Britain, sug- 
gested insuperable difficulties. 

" Having communicated," says his Grace, in a letter 
dated March 26, 1785, " to my court the readiness you 
expressed in your letter to me of the 9th December, to 
remove to London for the purpose of treating upon 
such points as may materially concern the interests, 
both political and commercial, of Great Britain and 
America, and having at the same time represented that 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 11 

you declared yourselves to be fully authorized and em- 
powered to negotiate ; I have been, in answer thereto, 
instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the 
real nature of the powers with which you are invested, 
whether you are merely commissioned by Congress, or 
whether you have received separate powers from the 

respective States The apparent determination of 

the respective States to regulate their own separate 
interests, renders it absolutely necessary, towards form- 
ing a permanent system of commerce, that my court 
should be informed how far the commissioners can be 
duly authorized to enter into any engagements with 
Great Britain which it may not be in the power of any 
one of the States to render totally useless and inefR- 
cient." * 

Now the Articles of Confederation, after providing in 
Art. 2, that " each State retains its sovereignty, free- 
dom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, 
and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled," 
provided in Art. 9, that " the United States, in Congress 
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive fight and 
power of determining on peace and war, .... of send- 
ing and receiving ambassadors, entering into treaties 
and alliances ; provided, that no treaty of commerce 
shall be made whereby the legislative power of the 
respective States shall be restrained from imposing 

* Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, A^ol. IT., p. 297. 



12 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own peo- 
ple are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation 
or importation of any species of goods or commodities 
whatsoever." And it also provided, in the same article, 
that the consent of nine States should be necessary to 
the exercise of even this limited power. Such a pro- 
vision, in the presence of thirteen States, differing 
widely in the character of their production and the 
interests of their commerce, was an absolute negative 
upon any permanent or concerted action. 

In addition to this, there was no efficiently con- 
structed Department of State. Congress itself was 
gradually subsiding into a political inanity; the States 
were absorbed in their local affairs ; their most distin- 
guished men were employed at home ; a quorum of 
members was tardily and with great difficulty convened 
at the seat of government ; the federal and state 
finances were in a condition of almost hopeless embar- 
rassment ; the military force of the country nearly dis- 
banded; and the executive government itself, at the 
very time it was offering to negotiate with the most 
powerful nation of the world, was driven from the capi- 
tal by a military insurrection which lacked principle to 
be called a rebellion, and had scarcely strength enough 
to be termed a riot. The questions, too, which were 
of first importance to the United States, were precisely 
those commercial and territorial questions which needed 
prompt action, a vigorous government, and competent 
military force : such questions, for example, as the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 16 

boundaries between Spain and themselves ; the restora- 
tion of the frontier posts by the English ; the commerce 
with the West Indies, and the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi. And yet, unfortunately, these were just the 
questions most calculated to excite sectional feeling, to 
develop mischievously local differences, and consequent- 
ly, under the limitation of the Confederation, the most 
unlikely to be settled. All therefore which could be 
expected at this period of our history was, that the gov- 
ernment should give up nothing, and, if it pressed no 
claims, that at least it should abandon none. And this 
is just what the government did. It held every thing in 
statu quo between the treaty of independence and the 
adoption of the constitution ; and therefore it is that 
from the transactions of these five years can best be 
learned the position of the United States upon the open- 
ing of General Washington's administration. 

In 1781, the Continental Congress, which had in the 
first years of the war neglected the organization of any 
department of foreign affairs, was compelled, by the 
growing necessities of its diplomatic relations, to estab- 
lish some orderly arrangement in this branch of admin- 
istration. 

They resolved, " That the extent and the rising im- 
portance of these United States entitle them to a place 
among the great potentates of Europe, while our polit- 
ical and commercial interests point out the propriety of 
cultivating with them a friendly correspondence and 
connection. \ 

2 



14 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

" That to render such an intercourse advantageous, 
the necessity of a competent knowledge of the interests, 
views, relations, and systems of those potentates, is 
obvious. 

" That a knowledge, in its nature so comprehensive, 
is only to be acquired by a constant attention to the 
state of Europe, and an unremitted application to the 
means of acquiring wellgrounded information. . . . 

" That to answer these essential purposes, the com- 
mittee are of opinion that a fixed and permanent office 
for the department of foreign affairs ought forthwith 
to be established, as a remedy against the fluctuation, 
the delay, and indecision to which the present mode 
of managing our foreign affairs must be exposed." 

Under this new and better arrangement, Robert R. 
Livingston, of New York, was elected " Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs." After filling this responsible post with 
eminent ability from the 20th of October, 1781, until 
June, 1783, Mr. Livingston resigned. Congress post- 
poned the election of his successor until they had deter- 
mined upon a place of permanent session ; and, in the 
mean time, conducted the correspondence with their 
foreign ministers through the successive presidents of 
their own body, Boudinot, Mifflin, and Lee. On the 7th 
of May, 1784, Mr. Jay was elected to the vacant post. 
A happier selection could not have been made. Mr. 
Jay, after filling high and responsible office at home, had 
been Minister to Spain, and one of the plenipotentiaries 
in Paris who negotiated the treaty of peace. The 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 15 

grave truthfulness of his character, the sobriety of his 
judgment, and his inflexible resolution, all abundantly 
illustrated in long public service, secured him the con- 
fidence of the country, while his diplomatic experience 
gave him precisely that knowledge of national and 
European interests and influences most needed in those 
questions which the varied policies of England, France, 
and Spain were anxious to settle, each to its own 
special advantage. Of all men in the country, Mr. Jay 
was thus the best fitted to comprehend the position of 
our ministers abroad, to appreciate their despatches, and, 
at the same time, to guide the deliberations of Congress 
in harmony with the policy of the department. Be- 
tween Mr. Livingston's resignation and Mr. Jay's entry 
into oflftce, Congress received and replied to several 
diplomatic communications, which, possessing perhaps 
no political value, were yet interesting as reflections and 
indications of European opinion. In March, 1783, the 
Burgomasters and Senate of the Free City of Ham- 
burg addressed, through John Abraham de Boor, to 
Congress, whom they style " right noble, high, mighty, 
most honorable Lords," a " most obsequious missive," 
in which, referring to the treaty of peace with England, 
they say : " We, impressed with the most lively sensa- 
tions on the illustrious event, the wonder of this and 
the most remote future ages, and desirons fully to tes- 
tify the part we take therein, do hereby offer your High 
Mightinesses our service and attachment to the cause ; " 
and then, stating the advantages of a reciprocal trade, 



16 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

proceed, " intercessionally and most obsequiously to 
request your High Mightinesses to favor and counte- 
nance the trade of our merchants, and to suffer them 
to enjoy all such rights and liberties as you allow to 
merchants of nations in amity, which, in gratitude and 
with zeal, we will in our place endeavor to retribute, etc., 
etc." To all which. Congress replied briefly but prop- 
erly, and, as was fitting in return, for so much friend- 
ship, prayed " God Almighty to keep the Honorable 
Burgomasters and Senate of the Imperial Free City 
of Hamburg in his holy protection." * 

In July, 1783, the Apostolical Nuncio in Paris sent 
to Franklin, to be transmitted to Congress, a note, in 
which he stated : " Before the Revolution, which has 
just been completed in North America, the Catholics 
and Missionaries of those provinces depended, as to 
their spiritual concerns, on the Apostolical Vicar resi- 
dent in London. It is well known that this arrange- 
ment can no longer exist ; but as it is essential that 
the Catholic subjects of the United States should have 
an ecclesiastic to govern them in their rehgious con- 
cerns, the Congregation de Propaganda Fide existing 
at Rome for the establishment and conservation of Mis- 
sions has come to the determination of proposing to 
Congress to establish, in some city of the United States 
of North America, one of their Catholic subjects, with 
the powers of Apostolical Vicar, and in the character of 

* Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. I. p. 62 and 67. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 17 

Bishop, or simply in quality of Apostolical Prefect. . . . 
And as it might sometimes happen that among the 
subjects of the United States, there might be no per- 
son in a situation to be charged with the spiritual 
government, either as Bishop or Apostolical Prefect, it 
would be necessary, in such circumstances, that Con- 
gress should consent to choose him from among the 
subjects of a foreign nation the most friendly with the 
United States." * 

It is unnecessary to examine the scope and conse- 
quence of this proposition, which was not, it must be re- 
marked, the opening of diplomatic intercourse between 
the Pope as a prince and the United States as a nation, 
but a scheme by which Congress, exercising the right to 
choose the Apostolical Prefect, would, by the act of 
choice, recognize and strengthen his position as an offi- 
cial of the national government. For on the 11th of 
May, 1784, Congress resolved : " That Dr. Franklin be 
desired to notify to the Apostolical Nuncio at Versailles, 
that Congress wdU be pleased to testify their respest 
to his sovereign and state ; but that, the subject of his 
application to Dr. Frankhn being purely spiritual, it is 
without the jurisdiction and powers of Congress, who 
have no authority to permit or refuse it, these powers 
being reserved to the several States individually." f 

On the 17th of May, 1784, the same day on which 
Mr. Jay was elected Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and 

* Sparks's Dip. Corres. Vol. IV. 156. 
t Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. I. 117. 

2* 



18 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Mr. Jefferson appointed to supply his place in the com- 
mission at Paris, Congress passed a series of resolu- 
tions, intended for the instruction of their foreign min- 
isters, and tracing a general outline of what they con- 
sidered a complete system of foreign policy. The field 
in which they proposed to negotiate was certainly wide 
enough ; for their first resolution declared, that it would 
be advantageous for the United States to conclude trea- 
ties of amity and commerce with Russia, Austria, Prus- 
sia, Denmark, Saxony, Hamburg, Great Britain, Spain, 
Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, Venice, Sar- 
dinia, and the Ottoman Porte ; and they then proceeded 
to declare the principles on which such treaties should 
be negotiated. These principles, considered simply as 
political sentiments, were highly honorable to those who 
announced them ; but it must always be impossible to 
establish, by a system of treaties, a theory of abstract 
right. Treaties are, in fact, simply the expression of im- 
mediate interests, and depend in their negotiation so 
much upon circumstances of adventitious strength and 
the constantly changing contingencies of national neces- 
sity, that it is difficult to say in advance how far they 
are or can be made the expression of general principles. 
Besides which, the United States were scarcely in posi- 
tion to introduce either new principles of national 
action, or even to enforce the application of many 
recognized political truths. These instructions, how- 
ever, evidenced no presumptuous desire to alter the old 
and well-established relations of national community, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 19 

nor claimed any special mission for the diplomacy of 
the new Republic. They declared, that, in all treaties, 
three points should be carefully stipulated : — 

" 1. That each party shall have the right to carry 
their own produce, manufactures, and merchandise, in 
their own bottoms, to the ports of the other, and thence 
the produce and merchandise of the other, paying in 
both cases such duties only as are paid by the most 
favored nations, freely where it is granted to such na- 
tion, or paying the compensation when such nation 
does the same. 

" 2. That with the nations holding territorial posses- 
sions in America, a direct and similar intercourse be 
admitted between the United States and such posses- 
sions ; or, if this cannot be obtained, then a direct and 
similar intercourse between the United States and cer- 
tain free ports within such possessions ; that if this, 
neither, can be obtained, permission be stipulated to 
bring from such possessions, in their own bottoms, the 
produce thereof to their States directly, and for these 
States to carry, in their own bottoms, the produce and 
merchandise to such possessions directly. 

" 3. That these United States be considered, in all 
such treaties and in every case arising under them, as 
one nation, upon the principles of the Federal Consti- 
tution." 

If the first and second of these points could have 
been established in the treaties of the United States, 
there would have been achieved, doubtless, a gi-eat and 



20 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

wholesome reform in the commercial system of the age. 
But they were just the points which it was hopeless to 
ask ; for they were in direct contravention of the essen- 
tial principles of both British and Spanish trade. And 
even France, in the character of our nearest ally, only 
admitted them in a modified and exceptional fashion. 
The close of the last century was emphatically an age 
of commercial alliances, but alliances negotiated on the 
principles of the strictest monopoly, and based entirely 
upon an exchange of mvitual privileges. 

As to the third point, the independence of each State 
in the matter of import and export, expressly guaran- 
teed by the Federal Constitution, would seem to have 
rendered it an impossible condition in the most impor- 
tant, that is, the commercial, negotiations of the com- 
monwealth. Indeed, Congress had, shortly before the 
adoption of these very resolutions, declared that, " unless 
the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be 
vested with powers competent to the protection of 
commerce, they never can command reciprocal advan- 
tages in trade ; and without these, our foreign commerce 
must decline, and eventually be annihilated. Hence 
it is necessary that the States be explicit, and fix on 
some effectual mode by which foreign commerce not 
founded on principles of equality may be restrained." * 
And they resolved to ask from the States a power 
for fifteen years, which should control State action 

* Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. I. p. 106. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 21 

both as to imports and exports. Without this power, 
which they never obtained, it is impossible to see how 
the United States could have negotiated a treaty of 
commerce " as one nation, upon the principles of the 
Federal Constitution." 

The instructions further required the foreign min- 
isters to negotiate, if possible, the principles of " free 
ships, free goods," the abolition of any confiscation for 
contraband, the repeal of the old system of marque 
and reprisal, and the exemption in war from armed 
interference of " all fishermen, all cultivators of the 
earth, and all artisans or manufacturers, unarmed or 
inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and 
all merchants and traders exchanging the produce of 
different places, and thereby rendering the necessaries, 
conveniences, and comforts of human life more easy 
to obtain and more general." 

This anomalous system of peaceful war, it may safely 
be said, can never be realized. For those not actually 
engaged in the field, it might deprive war of some 
of its discomfort, but would relieve none of its real 
horrors ; less money might be lost, but less blood 
would scarcely be spilt. And its false philosophy 
ought rather to have sprung from the selfishness of 
an absolute monarchy supported by a hired and un- 
sympathizing army, than from the rulers of a people 
whose every citizen was a soldier, and whose character 
and safety depended upon the identity, in honor, 
strength, and interest, of every class of its community. 



^ 



22 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

No nation should be taught to believe war the worst of 
evils; and when it does come, in stern justice or awful 
retribution, the national heart should not sink at its 
coming. Neither artisan, nor manufacturer, nor mer- 
chant, busy in rendering the comforts of life more gen- 
eral, should be exempt from the nation's grief or the 
nation's glory. If a country must peril her all, let her 
all be freely perilled ; but let every citizen feel that he 
is part and parcel of his country's life, — that she can- 
not be struck and he not bleed, — and that, when she 
calls her armies into battle, it is time for the reaping- 
hook to be reconverted into the sword. 

It is indeed singular, that men of such wonderful 
practical sagacity as were the statesmen of our early 
history, should have incorporated into an instrument of 
so business-like a character the sentimentality of these 
latter propositions. From these instructions, it is clear 
that the policy of the United States was meant to be 
distinctly commercial, and that their alliances were to 
be controlled simply by the advantages of trade that 
could be negotiated. And this was even more strongly 
indicated by a resolution of the 19th of October, 17^ 1 /'^ 
to which these instructions were intended to be supple- 
mentary. " Resolved, The acquisition of support to the 
Independence of the United States having been the 
primary object of the instructions to our ministers 
respecting the convention of the neutral maritime pow- 
ers for maintaining the freedom of commerce, you will 
observe that the necessity of such support is super- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 23 

seded by the treaties lately entered into for restoring 
peace. And, although Congress approve of the prin-s 
ciples of that convention, as it was founded on the! 
liberal basis of the maintenance of the rights of neu- [ 
tral nations and of the privileges of commerce, yet 
they are unwilling, at this juncture, to become a party to 
a confederacy which may hereafter too far complicate 
the interests of the United States with the politics of 
Europe ; and, therefore, if such a progress is not already 
made in this business as may render it dishonorable to 
recede, it is the desire of Congress, and their instruction 
to each of the ministers of the United States at the 
respective courts in Europe, that no further measures 
be taken at present towards the admission of the United 
States into that confederacy." 

Upon Mr. Jay's accession to office, the treaty relations 
of the United States were confined to France, England, 
Holland, and Sweden ; * and, during his term of office, 
treaties were negotiated with Prussia and Morocco ; 
but the only nations whose relation with and position 
towards the United States it is iinportant to determine 
at this time were France, England, and Spain. 

The relations of France with the United States 
present, during this period, very little of general interest. 
Frankfin, at that time Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris, 

* Treaty with France, 6th February, 1778; -with Holland, 8th 
October, 1782 ; with England, peace, 30th November, 1782, and 11th 
April, 1783; with Sweden, 3d April, 1783; with Prussia, 1785; 
with Morocco, 1786. 



24 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

retired from active service, to wear, without further 
responsibility, the accumulated honors of laborious 
years, and his place was ably and amply filled by 
Thomas Jefferson. The chief object of Mr. Jefferson's 
efforts was to obtain a broad and permanent commer- 
cial arrangement, by which the trade between the two 
countries might be as free as the interests of both 
manifestly reqmred. The French government was ex- 
tremely dissatisfied with the slow growth of its Ameri- 
can commerce. It had expected, that, upon the close 
of the war, a natural feehng of gratitude, and the bitter 
animosity betvv^een the late belligerents, would have 
diverted ti-ade from its old colonial channels, and had 
made what, under its old system, must be considered 
very liberal provisions for the encouragement of this 
commercial connection. But in two very important 
articles, tobacco and whale oils, the French system of 
farming the revenue, and its policy in view of the crea- 
tion of a powerful marine, did not allow the adoption 
of that perfect freedom of trade which could alone 
counteract the old commercial influence of Great 
Britain, and compensate for the liberal credits which 
recommended the British merchants, and were pecu- 
liarly needed by the trading community of the new 
Kepublic at this time. Mr. Jefferson spared no labor 
to convince the French court of the necessity for a 
broader policy than had been adopted ; his views seem 
to have attracted considerable attention in the highest 
quarters, and he was seconded earnestly and usefully 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 25 

by Lafayette. But even before his mission terminated, 
the difficulties had become insuperable. The death of 
Vergennes, the changes in the administration of the 
finances, indeed the state of the French finances them- 
selves, rendered any radical change in their system of 
imports and exports impossible. Besides, the treaty 
lately negotiated between England and France, and 
the well known ambition of Louis XVI. to extend his 
colonial power and develop the maritime capabilities 
of his empire, indicated a disposition to imitate the 
English system of colonial monopoly. But it is hardly 
probable, that, even with more liberal allies, Mr. Jefferson 
could have established a freer and permanent system of 
commerce. For his letters and despatches from home 
abound in constant complaint of the lack of all unity 
of opinion in the States, and the utter inefficiency of 
Congi-ess ; while France, on more than one occasion, 
and especially in relation to Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, made serious, and, as Mr. Jay admitted, 
well founded reclamations against the commercial reg- 
ulations of the several States. 

The political relations of the t^vo countries remained, 
during this period, undisturbed, although the treaty obli- 
gations bet\veen them might, under certain circum- 
stances, have seriously embarrassed the United States. 
For while, under the treaty, France guaranteed the boun- 
daries of the LTnited States, they reciprocally guaran- 
teed the French possessions in America ; and had war 
resulted in Europe, either from the disturbances in Hol- 

3 



26 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

land or the disputes as to the Bavarian succession, the 
relations between the United States and France might 
have gravely compromised the peace and safety of the 
former. Fortunately, France was able to solve the dif- 
ficulties of both these questions without an appeal to 
arms ; and, still more fortunately, the question between 
Great Britain and the United States as to the surren- 
der of the frontier posts was protracted in its settlement, 
until the impolicy of requiring France to substantiate 
her part of the guarantee was evident to the nation. 
In 1786, Mr. Jay instructed Mr. Jefferson to sound the 
French government as to its readiness to intervene in 
this matter ; and in reply, after referring to its possible 
consequences, Mr. Jefferson says : " However, if this me- 
diation should be finally needed, I see no reason to 
doubt our finally obtaining it, and still less to question 
its omnipotent influence on the British court." Now, 
difficult as it proved for the United States to maintain 
their neutrality in the war w^hich soon after broke out in 
Europe, it is easy to see how much more difficult that 
policy would have been, if the country had been indebt- 
ed for its boundary to the diplomatic intervention of 
France. And both the difficulty and wisdom of this 
neutral policy were fully comprehended by Mr. Jefferson 
at this time ; for writing, in October, 1787, to Mr. Jay, 
on the critical state of the difficulty between Prussia 
and Holland, which at one time threatened an Euro- 
pean war, he says : " Should this war take place, as is 
quite probable, and should it be as general as it threat- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 27 

ens to be, our neutrality must be attended with great 
advantages ; whether of a nature to improve our morals 
or our happiness is another question. But is it sure 
that Great Britain, by her searches, her seizures, and 
other measures for harassing us, will preserve our neu- 
trality ? " and then, stating his reasons for his opinion, 
he adds, referring to the King of Great Britain : " When 
I review this disposition, and review his conduct, I have 
little hope of his permitting our neutrality. He will 
find subjects of provocation in various articles of our 
treaty with France, which will now come in view in all 
their consequences, and in consequences very advanta- 
geous to the one and the other country." 

A few questions occurred for the solution of the two 
countries at this time, which are chiefly interesting as 
showing with what manly independence the United 
States then acted, even in the presence of an ally whose 
past services they gratefully acknowledged, and whose 
future friendship they anxiously sought. Just before 
the departure of the Chevaher de la Luzerne, the 
French Minister, from Philadelphia, Mons. de la Mar- 
bois, the Secretary of Legation, was assaulted in the 
streets of that city by a French resident, named Long- 
champs. Longchamps was prosecuted before the crim- 
inal courts of Pennsylvania, and sentenced to fine and 
imprisonment. While undergoing his punishment, the 
French government demanded that he should be deliv- 
ered up to it, as a French subject, guilty of a grave mis- 
demeanor against French law. The demand was 



28 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

warmly pressed by Mons. de Marbois, who had become 
Charge d'Affah-es. Such an extradition involved some 
of the most difficult and delicate questions of interna- 
tional law, and the rights as well as the pride of both 
countries would be affected by the result. The outrage 
was scandalous and indefensible ; and there was, on the 
part of Congress, every desire to soothe the susceptibil- 
ity of the monarch to whom they were under the high- 
est obligations of human gratitude. It was, too, one of 
those questions on which the court of France had 
always shown itself particularly sensitive ; and in the 
French archives, there was more than one case not dis- 
similar, in which France had asserted and obtained the 
amplest apology and fullest redress from some of the 
oldest and most powerful of the European states. 
Congress referred the correspondence to Mr. Jay for his 
opmion ; and his report is a most admirable specimen 
of the firm, judicious, and just character of his diplo- 
macy. 

" Your Secretary," said Mr. Jay, " considers the fol- 
lowing principles to be unquestionably true: namely, — 

" That every friendly foreigner, coming to any coun- 
try on lawful business, is entitled to the protection of 
the laws of that country, on the one hand, and owes 
obedience to them during his residence, on the other. 

" That whenever such foreigner breaks the peace, or 
otherwise violates the laws of the land, he is as amena- 
ble to them as any other person ; and that the sovereign 
power of the State has undoubted right to punisli him in 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 29 

the manner and degree prescribed by the laws of the 
State. 

" That where the said laws sentence such oflfending 
foreigner to imprisonment for a limited time, the State 
has a clear right to hold and detain him in prison ac- 
cordingly, and are not bound to release or deliver him 
up to his prince for any purpose whatever, before he 
shall have satisfied the laws of the land which he has 
violated, by undergoing the punishment decreed thereby 
for his offence. 

" Your Secretary is therefore of opinion, that the 
requisition is premature ; for, admitting Charles Julien 
de Longchamps to be a Frenchman ; admitting that he 
has offended his prince, either here or elsewhere ; admit- 
ting, further, that his prince has a right to demand him, 
and that the United States were bound by treaty or 
otherwise to deliver him up ; yet it is not to be denied 
that he has broken the peace and violated the laws of 
this country ; and having been legally condemned to 
imprisonment for the same, a compliance with the said 
requisition at present cannot possibly be required by 
the law of nations. 

" How far it would be right and proper for the Uni- 
ted States afterwards to demand of the State of Penn- 
sylvania to deliver the said Charles Julien de Long- 
champs to be tried and judged in France for that part 
of the aforesaid offence against the peace, government, 
and dignity of that commonwealth, which consisted in 
his having there violated the rights and privileges of His 

3* 



30 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Most Christian Majesty's Legation, and how far such 
demand would be warranted by the law of nations and 
the federal compact between the States, are questions 
so new, so deeply and intimately connected with the 
nature of our constitutions and confederation, and so 
extensive in their consequences, as to require very ample 
discussion, much reflection, and serious consideration. 
Your Secretary is further of opinion, that the Minister 
Plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of 
Versailles should be instructed to submit the above facts 
and reasons to the candid consideration of his Most 
Christian Majesty, to assure him that it would give 
them great pain to have their conduct viewed by him in 
an unfavorable point of view, and that they flatter 
themselves the reasons which render it impossible for 
them at present to comply with his requisition will ap- 
pear to him as conclusive as they do to Congress. That 
they will maturely, candidly, and earnestly consider how 
far a compliance with it, when the prisoner shall be 
legally released, may be free from objections, and will 
endeavor, in the mean time, to make that very important 
question the subject of mutual and friendly discussions ; 
that as the man himself can be no object with the 
States, and as neither their interests nor their inclina- 
tions can lead them to give cause of umbrage to their 
first and best friend and ally, they hope he will have 
perfect confidence in their sincerity when they declare 
that obstacles to their complying with his requests will 
always give them as much concern and regret as oppor- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 31 

tunities of manifesting their respect, their regard, their 
gratitude, and their attachment to him will always give 
them pleasure and satisfaction." 

Fortunately, some months after, and before the dis- 
cussion was renewed, Mons. de Marbois formally with- 
drew the demand on the part of his government. 

Another case, involving questions of a very similar 
character, occurred in 1788, soon after the arrival of the 
Count de Moustier, who succeeded the Chevalier de la 
Luzerne. Ferrier, a native of Languedoc, commanding 
the brig David, was despatched from the island of St. 
Domingo for Nantz with a valuable cargo of coffee. 
Under pretence of leaks in the vessel, he came to Nor- 
folk, Virginia. Satisfied, from depositions taken on 
board, that Ferrier intended fraudulently to convert the 
ship and cargo into his own possession, the French con- 
sul, with the consent of the mayor, arrested Femer, who, 
upon the investigation, had deserted, and sent him pris- 
oner on board of the French ship Jason, then lying in 
the same harbor. There the culprit underwent an ex- 
amination, and confessed his crime ; upon which the 
consul called an assembly of the merchants belonging 
to his nation, who resolved to send Ferrier to Nantz, 
there to be tried by the officers of the French Admi- 
ralty. 

At the same time, the consul wrote to the Governor 
of the State, declaring the facts of the case, and request- 
ing the consent of the Executive Council to send Ferrier 
to France, in the vessel which he had commanded. To 



32 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

this letter no answer was received; but shortly after, a 
sheriff went on board the French ship and arrested 
Ferrier, as a debtor in the sum of =£50 to a French 
resident of Norfolk. Ferrier was carried on shore, gave 
the necessary bail, and vanished. Under these circum- 
stances, the French government demanded his de- 
livery. 

The consular convention which was afterwards 
adopted being then only under negotiation, Mr. Jay 
held very properly, that " The foreign consuls here have 
no authority than that which they may derive from the 
law of nations and the acts of particular States;" and 
the whole matter was referred to Virginia. Governor 
Randolph, at that time executive officer of the State, 
held, that as consular powers must be measured by the 
legislative acts of the State, so must his, and declared 
that he could find no warrant to justify any such action 
on his part, adding : " That if the act of the public officer 
in withdrawing Ferrier from the Jason was unlawful, 
it belonged to the judiciary, not the executive, to declare 
it so ; that if it was lawful, the executive could not 
wrest him from the hands of that officer, especially as 
Mr. Oster (the consul) might have reclaimed him after 
his discharge, and caused a mulct to be imposed on the 
sheriff, if that discharge was improper." As the gov- 
ernment was just about passing from its old federal 
condition into its present constitutional organization. 
Count de Moustier did not press the reclamation. But 
in his last letter on the subject, he said : " If circum- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 33 

stances did not promise a happy revolution in the actual 
organization of the United States, and if the princi- 
ples that have been adopted in Virginia, with respect to 
Captain Ferrier, should serve as a basis for the com- 
mercial policies of the other States, which have hitherto 
followed very different maxims, the consequences would 
be, that no nation could safely navigate and trade in 
their ports, and that foreign captains might, under the 
protection of the laws, dispose of cargoes which have 
been intrusted to them, and might enjoy with impunity 
the fruit of their crimes, in spite of the claim of their 
owners, and notwithstanding the demands of the minis- 
ter plenipotentiary of a power closely connected with 
the United States." 

These cases not only exhibit the caution with which 
the government acted wherever the national rights or 
the national character were concerned, but they illus- 
trate strongly how absolutely necessary a more efficient 
and simpler executive authority was, for the adminis- 
tration of the foreign affairs of the country. For in all 
doubtful questions of right, this reference backwards 
and forwards from the States to Congress was only too 
well calculated, by its delay, to provoke difficulty and 
create unnecessary irritation. Not only, however, was 
the government stringent in the measure of its justice, 
even to such an ally, but it manifested a most sensitive 
susceptibility as to the style in which that ally should 
address it ; and of this, one of the last of Mr. Jefferson's 



34 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

despatches affords a very striking example. Writing to 
Mr. Jay on the 4th of February, 1789, he said : — 

" We had before understood, through different chan- 
nels, that the conduct of the Count de Moustier was 
politically and morally offensive. It was delicate for 
me to speak on the subject to the Count de Montmorin. 
The invaluable mediation of our friend the Marquis de 
Lafayette was therefore resorted to, and the subject 
explained, though not pressed. Later intelligence show- 
ing the necessity of pressing it, it was yesterday resumed, 
and represented through the same medium to the 
Count de Montmorin, that recent information proved to 
us that his minister's conduct had rendered him per- 
sonally odious in America, and might even influence 
the dispositions of the two nations ; that his recall was 
become a matter of mutual concern ; that we had un- 
derstood he was instructed to remind the new govern- 
ment of their debt to this country, and that he was in 
the purpose of doing it in very harsh terms ; that this 
could not increase their desire of hastening payment, 
and might wound their affections ; that therefore it was 
much to be desired that his discretion should not be 
trusted to as to the form in which the demand should 
be made, but that the letter should be written here and 
he instructed to add nothing ; nor was his private con- 
duct omitted. The Count de Montmorin was sensibly 
impressed," etc., etc. And the result was, as Mr. Jeffer- 
son proceeds to state in detail, that the Count de Mous- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 35 

tier was allowed to ask his conge, and his place sup- 
plied by Monsieur de Ternant- 

But that which indicated a radical difference of 
opinion between the two governments, as to their politi- 
cal relations, was the consular convention, the negotia- 
tions for which, commencing in 1782, were not termi- 
nated by ratification until 1789. As the treaty of 
amity and commerce made between France and the 
United States, in 1778, granted mutual liberty for the 
establishment of consulates and vice-consulates, Con- 
gress in 1782, by a committee consisting of Randolph, 
Sherman, and Clymer, reported the scheme of a con- 
sular convention. This convention was sent to Dr. 
Franldin, with the following special and stringent in- 
structions : " That the said minister plenipotentiary use 
his discretion as to the words or arrangement of the 
convention, conforming himself to the matter thereof in 
all respects, except as to so much of the sixth article as 
relates to the erection of a chapel, taking care that 
reciprocal provisions be made for the recognition of the 
consuls and vice-consuls of the United States, and for 
the admission of persons attached to the consulate to 
the privileges stipulated in the fifth article in a manner 
most conducive to expedition and freest from difficulty." 
In December, 1784, on motion of Mr. Jay, Congress 
unanimously " Resolved, That His Excellency the Presi- 
dent inform the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United 
States at the Court of France, that it is the desire 
of Congress, in case the convention proposed for reg- 



36 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ulating and ascertaining the powers and privileges of 
consuls should not already be signed, that he delay sign- 
ing it until he receive further instructions on the subject 
from Congress." To which Dr. Franklin replied, that 
he received the resolution too late, as the convention 
had been signed in July. The convention as signed 
came accordingly before Congress for ratification. The 
original scheme proposed by Congress was injudicious 
and extravagant enough, and it is difficult to understand 
how, in their usual cautious temper, they could ever 
have consented to a system of consular jurisdiction as 
wide, dangerous, and unusual as their scheme com- 
prised. But objectionable as was the original scheme, 
and evident as it was that Congress had changed their 
opinion as to its policy, when the convention was sub- 
mitted for ratification, it was discovered that Dr. Frank- 
lin had disregarded his special instructions to conform 
himself to the matter thereof in all respects, and had 
allowed Mons. de Rayneval, the French negotiator, to 
make sundry and important changes in the scheme, — 
all of which tended rather to exaggerate than diminish 
its original imperfections. The convention as signed 
was referred to Mr. Jay for a report, and an analysis 
of that report is the best statement of the faults of the 
original scheme, and its objectionable modifications in 
the hands of the American minister. Both conven- 
tions conferred upon consuls, their retinues, and houses, 
almost ambassadorial privileges, gave them such exten- 
sive judicial powers in relation to all disputes between 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 87 

individuals of the respective nations as to create an 
independent tribunal in many cases which good poUcy 
required should be settled by the national courts, and 
in fact organized a quasi diplomatic surveillance over 
the whole country. They were also wanting in recip- 
rocity in one important particular, inasmuch as while 
consuls were admitted into all the ports of the United 
States from France, provision was made for their 
admission only into the French continental ports from 
the United States. 

Mr. Jay first stated his objections to an error in the 
style of the preamble in reference to the United States. 
The error was a singular one, and the objection not 
insignificant. Instead of the United States of America, 
the style applied to the Republic was, " The Thirteen 
United States of North America." Mr. Jay's objection 
was, " the style of the Confederacy being ' The United 
States of America.' The scheme and the convention 
are both erroneous, so far as they both add the word 
' North.' But the title of the convention departs essen- 
tially from that of the scheme, inasmuch as it fimits the 
compact to thirteen United States of America, and con- 
sequently excludes from it all such other States as 
might, before the ratification of it, or in future, be cre- 
ated by, or become parties to, the Confederacy." It 
would be interesting to know whether the alteration 
was suggested by the French negotiator, and for what 
reason Dr. Frankfin consented to the change. Placing 
the variations of the scheme and the convention in Ions: 

4 



38 DIPLOMATIC IIISTOIIY. 

and careful comparison, Mr. Jay summed up his objec- 
tions to their principle in the following brief and forci- 
ble statement. 

" The convention appears well calculated to answer 
several purposes ; but the most important of them are 
such as America has no interest in promoting. They 
are three : — 

" 1. To provide against infractions of the French and 
American laws of trade. 

" 2. To prevent the people of one country from emi- 
grating to the other. 

" 3. To establish in each other's country an influential 
corps of officers, under one chief, to promote mercantile 
and political views. 

" The first of these objects is clearly evinced by the 
tenth article. 

" The second of these objects, though less explicitly, 
is still sufficiently, evinced from the fourteenth article. 

" The third of these objects, as it respects mercantile 
views, is apparent from the general tenor of the con- 
vention ; and it appears plain to your Secretary, that a 
minister near Congress, consuls so placed as to include 
every part of the country in one consulate or the other, 
vice-consuls in the principal cities and agents in the 
less important ones, constitute a corps so coherent, so 
capable of acting jointly and secretly, and so ready to 
obey the orders of their chief, that it cannot fail of 
being influential in two very important political re- 
spects : first, in acquiring and communicating intelli- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 39 

gence; and secondly, in acquiring and impressing such 
advices, sentiments, and opinions of men and measures 
as it may be deemed expedient to diffuse and encour- 
age. These being the three great purposes whicli the 
convention is calculated to answer, the next question 
which naturally occurs is, whether the United States 
have any such purposes to answer by establishing such 
a corps in France. As to the first, we have no laws 
for the regulation of our commerce with France or any 
of her dominions ; and, consecjuently, we want no pro- 
visions or guards against the infraction of such laws. 
As to the second, we have not the most distant reason 
to apprehend or fear that our people will leave us to 
migrate either to the kingdom of France or to any of 
its territories ; and, consequently, every restriction or 
guard against it must be superfluous and useless. As 
to the third, France being a country in whose govern- 
ment the people do not participate, where nothing can 
be printed without previous license, or said without 
being known, and, if disliked, followed with inconven- 
iencies, such a corps would there be very inefficient 
for political purposes. Where the people are perfectly 
unimportant, every measure to influence their opinions 
must be equally so. For political purposes, therefore, 
we do not want any such corps in France. As to 
assisting our merchants, and such other matters as 
properly belong to consuls, they would answer all those 
purposes just as well without these extraordinary powers 
as with them." 



40 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

To comprehend the force of the second objection in 
this report, it must be borne in mind, that both scheme 
and convention conferred upon consuls the right to 
arrest, not only deserters of the crew, but the captain, 
officers, and passengers, of any ship of the one nation 
arriving in the ports of the other. But the convention, 
in one of its articles, added to the scheme the follow- 
ing provision : " They who shall prove they belong to 
the body of their respective nations by the certificate 
of the consuls or vice-consuls of the district, mention- 
ing their names, surnames, and places of their settle- 
ment as inscribed on the registers of the consulate, 
shall not lose, for any cause ivhatever, in the respective 
States and domains, the quality of subjects of the 
country of which they originally were." Comparing the 
two clauses, and considering the plenary power of the 
French crown as to its emigration laws, Mr. Jay cor- 
rectly argued, that the King had only to require every 
French passenger in a French ship to register himself 
on his arrival at the consulate, and he would then be 
for ever incapacitated for naturalization, while the 
power of arrest in the hands of the consul would be 
the means of enforcing this regulation or punishing its 
infraction, — a right, which, he contended, went far 
beyond the provision of the treaty of 1778, on which 
it was expressly based. 

The report concluded with the following recommen- 
dation : " Although the true policy of America does 
not require, but on the contrary militates against, such 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 41 

conventions ; and although your Secretary is of opinion 
that the convention as it now stands ought not to be 
ratified, yet as Congress have proceeded so far in the 
present instance, he thinks that instructions should be 
sent to their minister at Versailles to state the objec- 
tions to the present form, and to assure the King of the 
readiness of Congress to ratify a convention made 
agreeable to the scheme before mentioned, provided 
an article be added to limit its duration to eight or ten 
years, in order that practice and experience may enable 
them to judge more accurately of its merits than can 
ever be done of mere theoretical establishments, how- 
ever apparently expedient." 

This advice was followed, and one of the last acts of 
Mr, Jefferson's mission was to sign this convention with 
the modifications and limitations required. It is much 
to be regretted that Congress did not take advantage of 
the variations between the scheme and the convention 
as negotiated by Dr. Franklin, to change the whole 
basis of their consular arrangement with France. For 
the scheme itself was little better than the convention, 
and they would have been exercising only a recognized 
right in insisting upon a renewal of negotiation on an 
altered basis. As it was, the practical working of the 
convention during Washington's administration afford- 
ed ample proof of the wisdom and practical foresight 
of Mr. Jay's objections. 

/^ This convention was in perfect keeping with the 
spirit of the old French diplomacy, and serves as a fair 
4* 



42 DIPLOMATIC HISTOEY. 

illustration of the light in which France regarded the 
American alliance. Firm and generous in its support 
of the United States, liberal in its commercial arrange- 
ments, and forbearing in its claims upon the treasury of 
the young Republic, the government of France never- 
theless manifested a constant desire to exercise a pro- 
tectorate, as it were, over the country. The principle of 
French diplomacy in Europe had been to maintain the 
closest and kindest relations with the secondary powers, 
asking and obtaining in return that degree of influence 
which enabled her to combine them against any rival 
power. Influence with Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
smaller German States, was thus a principle with 
French statesmen, from Richelieu to Vergennes ; and 
they proposed to place the United States in a similar 
position, — to make them the means of French strength 
and influence in the colonial system, just as these States 
were in the continental. It was a perfectly fair policy, 
if the United States were indeed a second-rate power 
in a subordinate political system ; and it cannot cer- 
tainly be urged against the French statesmen of that 
day as a want of political sagacity, that they did so con- 
sider the United States. But it is one of the highest 
( and worthiest of the countless claims of the early Amer- 
ican statesmen upon the reverence of their countrymen, 
that they realized from the beginning the noblest of 
futures for their country, and laid the foundations of 
their poHcy so deep and broad that the fortunes of a 
continent rest secure upon its massive base. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 43 

The relations between the United States and Spain, 
during this period, were both uncertain and unpleasant. 
In 1785, Don Diego de Gardoqui arrived in the United 
States, commissioned as Charg^ d' Affaires from the 
Spanish court. The relations between the two coun- 
tries had never been cordial. They had, during the war, 
occasionally acted together, and maintained throughout 
its progress a continued diplomatic correspondence, 
which came to nothing ; for both parties anticipated 
the future consequences of independence of the Colo- 
nies, and were unwilling to make concessions, to which 
circumstances might give unforeseen importance ; be- 
sides which, there was open between them one question, 
at least, — the navigation of the Mississippi, — upon 
whicii they disagreed widely and hopelessly. Upon the 
establishment of their independence, the United States, 
as well as Spain, were anxious to settle this question. 
The increasing trade and emigration westwardly and 
south-westwardly were fast multiplying the causes and 
occasions of difficulty, and more than one serious mis- 
understanding between the western settlers and the 
Spanish authorities proved the necessity not only of a 
positive, but of a very prompt, settlement of all disputed 
points. Congress, therefore, in July, 1785, commis- 
sioned Mr. Jay to open negotiations with Gardoqui. 
As minister in Spain, Mr. Jay had gone over all this 
ground with Gardoqui, then as now the representative 
of Spain in the discussion ; and they, in fact, only re- 
sumed a former negotiation, the United States, in the 



44 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

mean time, having gained both in strength and consist- 
ency, and thus coming upon the old ground with 
greater advantages. 

Spain, on her part, claimed, — 1. The relinquishment 
by the United States of their claim to navigate the Mis- 
sissippi beyond their own boundary ; and 2. The accom- 
modation of the boundaries between the two countries 
to the claim of Spain on certain lands lying between 
the boundaries of Florida and the eastern bank of the 
Mississippi, which claim the United States had hitherto 
refused to admit. In exchange for these concessions, 
she offered a commercial treaty of singular liberality, 
and affording to the United States opportunities and 
advantages offered by no other maritime and colonial 
power ; and the Spanish Minister intimated, that if the 
first demand were complied with, the second might be 
easily modified to meet the territorial convenience of 
the United States. In short, the language of Spain 
was, " Give up the navigation of the Mississippi, and 
we will be friends ; even the stringency of my commer- 
cial system shall be relaxed in your favor, and none bet- 
ter than yourself know the value of my offer. Refuse, 
and we are enemies." Mr. Jay felt the full force of this 
reasoning. To refuse was, first, to forfeit the advan- 
tages of a commerce, the value of which could not be 
exaggerated ; and, secondly, to incur the risk of a war, 
and the certainty of the active political hostility of a 
power which could and would work the United States 
serious damage. For if the United States brouorht on 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 45 

a rupture with Spain, France was pledged to their ene- 
my. Ah-eady, and more than once, the French minis- 
ters to Congress had declared the position of the United 
States untenable ; and the family alliance was too close 
to permit arbitration on behalf of the United States, or 
neutrality in regard to Spain. Portugal, wnth whom 
the United States had manifested an early and steady 
desire to form an alliance, was under the influence of 
Spain ; and the Barbary Powers, who had given the 
young Republic great, anxiety, and with whom they 
were even then negotiating under the patronage of 
Spain, would need but the slightest encouragement 
from that power to break off all discussion, and renew 
with fiercer vigor their war of depredation, while Eng- 
land would gladly aid in the destruction of our commer- 
cial hopes, and purchase, even at a sacrifice, the transfer 
of those commercial advantages that Spain so liberally 
offered. Knowing all this, — believing that Spain was in 
earnest in her anxiety to conclude a negotiation, the 
progress of which only multiplied its difficulties, — think- 
ing that it would be at least twenty years before the 
navigation of the Mississippi would develop into an 
absolute national necessity, and feeling the utter impo- 
tence of the country for war, Mr. Jay endeavored to 
effect a compromise. He suggested, first, the relinquish- 
ment of the right for a hmited period, about twenty- 
five years : it was refused. Then he proposed to relin- 
quish the exercise of the right explicitly, retaining the 
right by implication. This too failed, after one or two 



46 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

attempts at the construction of a clause sufficiently 
subtle. Finally, Mr. Jay drafted a clause, in which all 
reference to the right was omitted, and the United 
States, for certain reasons therein stated, consented not 
to use . the river below their own boundaries. This 
clause would of course expire with the term of the 
treaty, and as the reasons alleged were temporary, the 
rights of the United States would then I'evive in undi- 
minished force. No settlement, however, would be ad- 
mitted by Spain short of an absolute relinquishment. 
But Mr. Jay had, when in Spain, put on record his 
opinion, that such an absolute relinquishment Avas im- 
possible, and that any treaty which included it was a 
declaration in advance of a future war ; and that opinion 
he still held ; and Congress itself neither could nor 
would consent to such an abandonment of the clearest 
and most important national rights. In the mean time, 
the collisions between the citizens and authorities of the 
two nations were becoming more frequent and more 
difficult of settlement. Congress, it is true, in good 
faith condemned every instance of individual invasion 
of Spanish rights, even where those rights were doubt- 
ful ; declaring, very justly, that as they were actually in 
negotiation upon the whole matter, it was but proper 
that the country should wait that decision, and abide it. 
But their power was not always equal to then* will ; and 
in April, 1787, Mr. Jay reported the alternative before 
the United States strongly and briefly. 

" Your Secretary is convinced that the United States 



DIPLOMATIC II ISTOKY. 47 

have good right to navigate the river from its source to 
and through its mouth ; and unless an accommodation 
should take place, that the dignity of the United States, 
and their duty to assert and maintain their rights, will 
render it proper for them to present a memorial and 
remonstrance to his Catholic Majesty, insisting on their 
right, complaining of its being violated, and demanding, 
in a temperate, inoffensive, but at the same time in a 
firm and decided manner, that his Majesty do cease in 
future to hinder their citizens from freely navigating the 
river through the part of its course in question. Your 
Secretary is further of opinion, that, in case of refusal, 
it will be proper for the United States then to declare 
war against Spain. There being no respectable middle 
way between peace and war, it will be expedient to 
prepare without delay for the one or the other ; for cir- 
cumstances which call for decision seem daily to accu- 
mulate. 

" If Congress conceive that a treaty with Spain on 
the terms proposed is eligible, the sooner such senti- 
ments are communicated to your Secretary, the better. 
If an idea of obtaining better terms should be enter- 
tained, the sooner the question can be decided, the bet- 
ter ; and for that purpose, your Secretary thinks it would 
be well either to place some other negotiator in his stead, 
or to associate one or more persons with him in the 
business. Any manner of conducting it most advan- 
tageous and most satisfactory to his country will always 
be the manner most pleasing and agreeable to him. 



48 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

" With respect to prescribing a line of conduct to our 
citizens on the banks of the river, your Secretary is 
embarrassed. If war is in expectation, then their ardor 
should not be discouraged nor their indignation dimin- 
ished ; but if a treaty is wished and contemplated, then 
those people should be so advised and so restrained as 
that their sentiments and conduct may, as much as pos- 
sible, be made to quadrate with the terms of articles of 
it. Your Secretary cannot forbear to express his solici- 
tude that this very important and consequential business 
may not be left in its present situation. The objects 
involved in it are of great magnitude, and effects must 
and will result from it, by which the prosperity of Amer- 
ica wiU be either greatly advanced or greatly retarded. 
He also takes the liberty of observing, that a treaty dis- 
agreeable to one half of the nation had better not be 
made, for it would be violated ; and that a war, disliked 
by the other half, would promise but little success, espe- 
cially under a government so greatly affected by popular 
opinion." 

Under these circumstances, the negotiations having 
been prolonged without approaching any satisfactory 
conclusion, public opinion began to be disturbed by 
rumors of intended cessions. Congress, therefore, took 
occasion, on motion of the delegates from North Caro- 
lina, stating the uneasiness produced by a report 
" that Congress are disposed to treat with Spain for the 
surrender of their claim to the navigation of the river 
Mississippi," to refer the matter to a committee, upon 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 49 

whose recommendation the following resolutions were 
adopted : — 

^'■Resolved^ That the said report not being founded in 
fact, the delegates be at liberty to communicate all such 
circumstances as may be necessary to contradict the 
same, and to remove misconceptions. 

^'■Resolved, That the free navigation of the river Mis- 
sissippi is a clear and essential right of the United 
States, and that the same ought to be considered and 
supported as such. 

'■'■Resolved, That no further progress be made in the 
negotiations with Spain by the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs ; but that the subject to which they relate be 
referred to the federal government, which is to assemble 
in March next." 

There were some minor subjects of disagi'eement be- 
tween the two countries ; complaint by citizens of the 
United States of crfltel and vmjust treatment in Havana ; 
and, on the part of Spain, of irregular invasion of her 
territory by adventurous individuals from the United 
States ; but they were subordinated to the general inter- 
ests of the main negotiation. On one subject, however, 
Congress took decided action, and, upon a report from 
Mr. Jay submitting the facts of the complaint, on the 
26th of August, 1788, thus — 

'■^Resolved, That the Secretary for the Department of 
Foreign Affairs be directed to transmit copies of the 
papers referred to in his said report, to the Charge d' Af- 
faires of the United States at Madrid, and to instruct 
5 



50 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

him to represent, to his Cathohc Majesty the inconven- 
iences which the States bordering on his dominions 
experience from the asylum afforded to fugitive negroes 
belonging to the citizens of the said States ; and that 
Congress have full confidence that orders will be given 
to his Governors to permit and facilitate their being 
apprehended and delivered to persons authorized to 
receive them, assuring his Majesty that the said States 
will observe the like conduct respecting all such negroes 
belonging to his subjects as may be found therein. 

^'-Resolved, That the said Secretary be also directed 
to communicate the said papers to the Encargado de 
Negocios of Spain, and to signify to him that his inter- 
position to obtain proper regulations to be made on the 
subject would be very agreeable to Congress." 

Ii is but justice, however, to Spain to state, that the 
Governor of East Florida had permitted the fugitives 
to be apprehended and put in keepffig of persons named 
by their masters, but declined to deliver them up, on 
the ground that Georgia, while under the British gov- 
ernment, had refused to observe a reciprocal conduct as 
to their capture and delivery. This subject, along with 
the others, passed into the hands of the new government. 

The treaty of 1783, with England, went no further 
than the recognition of the independence of the United 
States. The numerous and important questions "which 
their altered relations forced upon both governments 
were postponed to a more convenient season, and, as in 
most postponements, national interests were daily more 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 51 

entangled, and national sentiment more irritated. The 
commercial questions which sprang naturally from the 
recognition of American Independence were of the first 
importance to the people of the United States. As 
subjects of the Crown, they had, under the British sys- 
tem, enjoyed certain privileges and immunities, which 
had given the character and current to their commerce. 
As aliens, the navigation laws of England unsparingly 
cut them off from old immunities, closed the "West 
Indies, and imposed heavy and, to them, unwonted 
duties on their productions. The American statesmen 
were anxious that the commercial arrangements between 
the two countries should be adjusted on the freest basis. 
They wished the relation between the new Republic 
and their ancient sovereign to be stii g'eneris, and 
thought that their independence need not make them 
aliens. They argued, with great force, that the natural 
tendency of their commerce was towards England ; that 
the British West Indian Colonies depended upon them 
for cheap and prompt supplies ; that trade between the 
two countries, on equal and liberal terms, would soon 
efface the angry recollections of a seven years' war, and 
that the prosperity resulting from such a commerce 
would enable American debtors, in the pleasantest and 
speediest manner, to pay their English creditors, and 
thus remove a source of perpetual and bitter contro- 
versy. The English poUticians, on the other hand, 
maintained, with equal force, that such a relation was 
impossible ; that the United States became, as the nat- 



52 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ural consequence of their own act, a foreign power; 
that, even admitting the wisdom and expediency of 
such a liberal policy as was suggested, there was this 
insuperable difficulty in the way : England was bound 
by her commercial treaties with other nations to allow 
them any privileges granted to the most favored nations ; 
that these nations would insist upon a participation in 
any advantages afforded to what they would justly de- 
clare was the foreign nation of the United States ; and 
thus, any relaxation towards their ancient colonies 
would involve a complete revolution of their whole 
commercial system. Some of the leading English 
statesmen went further, and opposed the pohcy of any 
such misplaced liberality. Lord Sheffield may be con- 
sidered the head of this party ; and he argued, with great 
selfishness it may be, but certainly with great shrewd- 
ness : " Our impatience to pre-occupy the American mar- 
ket should perhaps be rather checked than encouraged. 
The same eagerness has been indulged by our rival 
nations. They have vied with each other in pouring 
their manufactures into America, and the country is 
already stocked, most probably overstocked, with Euro- 
pean commodities. It is experience alone that can 
demonstrate to the French or Dutch trader the fallacy 
of his eager hopes, and, that experience will operate 
every day in favor of the British merchant. He alone 
is able and willing to grant that liberal credit which 
must be extorted from his competitors by the rashness 
of their early ventures. They will soon discover that 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 53 

America has neither money nor sufficient produce to 
send in return, and cannot have for some time ; and not 
intending or being able to give credit, their funds will 
be exhausted, their agents will never return, and the iTiin 
of the first creditors will serve as a lasting warning to 
their countrymen. The solid power of supplying the 
wants of America, of receiving her produce, and of 
waiting her convenience, belongs almost exclusively to 
our own merchants. If we can abstain from mischiev- 
ous precipitation, we shall learn, to our great satisfac- 
tion, that the industry of Britain will encounter little 
competition in the American market. We shall observe 
with pleasure, that, among the maritime States, France, 
after all her efforts, will derive the smallest benefits from 
the commercial independence of America. She may 
exult in the dismemberment of the British Empire ; but 
if we are true to ourselves and to the wisdom of our 
ancestors, there is still life and vigor left to disappoint 
her hopes, and to control her ambition." 

Immediately after the negotiation of the preliminary 
Articles of Peace, there seems to have been some anxi- 
ety on the part of England, as to the retention of the 
commerce of the United States. The administration 
of Lord Slu'lburne did in fact introduce an American 
Intercourse Bill, which was ably argued by Mr. Pitt in 
the House of Commons, and certainly exhibited in its 
provisions a wise and generous liberality. It was, how- 
ever, Warmly opposed, especially by Mr. Eden, who was 
the negotiator of the Commercial Treaty with France; 
5* 



54 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

and although supported by Mr. Burke, it was opposed by 
Mr. Fox. Lord Shelburne's administration was over- 
turned by the vote of censui'e passed by the House of 
Commons on his treaty of peace with the United States ; 
and he was succeeded by the Duke of Portland, as the 
head of the famous coalition ministry of Lord North 
and Mr. Fox. One of Mr. Fox's earliest proceedings 
was to move the postponement of this bill ; and he soon 
after substituted another, simply repealing certain com- 
mercial forms which were attached to the old colonial 
navigation, and which were useless and improper in re- 
lation to the commerce of an independent nation. In 
doing so, Mr. Fox declared his intention of making the 
commercial relations between the two countries a sub- 
ject of large and liberal negotiation ; but that negotia- 
tion never came to any result, and after a useless delay, 
the preliminary articles were converted into the defi- 
nitive treaty of peace with the United States. Circum- 
stances unfortunately proved the correctness of Lord 
Sheffield's prophecy. It became the general opinion in 
England, that a treaty with the American States was 
unnecessary and impolitic ; that the English merchants 
would have as much of the American trade as they 
ought to wish for ; that no sacrifices of navigation or 
commercial regulations could avail to secure any greater 
advantage than they would otherwise have ; and that 
the dependence of the British West Indies, as repre- 
sented by American and West Indian advocates, was 
fallacious. In addition to this subject of difference. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 55 

large and perplexed enough to tax the highest ability of 
any negotiator, England, in direct violation of the pro- 
visions of the treaty, held on to the north-western posts, 
a wrong to which the United States could not submit 
with dignity, and yet which they had not the force to 
resist with success. It was in the midst of this very 
troubled state of affairs, that Mr. Adams arrived in 
London as Minister Plenipotentiary from the United 
States. 

His instructions were brief and simple. " You will, 
in a respectful but firm manner, insist that the United 
States be put, without further delay, in possession of all 
the posts and territories within their limits, which are 
now held by British garrisons, and you will take the 
earliest opportunity of transmitting the answer you may 
receive to this requisition. 

" You will remonstrate against the infraction of the 
treaty of peace by the exportation of negroes and other 
American property, contrary to the stipulations on that 
subject in the seventh article of it. Upon this head, 
you will be suppUed with various authentic papers and 
documents, particularly the correspondence between 
Gen. Washington and others on the one part, and Sir 
Guy Carleton on the other. You will represent to the 
British ministry the strong and necessaiy tendency of 
their restrictions on our trade to incapacitate our mer- 
chants, in a certain degree, to make remittances to 
theirs. 

" You will represent in strong terms the losses which 



56 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

many of our and also of their merchants will sustain, 
if the former be unreasonably and immediately pressed 
for the payment of debts contracted before the war. On 
this subject, you will be furnished with papers in which 
it is amply discussed." 

On the 1st of June, 1785, Mr. Adams had his first 
audience of the King. And surrounded as his duty was 
with difficulties, surely as he must have anticipated the 
failure of all negotiation on the subjects which he was 
commissioned to discuss, yet to no man has the retribu- 
tive justice of history offered an hour of prouder life 
than that in which, as the recognized representative of 
the United States of America, he placed in the hands of 
his ancient sovereign the credentials of his honorable 
trust. In his person, no unworthy example of the vig- 
orous and refined manhood which at that day charac- 
terized the statesmen of America, — in his fame, iden- 
tified with every great event of his country's progress, 
from the Congress which declared, to the treaty which 
recognized, independence, — well might he be, as he de- 
scribes himself, the focus of all eyes as he stood in the 
royal antechamber, full of ministers of state and bish- 
ops and ambassadors. 

When Mr. Adams was introduced into the King's 
closet, he thus addressed His Majesty: — 

" Sir : The United States of America have appointed 
me their Minister Plenipotentiary to your Majesty, and 
have directed me to deliver to your Majesty this letter, 
which contains the evidence of it. It is in obedience 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 57 

to their express commands that I have the honor to as- 
sm-e your Majesty of their unanimous disposition and 
desire to cultivate the most friendly and liberal inter- 
course between your Majesty's subjects and their citi- 
zens, and of their best wishes for your Majesty's health 
and happiness, and that of your royal family. The ap- 
pointment of a minister from the United States to your 
Majesty's court w^ill form an epoch in the history of 
England and of America. I think myself more fortu- 
nate than all my fellow-citizens, in having the distin- 
guished honor to be the first to stand in your Majesty's 
royal presence in a diplomatic character ; and I shall es- 
teem myself the happiest of men, if I can be instru- 
mental in recommending my country more and more to 
your Majesty's royal benevolence, and of restoring an 
entire esteem, confidence, and affection, or, in better 
words, the old good-nature and the old good-humor 
between people, who, though separated by an ocean and 
mider different governments, have the same language, a 
similar religion, and kindred blood. 

" I beg your Majesty's permission to add, that although 
I have some time before been intrusted by my country, 
it was never in my life in a manner so agi'eeable to 
myself." 

" The King," says Mr. Adams, " listened to every word 
I said with dignity, but with an apparent emotion. 
Whether it was the nature of the interview, or Mdiether 
it was my visible agitation, — for I felt more than I did 
or could express, — that touched him, I cannot say ; but 



58 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

he was much affected, and answered me with more tre- 
mor than I had spoken with, and said : — 

" ' Sir : The circumstances of this audience are so 
extraordinary, the language you have now held is so 
extremely proper, and the feehngs you have discovered 
so justly adapted to the occasion, that I must say that 
I not only receive with pleasure the assurance of the 
friendly dispositions of the United States, but that I 
am very glad the choice has fallen upon you to be their 
minister. I wish you, sir, to believe, and that it may be 
understood in America, that I have done nothing in the 
late contest but what I thought myself indispensably 
bound to do, by the duty which I owed to my peojile. I 
will be very frank with you. I was the last to consent 
to the separation ; but the separation having been made, 
and having become inevitable, I have always said, as I 
say now, that I would be the first to meet the friendship 
of the United States as an independent power. The 
moment I see such sentiments and language as yours 
prevail, and a disposition to give this country the pref- 
erence, that moment I shall say, let the circumstances 
of language, religion, and blood have their natural and 
full effect.' " 

Notwithstanding this happy inauguration of his mis- 
sion, Mr. Adams soon discovered the utter hopelessness 
of carrying his purposes. His despatches were but con- 
stant complaint and sorrowful acknowledgment that cir- 
cumstances were too strong for him. It is clear, from 
the correspondence between ]Mi\ Jay and himself, — 



DIPLOMATIC IIISTOKY. 59 

1. That behveen the treaty of 1783 and his arrival 
in 1785, Lord Sheffield's views had become almost uni- 
versal. The Marquis of Lansdowne, in whom alone 
Mr. Adams saw any liope, was out of power, and not 
likely to return ; while neither among the people, nor the 
various political parties, was there manifest the slightest 
desire to liberalize their national policy. 

2. The commerce of the United States had literally 
fulfilled the prophecy of its enemies, and had run towards 
England with a current too strong to be turned by home 
legislation, and regardless of British restriction. And 
thus England was already in full enjoyment of almost 
all which she could have obtained by the most concil- 
iatory policy. 

3. The right of each State to govern and regulate its 
own commerce, and the rivalry of their various inter- 
ests, rendered it impossible to resort to any uniform and 
consistent system of retaliation, by which alone Eng- 
land could be brought to negotiation. The result of 
Mr. Adams's labors might be summed up in a few des- 
ultory and inconsequential conversations with the Brit- 
ish minister ; for the question of the posts was as hope- 
less as a more liberal arrangement of their commercial 
regulations. In the first place, England had the power, 
and in the next, she pretended a right. The British 
minister declared that the United States had broken the 
treaty, by putting obstacles in the way of the recovery 
of English debts ; and they found, in the independent 
legislation of so many States, some laws which afforded 



60 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

a plausible ground for argument. They therefore dis- 
tinctly signified their intention to hold on to the posts, 
until the legislation of which they complained was re- 
pealed. There was, of course, but one alternative, if the 
issue was directly made, to resist or to submit. The 
first was impossible ; for Mr. Jay's language, applied to 
the state of affairs between Spain and the United States, 
was still more painfully true in reference to Great 
Britain. " Unblessed with an efficient government, des- 
titute of funds, and without public credit either at home 
or abroad, we should be obliged to wait in patience for 
better days, or plunge into an unpopular and dangerous 
war, with very little prospect of terminating it by a 
peace either advantageous or glorious." To submit was 
equally impossible ; and Mr. Adams was therefore in- 
structed by Congress to protract the discussions, and 
thus avoid a categorical answer, which would have 
forced upon the United States a profitless issue. Hav- 
ing demonstrated the uselessness of his mission, Mr. 
Adams was recalled at his own request. The British 
government had never reciprocated the courtesy of the 
United States in sending an ambassador, but had con- 
tented itself with appointing Mr. Temple consul-gen- 
eral at New York, an appointment which Congress 
sanctioned in a spirit of very ill-judged liberality. The 
negotiations between the two countries were therefore 
ended, and as the Federal Constitution was about to go 
into operation, Congress suffered the foreign affairs of 
the country to wait in patience for those better days. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 61 

Mr. Adams concluded his mission early in 1788, and 
with it he closed his diplomatic life. As a diplomatist, 
he was second to none. He possessed neither the facil- 
ity of Franklin, nor the singular impartiality of Jay; 
but he was wider and bolder in his views than either. 
His appreciation of political events took in a broader 
scope, and was sustained by a profounder and ampler 
study of political history. His temper was not concili- 
ating, for his intellect was too active and impetuous to 
wait upon other men's doubts. From the outset of the 
Revolution, he realized, more vividly than perhaps any 
other public man, the full force and value of that great 
event. If he erred, it was because he insisted too stren- 
uously upon the immediate recognition by others of that 
consequence which he foresaw must attach to the polit- 
ical position of the United States. In his despatches 
will be found more than one anticipation of political 
consequences which his country is only now developing 
in the fulness of its strength and prosperity; and the 
American historian would be unfit for his task who 
could censure, with unsympathizing criticism, the impa- 
tience of an enthusiasm so patriotic in its zeal, and so 
far-seeing in its hopes. The treaty with Holland, which 
w^as his own peculiar work, and of critical importance 
at the time of its signature, could have been negotiated 
only by one who knew how to inspire others with his 
own confidence in his country's future. His thorough 
knowledge of the riiijhts and interests of the colonies 

gave his services incalculable importance in the peace 

6 



62 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

negotiations with Great Britain ; and his mission to 
England was all that under the circumstances it could 
be, — a strong and dignified protest against the wilful- 
ness of a short-sighted and selfish policy. Since the 
day on which, in St. James's Palace, he was presented to 
the King, a long line of worthy successors, in that same 
palace, surrounded by the same royal pomp and circum- 
stance, have from time to time renewed and maintained 
the bonds of national intercourse, and each new minis- 
ter has represented a vaster, richer, greater nation. But 
with all our increase, we have added to the national 
possession no nobler spirit, no truer patriot, no higher 
gentleman, than he who purchased his honors neither by 
popular lip service nor party jugglery, but who, literally, 
by journeyings often, in perils in the city, in perils in 
the sea, in perils among false brethren, in weariness and 
painfulness, earned the proud privilege of being named, 
by a grateful senate, the first Minister of the United 
States to the court of England. 

This necessarily brief review of the diplomatic trans- 
actions of the years intervening between the treaty of 
peace of 1783 and the institution of the constitutional 
government in 1789, shows the difficulties which the 
new government had to encounter at the outset of its 
administration of the foreign affairs of the country. 
The object of the following pages will be to trace the 
policy of that government in dealing with the troubles 
it inherited, and to follow the progress of its negotia- 
tions to their successful conclusion. 



CHAPTER II. 

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH ENGLAND. 

On the 30th of April, 1789, George Washington was 
solemnly inaugurated as first President of the United 
States of America. After taking the oath of office, he 
addressed the two houses of Congress in the senate 
chamber. And with an " aspect grave almost to sad- 
ness, his modesty actually shaking, his A^oice deep, a lit- 
tle tremulous, and so low as to call for close attention," 
he declared, in language which finds its fullest and fit- 
test application in the history of his own administration, 
that " there is no truth more thoroughly established, than 
that there exists, in the economy and course of nature, 
an indispensable union between virtue and happiness, 
between duty and advantage, between the genuine max- 
ims of an honest and magnanimous policy and the 
solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity." * 

In the construction of the cabinet, which immediately 
followed the inauguration, the secretaryship for Foreign 
Affairs was conferred upon Thomas Jefierson, of Vir- 

* Life aud Works of Fisher Ames, Vol. I. p. 34. 



64 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ginia. Mr. Jefferson had been Governor of Virginia, a 
distinguished and useful member of the Continental 
Congress, and had achieved in that body a lasting and 
historical reputation by the authorship of the famous 
Declaration of Independence. He had taken no part in 
the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention; and 
although at that time not properly to be ranked among 
either the advocates or the opponents of the constitu- 
tion, he looked upon that instrument rather as an experi- 
ment than an achievement. At the time of his appoint- 
ment, he was Minister Plenipotentiaiy of the United 
States at Paris, but on leave of absence from his mission. 
When Mr. Jefferson left Paris, in September, 1789, 
the French Revolution had commenced. He had heard 
the cannon proclaim the fall of the Bastile, and seen 
the ferocious crowd which tore Foulon from the pro- 
tecting arms of Lafayette, and butchered Savigny under 
the windows of the Hotel de Ville. He had seen the 
fleur-de-lis, which had floated in brave and noble com- 
panionship with his national flag over the historic fields 
of the Revolution, sink, stained with the blood of its 
faithful guardians, before the tricolor, and had heard 
Lafayette predict that it would make the tour of the 
world. The King of France, towards the power and 
glory of whose crown he had looked earnestly in the 
darkest hours of his country's fate, longing to see its 
splendor rise sunlike over the broad Atlantic, bringing 
healing on its wings, — that royal friend he had seen 
broken and humiliated, surrounded, to use his own de- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 65 

scription, with a fierce crowd of sixty thousand citizens, 
of all forms and colors, armed with the muskets of the 
Bastille and the Invalides, as far as they would go, the 
rest with pistols, swords, pikes, pruning-hooks, scythes, 
etc., and while the tumultuous shout of " Vive la Na- 
tion" hailed the States- General who accompanied him, 
" not a single ' Vive le Roi ' was heard." He had seen 
Baily attach the tricolor cockade to the King's hat, 
and thus witnessed, in his own words, the conclusion of 
" such an amende honorable as no sovereign ever made, 
and no people ever received." 

IVIr. Jefferson looked upon these disturbances, however 
unfortunate, as natural, but temporary. He had gi'eat 
confidence in the character and ability of the popular 
leaders of the States- General. With many of them he 
was in the habit of confidential consultation, and by all 
of them he was treated with great respect, while his 
views and theories, both of the American Revolution 
and of government, found among them general accept- 
ance and sympathy. Mr. Jefferson, therefore, left 
France, deeply and favorably interested in the Revolu- 
tion, which, just before his departure, had been, as it 
were, constitutionally inaugurated by the vote which 
declared the permanence of the Assembly. It was nat- 
ural that it should be so. As a speculative politician, 
Mr. Jefferson belonged, more nearly than any other of 
the great American statesmen, to that school in which 
the best of the French reformers were devoted disciples. 
He was, like them, not so much a revolutionary states- 
6* 



66 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

man as a social reformer. Born and bred in Virginia, 
where social distinctions were wider and stronger than 
in any other of the colonies, where the great colonial 
proprietors formed, in fact, a landed aristocracy, and 
where the institution of slavery gave even an intenser 
character to their aristocratic privileges, Mr. Jefl'erson 
had, early in life, placed himself in direct opposition to 
the social system into which he was born. The primo- 
geniture law, the established church, the institution of 
slavery, he attacked early and continuously. When he 
entered Congress, he gave, by the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, a very much broader and more radical char- 
acter to the grounds of difference between the mother 
country and the colonies than had yet been avowed. 
For with regard to the leaders of the American Revolu- 
tion, it has been said with great force and truth : " What 
we find in their speeches, what we read in the writings 
of those days, has much about birthright and inheri- 
tance, charters and the privileges of English born sub- 
jects, and very little about the rights of man. . . . They 
had gone but a short way into those philosophical ideas 
which characterized the subsequent and real revolution 
in France. The great State papers of American liberty 
are all predicated on the abuse of chartered, not abso- 
lute, rights."* These opinions Mr. Jeflerson carried with 

* Gibbs, Administration of Washington and Adams, Vol. I. p. 2, 
3. In (^oting this work, while I cheerfully admit the greaf value of 
its original matter for the purposes of historical illustration, while I 
sympathize with much of its enthusiastic regard for the leaders of 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 67 

him into the Department of State. In the unexpected 
contingencies of national politics, it happened that these 

the old federal pai'ties, and admire the spirit and ability displayed in 
its conij)Osition, I cannot too strongly deplore and condemn its whole 
tone and temper. It is written, not in the calm and conscientious 
spirit of history, but with all the violent animosity of perverted party 
feeling. The small, personal jealousies, the idle and malignant gossip, 
the discredited and discreditable scandal, which are always rife in 
times of great party excitement, are not only reproduced, — that 
might be justified, as necessary for the illustration of the sentiment 
and opinions of the day, — but made ground for grave historical ref- 
erence and induction. Now, to say the least, it is very unphilosophi- 
cal to assume, that, at any period of political strife, all the wisdom and 
the worth belong to one party. Imperfect as is human nature, and 
complicated as are the motives of human action, not every difference 
of oi)iMion, even where we feel assured that our own judgment is 
right, not every weakness or inconsistency, or even selfishness of pub- 
lic conduct, although repugnant to our moral sense, is ground suffi- 
cient for harsh condemnation. But if ever there was a time when 
men might have differed, not only honestly, but hotly, when every 
allowance ought to be made for misconceptions of each other's mo- 
tives, and misunderstandings of each other's characters, it was during 
the early years of our national life. A new government, a vast 
country, unsettled interests, wide spread privation and unreasonable 
hopes, ambition in high places, restlessness everywhere, and great 
political diflSculties both at home and abroad, — surely, all these ele- 
ments must have combined in a public life, which requires for its 
proper appreciation, not only wise and stern judgment, but* that gen- 
tler and better teacher, the chanty which believeth no evil, and 
which hopeth all things. That the men of the day misjudged them- 
selves and their contemporaries, and that they spoke bitterly one of 
another, is natural enough, for they were mortal. But if that great 



68 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

opinions, and the personal sympathies perhaps conse- 
quent upon them, did not permit him cordially to ap- 
prove the policy of the cabinet in which he was chief, 
and did finally induce his resignation. But he certainly 
never compromised his character as Secretary of State 
by their expression, and the views of the government, 
in their full integrity, were announced, enforced, and 
supported by him with a strength of logic, an elevation 
of sentiment, and an elegance of style, which have 
made his State papers memorable illustrations of the 
national mind. 

The questions which demanded the attention of his 
department have already been indicated ; but some time 
necessarily elapsed before the new government was 
ready for active negotiation ; and it was not, in fact, 
until 1791, that the diplomatic system of the country 
was organized by the a]"»])ointment of Thomas Pinck- 
ney, of South Carolina, to London, Gouverneur Morris, 
of New York, to Paris, and Wilham Short, of Mary- 
land, to the Hague, Colonel David Humphreys, of Con- 
necticut, having been previously nominated Minister Res- 
band of worthies has been reunited in a higher sphere, looking back, 
perhaps with joy, perJiaps with sorrow, but certainly with profound 
humility, upon their best acliievements, how little would they desire 
that we should, in a spirit of unwise and exaggerated partisanship, 
expose their weaknesses, repeat their misunderstandings, and coun- 
teract, as much as in us lies, the sacred work of time. What they 
did, they did all together; the humblest of them doing much 
that we should imitate, the highest of them much that we should 
avoid. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 69 

ident at Lisbon, and Mr. Carmichael remaining, nnder 
his old commission, Chargd d'AlTaires at Madrid. When 
Mr. Jefferson entered upon his official duties, the inter- 
ests of the country required innnediate negotiation with 
Spain and England. But while the negotiations with 
Spain pursued their distinct course to their consumma- 
tion by treaty, in 1795, the relations between the United 
States and England became so comphcated with the 
relations of both to France, as to render the negotiations 
with these courts to a great degree dependent on each 
other. This complication found its solution in Mr. Jay's 
treaty of 1794 ; but to comprehend thoroughly the bear- 
ing of this treaty, it will be necessary to follow sepa- 
rately the parallel hues of the French and English nego- 
tiations, until they converge into this central and critical 
transaction of our diplomatic history. 

By the treaty of 1783, between Great Britain and 
the United States, it had been agreed, that creditors on 
either side should meet with no lawful impediment to 
the recovery of the full value, in sterling money, of all 
bond fide debts heretofore contracted ; that Congress 
should earnestly recommend to the legislatures of the 
respective States restitution of all confiscated estates, 
and the adoption of such conciUatory legislation as 
would effectually carry out the prior provision of the 
treaty ; and that his Britannic Majesty should, with all 
convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, 
or carrying away any negroes or other property of the 
American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garri- 



70 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

sons, and fleets from the United States, and from any 
port, place, and harbor within the same. These pro- 
visions, it was mutually alleged, had not been executed 
on either side. When Mr. Adams, after failing in his 
effort to settle these difficulties, had returned from his 
mission, the British government, as has been stated, 
contemptuously neglected the courtesy of reciprocating 
a di])lomatic representation, and the complaints of the 
two countries were thus aggi'avated by the impossibil- 
ity of all explanation. The retention of the posts by 
the British, wounded the national honor, while their 
commercial restrictions sensibly affected the national 
interests. Feeling the urgent necessity for some action, 
and prevented by the discourtesy of Great Britain from 
any direct approach, the government resolved to open 
an informal communication with the British court. 
For this purpose, Washington authorized Gouverneur 
Morris, at that time in London on private business, to 
ascertain, if possible, the intentions of Great Britain. 
In view of the final treaty, the instructions of Washing- 
ton are specially important, as indicating what were, at 
the outset, the objects of any negotiation on the part of 
the United States. Mr. Jefferson not having yet as- 
sumed his functions. General Washington himself 
addressed Mr. Morris: — 

" Your inquiries will commence by observing, that as 
the present constitution of government, and the courts 
established in pursuance of it, remove the objections 
hitherto made to putting the United States in posses- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 71 

sion of their frontier posts, it is natural to expect, from 
the assurances of his Majesty, and the national good 
faith, that no unnecessary delays will take place. Pro- 
ceed, then, to press a speedy performance of the treaty 
respecting that object. 

" Remind them of the article by which it was agreed, 
that negroes belonging to our citizens should not be 
carried away ; and of the reasonableness of making 
compensation for them. Learn, with precision, if pos- 
sible, what they mean to do on this head. 

" The commerce between the two countries you well 
understand. You are apprised of the sentiments and 
feelings of the United States on the present state of it ; 
and you doubtless have heard, that, in the late session of 
Congress, a very respectable number of both houses 
were inclined to a discrimination of duties unfavorable 
to Britain, and that it would have taken place but for 
conciliatory considerations, and the probability that the 
late change in our government and circumstances would 
lead to more satisfactory arrangements. 

" Request to be informed, therefore, whether they 
contemplate a treaty of commerce with the United 
States, and on what principles or terms in general. In 
treating this subject, let it be strongly impressed on your 
mind, that the privilege of carrying our productions in 
our vessels to their islands, and bringing in return the 
productions of those islands into our own ports and mar- 
kets, is regarded here of the highest importance, and 
you will be careful not to countenance any idea of our 



72 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

dispensing with it in a treaty. Ascertain, if possible, 
their views on this point, for it would not be expedient 
to commence negotiations without previously having 
good reasons to expect a satisfactory termination of 
them. 

" It may also be well for you to take a proper occa- 
sion for remarking, that their omitting to send a minister 
here, when the United States sent one to London, did 
not make an agreeable impression, and request to 
know what would be their future conduct on similar 
occasions." 

In virtue of this authority, , Mr. Morris had several 
interviews with the Duke of Leeds and Mr. Pitt. They 
resulted in nothing. " I have," said he, in writing to 
General Washington, " some reason to believe that the 
present administration intend to keep the posts, and 
withhold payment for the negroes. If so, they will 
color their breach of faith by the best pretexts in their 
power. I incline to think, also, that they consider a 
treaty of commerce with America as being absolutely 
unnecessary, and that they are persuaded they shall 
derive all the benefit from our trade without the treaty. 
It is true, we might lay them under restriction in our 
ports ; but they believe that an attempt of that sort would 
be considered by one part of America as calculated by 
the other for private emolument, and not for the general 
good. The merchants here look on it as almost impos- 
sible for us to do without them ; and it must be 
acknowledged, that past experience and the present situ- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 73 

ation of neighboring countries go far to justify that 
opinion. Whether the ministers shall act according to 
their own ideas, or consult mercantile people, they will 
equally, I think, repel advances from us, and therefore it 
seems more prudent to lay the foundations of future 
advantage, than attempt to grasp at present benefit." 

And the whole negotiation was thoroughly and briefly 
summed up by the President in the message which ac- 
companied the despatches sent to the Senate. 

" The sum is, that they declare without scruple they 
do not mean to fulfil what remains of the Treaty of 
Peace to be fulfilled on their part, (by which we are to 
understand the delivery of the posts and payment for 
property carried off,) till performance on our part, and 
compensation where the delay has rendered the perform- 
ance now impracticable ; that on the subject of a treaty 
of commerce, they avoided direct answers, so as to sat- 
isfy Mr. Morris they did not mean to enter into one, 
unless it could be extended to a treaty of alliance offen- 
sive and defensive, or unless in the event of a ruptm-e 
with Spain. As to sending a minister here, they made 
excuses at the first conferences, seemed disposed to it in 
the second, and in the last, express an intention of so 
doing." 

Nothing could be clearer, and nothing more embar- 
rassing. Conscious of w^eakness, and irritated at the 
injustice which it could not resist, is it w^onderful that 
the public opinion of the country should have become 

extravagant in its antagonism to England, or that the 

7 



74 DIPLOMATIC HISTOllY. 

system of restriction on English commerce should have 
found a stronger and more vehement support than its 
intrinsic merits justified ? Before, however, the govern- 
ment had determined upon a line of policy to meet the 
requirements of the position, Great Britain had so far 
opened the door for an arrangement, as to send an ac- 
credited minister to Philadelphia. And, in 1791, Mr. 
Hammond, who had been secretary to Mr. Hartley's 
mission at Paris in 1783, and was, at the time of his 
appointment. Secretary of Legation at Madrid, arrived 
in this country as Minister Plenipotentiary. But before 
the opening of any discussion between the tsvo govern- 
ments, the presence of the British minister raised tAVO 
preliminary questions, which it was expedient to have 
answered. The first was, did he come authorized to 
conclude a treaty ; and the second, whether the British 
government were in good faith prepared to give up the 
posts, upon the fulfilment of what they claimed to be 
treaty obligations ; or were these difficulties made simply 
to supply a diplomatic excuse for the permanent reten- 
tion of these important military positions ? Mr. Jeffer- 
son therefore formally asked of Mr. Hammond the ex- 
tent of his powers ; and a short correspondence made it 
apparent that the British minister had not, to use his 
own language, any " special commission empowering 
him to conclude any definite arrangements upon the 
subject of the commercial intercourse between Great 
Britain and the United States," but that, under his gen- 
eral plenipotentiary powers, he felt fully " competent to 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 75 

enter into a negotiation with this government for that 
purpose, in the discussion of principles which may serve 
as a basis, and constitute the stipulations, of any such 
definite arrangements." Feehng very justly that a mere 
procrastinating discussion of abstract commercial prin- 
ciples would be idle ; satisfied that the American minis- 
ter at London could learn more directly and certainly 
the inclination of the British government on that head ; 
and indisposed, moreover, to mix up the clear questions 
of treaty obligations with the doubtful issues of com- 
mercial expediency, Mr. Jefferson wisely determined to 
limit his discussion with the British minister " to the 
measures which reason and practicability may dictate 
for giving effect to the stipulations of our treaties yet 
remaining to be executed." 

On the 15th of December, 1791, he addressed a letter 
to Mr. Hammond, containing a full, clear, and explicit 
statement of the claims of the United States govern- 
ment. 

" I have the honor to propose," said the letter, " that 
we shall begin by specifying, on each side, the particular 
acts which each considers to have been done by the 
other in contravention of the treaty. I shall set the 
example. 

" The provisional and definitive treaties in their seventh 
article stipulated, that ' His Britannic Majesty should 
with all convenient speed, and without causing any de- 
struction or carrying away any negroes or other property 
of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, 



76 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

garrisons, and fleets from the said United States, and 
from every port, place, and harbor within the same.' 

" But the British garrisons \^^ere not withdrawn with 
all convenient speed, nor have ever yet been withdrawn, 
from Michilimackinac, on Lake Michigan ; Detroit, on 
the straits of Lake Erie and Huron ; Fort Erie, on 
Lake Erie ; Niagara ; Oswego, on Lake Ontario ; 
Oswegatchie, on the River St. Lawrence ; Port-au-fer, 
and Dutchman's Point, on Lake Champlain. 

" 2. The British officers have undertaken to exercise 
a jurisdiction over the country and inhabitants in the 
vicinities of the forts. 

" 3. They have excluded the citizens of the United 
States from navigating even on our side of the middle 
line of the rivers and lakes, established as a boun- 
dary between the two nations. 

" By these proceedings, we have been intercepted 
entirely from the commerce of furs with the Indian 
nations to the northwards, a commerce which has ever 
been of great importance to the United States, not only 
for its intrinsic value, but as it was the means of cher- 
ishing peace with those Indians, and of superseding the 
necessity of that expensive warfare we have been 
obliged to carry on with them during the time that 
these posts have been in other hands. 

" On withdrawing the troops from New York, 1st, a 
large embarkation of negroes, the property of the inhab- 
itants of the United States, took place, before the com- 
missioners, on our part, for inspecting and superintend- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 77 

ing embarkations had arrived there, and without any 
account ever rendered thereof; 2nd, near three thou- 
sand others were publicly carried away by the avowed 
order of the British commanding officer, and under the 
view and against the remonstrances of our commis- 
sioners ; 3d, a very great number were carried ofl" in 
private vessels, if not by the express permission, yet 
certainly without opposition, on the part of the com- 
manding officer, who alone had the means of preventing 
it, and without admitting the inspection of the Ameri- 
can commissioners ; and, 4th, of other species of prop- 
erty carried away, the commanding officer permitted 
no examination at all. In support of these facts, I have 
the honor to inclose you documents, a list of which 
will be subjoined; and in addition to them, I beg leave 
to refer to a roll signed by the joint commissioners, and 
delivered to your commanding officer for transmission 
to his court, containing a description of the negroes 
publicly carried away by his order, as before mentioned, 
with a copy of which you have doubtless been furnished. 

" A difference of opinion, too, having arisen as to the 
river intended by the plenipotentiaries to be the boun- 
dary between us and the dominions of Great Britain, 
and by them called the St. Croix, which name it seems 
is given to two different rivers, the ascertaining of this 
point becomes a matter of present urgency ; it has here- 
tofore been the subject of application from us to the 
government of Great Britain. 

" There are other smaller matters between the two 
7* 



78 DIPLOMATIC HISTOEY. 

nations, which remain to be adjusted ; but I think it 
would be better to refer these, for settlement, through 
the ordinary channels of our ministers, than to embarrass 
the ])resent important discussions with them. They 
can never be obstacles to friendship and harmony. 

" Permit me now, sir, to ask from you a specification 
of the particular acts which, being considered by his 
Britannic Majesty as a non-compliance on our part 
with the engagements contained in the 4th and 5th 
articles of the treaty, induced him to suspend the exe- 
cution of the 7th, and render a separate discussion of 
them inadmissible." 

On the 5th of March, 1792, about three months after 
the receipt of this letter, a lapse of time which certainly 
indicated, on the part of the British minister, no such 
full and matured instruction as he would have neces- 
sarily possessed, had the complaints of his government 
been simple and sincere, Mr. Hammond addressed to 
Mr. Jefferson his reply. In this reply, after stating that 
its delay resulted from the necessity of collecting from 
distant parts of the continent the requisite materials, 
and of combining and arranging them, Mr. Hammond 
distinctly avowed, that the action of the British govern- 
ment in suspending the 7th article was justifiable and 
justified, on the ground of the irreparable injury which 
many classes of British subjects had sustained, and the 
heavy expense to which the British nation had been 
subjected, by the non-performance of their engagements 
on the part of the United States. In support of his 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 79 

position, he quoted the ti-eaty by which Congress bound 
itself to recommend the necessary legislation to the 
States ; the circular letters of Congress, urging such 
legislation upon the various States ; and the language 
of the old Congress, through their Secretary, Mr. Jay, 
by which they declared, " they had deliberately and 
dispassionately examined and considered the several 
facts and matters urged by Great Britain as infractions 
of the treaty of peace on the part of America ; and 
regret, that, in some of the States, too little attention 
appears to have been paid to the public faith, pledged 
by treaty." He then recited the continued interposition 
of Congress with the States, to induce them to con- 
form their legislation to their treaty engagements, and 
the continuous disregard of their obligations on the 
part of the States, — 

1. In not repealing laws that existed antecedently to 
the pacification. 

2. In enacting laws, subsequent to the peace, in con- 
travention of the treaty, such as related to the estates 
of the loyalists, such as respected their persons, and 
such as obstructed the recovery of debts due to subjects 
of the crown. 

3. In the decisions of the State courts upon ques- 
tions affecting the rights of British subjects, especially 
those decisions which refused to allow interest on debts 
contracted before the Revolution. 

And the reply was accompanied by a long list of the 
acts of the States, and the decisions of the State courts. 



80 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

in proof and illustration of each head of the complaint. 
Mr. Hammond did not reply to the charge of the ab- 
straction of the negroes and other property, nor to the 
alleged irregularities attendant upon the evacuation of 
the British armies. 

On May 29th, 1792, Mr. Jefferson furnished the British 
minister with his rejoinder, a voluminous and most 
elaborate state paper. In this document, Mr. Jeflerson 
met not only the broad questions open between the gov- 
ernments, but went into an able and minute review of 
the legislation and judicial decisions of every State, as 
quoted by Mr. Hammond. He proved that such asts 
as were complained of had followed and been provoked 
by the British infractions of the treaty, and that, consid- 
ered as acts of retaliation, which they were, they were 
" all of them so moderate, of so short duration, the re- 
sult of such necessities, and so produced, that we might 
with confidence have referred them alterius principis, quo 
boni viri, arbUrio" " That induced at length, by assur- 
ances from the British court that they would concur in 
a fulfilment of the treaty. Congress, in 1787, declared 
to the States its will that even the appearance of obsta- 
cle, raised by their acts, should no longer continue, and 
required a formal repeal of every act of that nature; 
and, to avoid question, required it as well from those 
who had not, as those who had, passed such acts,— which 
was complied with so fully that no such laws remained 
in any State of the Union, except one ; and even that 
one could not have forborne, if any symptom of com- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 81 

pliance from the opposite party had rendered a reiterated 
requisition from Congress important." He went on to 
argue, that even this repeal was unnecessary, as treaties 
were the supreme law of the land, overriding all incon- 
sistent legislation, and that the courts, both of the State 
and general government, had so decided ; — that British 
creditors had been for some time in the habit of having 
recourse to these courts with perfect success ; — that no 
external influence was brought to bear on either courts or 
creditors, and that, in fact, the class of separate and un- 
settled debts contracted before the war formed but a 
small portion of the original amount. He then exam- 
ined the question of the interest which had accumulated 
on the American debt during the war, and reviewed the 
decisions of the State courts, concluding " on the whole, 
without undertaking to say what the law is, which is 
not the province of the Executive, we say that the rea- 
sons of those judges who deny interest during the war 
appear sufficiently cogent to account for their opinion on 
honest principles, to exempt it from the charge of pal- 
pable and flagrant wrong, and to take away all pretence 
of withholding execution of the treaty by way of re- 
prisal for that cause." It is fortunately mmecessary to 
follow in detail this masterly argument, which was char- 
acterized by an extent and accuracy of legal knowledge, 
both international and local, worthy of a judicial decis- 
ion. For its great excellence consists in the strength, 
clearness, and elegance with which it brought out the 
two leading points of the American argument, and 



82 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

which, once settled, swept away the crowd of small and 
special issues with which Mr. Hammond had very in- 
geniously obscured the main points of the controversy. 
These were simple enough. The government of the 
United States, pointing to the seventh article of the 
treaty, said to England, " in violation of that article, 
you have not delivered up the posts, and you have car- 
ried away negroes." The British government answered, 
" Yes, we have not executed that article, we have not 
given up the posts, and we have carried away negroes, 
because you have not carried out in good faith the 
fourth and fifth articles of the treaty." To this, the con- 
clusive reply of the United States government was : — 

" 1. We have done all that we promised to do. By 
the explicit language of the treaty, the United States 
simply covenanted to recommend to the several States 
the legislation which you claim. And that the charac- 
ter of this recommendation was understood in all its 
possible and probable inefficiency, appears from the cor- 
respondence between the negotiators and the language 
of your own statesmen in the discussion upon its mer- 
its. Now that Congi'ess has recommended and labored 
earnestly to secure the adoption by the States of those 
recommendations, you yourself admit. What further, 
then, can you claim ? 

" 2. Granting that the United States, however, were 
bound to 'procure the passage in each State of this con- 
ciliatory legislation, how does the case stand? You 
covenant to deliver up the posts, — we agree to pass 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 83 

certain laws. The delivery of the posts is a matter sim- 
ple in its nature, requiring but little time and small 
preparation. The legislation you desire requires the 
action of thirteen independent States, scattered over a 
continent, and demanding time, temper, and tact in its 
attainment. You have never made the first movement 
towards the performance of your part of the contract, 
and your neglect has been the sti'ongest argument with 
the States against our recommendation. With what 
hope could we approach them to ask such legislation as 
would heal old wounds and restore kindness and confi- 
dence, while your troops are encamped on our territory 
in direct and insulting violation of your own promises ? 
If you had given up the posts, and we had then, in the 
process of a reasonable time, neglected what we were 
bound to perform, then, but not until then, could you 
fairly have complained of our failure, and then, in a thou- 
sand ways, you could have retaliated our want of faith." 
With Mr. Jefferson's letter, the con'espondence 
ceased ; and when the American Secretary, more than 
eighteen months after, " had it again in charge from the 
President of the United States to ask whether we can 
now have an answer to the letter of May 29th," Mr. 
Hammond, the 22d of Nov., 1793, replied, " I have not 
yet received such definitive instructions relative to your 
communication of the 29th of May, 1792, as will enable 
me to renew the discussions upon the subject of it, which 
have been for some time suspended." In a conversa- 



84 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

tioii between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, as 
far back as 1790, Mr. Pitt had hinted that it would be 
better to make a new treaty than comply with the old ; 
and in November, 1793, while this useless negotiation 
was dragging its slow length along. Lord Grenville had 
the following very significant conversation with the 
American Minister in London : " With respect to the 
posts, he observed, that the negotiation concerning them 
was proceeding in another place, in which we were 
both of opinion, for obvious reasons, that it was too 
inconvenient to continue it ; that this negotiation was 
not terminated ; and he assured me that he continued to 
receive pressing applications from the commercial sub- 
jects of his Majesty, on account of the non-execution of 
the treaty on our part. He further said, that if the meas- 
ure of relinquishing the posts were to take place, their 
settlements would be exposed to the ravages, and them- 
selves to the expense and disadvantage, which I had 
described to be at present the case with us. For these 
reasons, he thought, administration would not be justi- 
fied in relinquishing the posts at this time, and ex- 
pressed his regret that Mr. Hammond had not been per- 
mitted by us to enter into a negotiation for some 
arrangements relating particularly to the' posts, and (as 
I apprehended him) Indian affairs, Avhich he had no 
doubt would have terminated in our common advan- 
tage and mutual satisfaction ; but that, when Mr. Ham- 
mond wished to open that business, he was given to 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 85 

understand (though in the most civil terms) that the less 
that was said on that subject the better." * 

It is clear from this correspondence, especially when 
taken in connection with these conversations, that the 
English government had at that time no idea of negoti- 
ating. Mr. Hammond's mission was simply a dilatory 
plea. His appointment was delayed beyond any reason- 
able reciprocity of diplomatic intercourse. When he did 
arrive, he was entirely unauthorized to conclude a treaty. 
When the discussion was fairly opened, instead of sim- 
plifying the argument, he started, by his course of 
reasoning, a thousand small and subordinate issues, 
which would have led in their full debate to an inex- 
tricable confusion of legal niceties. And, finally, when 
Mr. Jefferson met him on his own gi'ound, and under- 
took the discussion which he had himself introduced, he 
allowed the whole matter to drop, without attempting 
even the obligatory courtesy of an official reply. And 
when, at the close of 1793, Mr. Jefferson resigned the 
Secretaryship of State, this negotiation, wilfully and 
perversely prolonged, still remained to irritate national 
sentiment and perplex the national pohcy. 

In the mean time, in the beginning of August, 1792, 
Mr. Pinckney arrived in London, as Minister Plenipo- 
tentiary from the United States, and in a despatch, in 
December of the same year, he described his situation 
to the Secretary. 

* Pinckney MSS. See next note. 



86 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

" In my first communication, I mentioned the civility 
with which I was received at St. James's and at the 
Office of Foreign Affairs. The only circumstance worth 
mentioning in my conference with the King was, that 
Lord North's rope of sand appeared not to have been 
entirely effaced from his Majesty's memory, which I 
infer from his mentioning the differing circumstances 
between the northern and southern parts of our coun- 
try, tending to produce disunion. I declined entering 
on any discussion, observing only, that we agreed very 
well at present, and hoped a continuance of the same 
disposition. I have been constant in my attendance at 
the King's levees, since the return of the com-t to St. 
James's, and, placing myself in the circle of foreign min- 
isters, his Majesty never fails to have a few moments' 
conversation with me on the weather, or other topics 
equally important ; but, notwithstanding the great vari- 
ety of incident that has lately occurred in European 
politics, he never touches that subject with me ; indeed, 
not only the King, but most of his courtiers, and (except 
the Pole) all the foreign ministers, seem to consider the 
Americans as united in principles with the French, and 
as having, by example, at least, assisted in exciting the 
commotions with which great part of Europe is con- 
vulsed, and consequently are not very agreeable associ- 
ates. Some of the foreign ministers with whom I am 
most intimate have told me that this idea prevails; 
at the same time, they have been polite enough to 
make, themselves, a proper distinction between the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 87 

modes of conducting the revolutions in the two coun- 
tries ; although I consider this as an honorable testi- 
mony of the good conduct of my country, it serves to 
keep me at a greater distance from those with whom 
it is my business to have most ' intercourse than would 
otherwise be the case. The Queen received me with 
affability at my audience ; but at the drawing-rooms, 
though she condescends to say a few words to me, yet 
she gives a marked priority to any person near ; it is, in 
short, very evident, that I am by no means in favor in 
any of the apartments at St. James's. 

" You may be assured that I avoid every thing that 
may tend to widen the distance, by keeping as clear as 
possible of all European politics, by forbearing all men- 
tion of the cold civility which I experience, and, in gen- 
eral, by aiming at a conciliatory conduct. Of the diplo- 
matic corps, the Minister from Poland converses freely 
with me, and we are on good terms ; the rest consider 
me as one who, with respect to the present European 
politics, neither rejoices in their joy, nor is afflicted with 
their sorrow. They have all, however, paid me the com- 
pliment of the first visit, except the Russian minister, 
and with him I have no acquaintance." * 

* This extract is copied from General Pinckney's Letter Book, 
Vol. I. p. 74. For these volumes, together with a large collection of 
private correspondence, I am indebted to his son, Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, Esq. ; and I am under further obligation to other members 
of the family for the Letter Book and papers of General Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, Minister to France. In using these manu- 



88 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

The negotiation which had been opened between Mr. 
Jefferson and Mr. Hammond was not transferred to 
Mr. Pinckney, and his mission was therefore confined 
to the discussion of such points of difference as might 
arise in the current relations between the two countries ; 
and these, unfortunately, were irritating enough. The 
relations of the two countries were disturbed, not only 
by the restrictive policy of the English commercial laws, 
but by a suspicion on the part of the American people, 
almost substantiated into certainty, that Lord Dorches- 
ter was using the frontier posts as centres, from which 
to stimulate the savage hostility of the Indian tribes 
against the United States ; and by the repeated impress- 
ments of American seamen, — impressments incapable 
of justification, and almost always conducted with the 
rudest insolence. In vain did Mr. Pinckney urge upon 
Lord Grenville the propriety of coming to some amica- 
ble settlement of the question of impressment, before it 
had excited too much feeling, or had become complicated 
with more difficult issues. Lord Grenville agreed that 
it would be wise to do so, but the difficulties were im- 
mense, the cabinet busy ; and so the matter ended, as far 

scripts, I have, of course, confined my extracts to such documents 
only as have not been published in any collection of State papers. 
The quotation from General Thomas Pinckney's papers is marked 
T. P. MSS. ; those from General Cotesworth Pinckney, C. C. P. MSS. 
It is a very small matter, but in reference to the despatch above, it 
is proper to add, that a postscript states, " Since writing the above, 
the Russian minister sent me his card." 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 89 

as preventive action went. The length to which the X 
contemptuous violation of American rights was carried 
may be illustrated by the following case, not perhaps 
the most extreme that might be selected. An Ameri- 
can vessel, bound from China to Ostend, was driven by 
stress of weather into the port of Ramsgate. While 
there, several seamen, who were under contract to per- 
form the whole voyage from Boston to the East Indies, 
thence to Ostend, and then back to Boston, deserted and 
entered a British shij) of war. The British commander 
not only detained the men, but insisted upon payment 
of their wages, although by their own contract they 
had forfeited all right to compensation ; and threatened 
to enforce his demand by the retention of the vessel. 

Mr. Pinckney immediately brought the whole subject 
to Lord Grenville's attention, and briefly, but very ably, 
pointed out the illegality of the course of the British 
commander. As to the taking and detaining American 
seamen, which was becoming too common, he showed 
the difficulty of distinguishing between the citizens of 
the two countries ; the fact that the declaration of a de- 
serter could not be assumed as proof of what he had so 
much interest in proving; that the question of what 
constituted citizenship might be open to the govern- 
ments, but should not be left to the British naval com- 
manders ; that the captains, on both sides, were in every 
case interested and prejudiced ; that in every case of 
dispute, force must be appealed to for a decision ; a con- 
dition of things which placed the peace and commerce 
8* 



90 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

of the country at perpetaal hazard ; and that it was a 
practice not exercised by any other nation of the world. 
It was further suggested, that, granting these men to be 
British citizens, they had voluntarily made a contract 
not forbidden by the laws of theii- own country, or of 
that where the contract was made ; that Great Britain 
herself encouraged the engagement of foreign mariners 
in her merchant service ; and that such an interference 
with a lawful contract was a great and deliberate out- 
rage.* Lord Grenville admitted the force of the argu- 
ment as to the contract, but no redress was offered. 
All Mr. Pinckney's representations ^vere met in the same 
spirit, — answered courteously, but very slowly ; dis- 
cussed vaguely and at tedious intervals, and allowed 
finally to rest without result in the dusty obscurity of 
the Foreign Office. But the march of events in Europe 
was fast hurrying beyond the ordinary limits of diplo- 
matic discussion. 

On the 30th of January, 1793, Mr. Pinckney, ^^Titing 
to his government as to the probability of war between 
France and England, after referring to certain advan- 
tages which the commercial stipulations with some of 
the belligerents afforded, said, " I wish we had similar 
articles in a treaty with this country ; for, although the 
administration of this country appear sensible of the 
importance of our trade, and profess an inclination to 
cultivate our friendship, yet they are adopting a measure 

* T. P. MSS. Letter Book, Vol. I. p. 102-108. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 91 

respecting the French, which, in its execution, may lead 
to disagreeable consequences with respect to us. I 
mean their plan of distressing them, by preventing them 
from receiving supplies of provisions. Now as we 
shall be the people who must principally supply them, 
and have no treaty with Great Britain respecting our 
intercourse with countries with whom she may be at war, 
and although our claim to a free intercourse is founded 
in reason and our national right, yet, as we have no 
armed neutraUty the members whereof this people have 
to fear, they may stop our vessels bound to French ports 
with provisions." * Circumstances soon justified Mr. 
Pinckney's apprehensions. Early in 1793, war between 
England and France was formally declared, and the 
efforts of the United States to maintain a just neutral- 
ity complicated their relations with both. The relations 
between the United States and France, springing out of 
the French Revolution, will be detailed in the chapter 
devoted to the history of the French negotiation. At 
present, it is only necessary to state that an angry and 
harassing controversy was engendered between the two 
governments ; that they were upon the brink of a most 
disastrous rupture ; and that the conduct of the French 
minister was in such open violation of all the decencies 
of national intercom'se, that his recall was finally de- 
manded of his government. On the 9th of May, 1793, 
the National Convention of France passed a decree, by 

* T. P. MSS. Letter Book, Vol. I. p. 143, 144. 



92 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

which, among other things, ships of war and privateers 
were " authorized to seize and carry into the ports of 
the repubhc, merchant vessels which are wholly or in 
part loaded with provisions, being neutral property, 
bound to an enemy's port, or having on board merchan- 
dise belonging to an enemy." Merchandise belonging 
to an enemy was declared lawful prize, seizable for the 
profits of the captors ; but provisions, being neutral prop- 
erty, were to be paid for at the price they would have 
sold for at the port to which they were bound. Against 
this decree, Mr. Morris, United States minister in 
France, protested immediately, both on general grounds 
and upon the special obligations of the treaties between 
the two countries ; and in consequence, a few days after, 
the Convention passed another decree, by which they 
declared, that the vessels of the United States were not 
included in their first decree of the 9th of May. 
Scarcely, however, had the French government decreed 
this exemption of American commerce, than Great 
Britain passed a hostile set of orders, based upon the 
same principles, and admitting of no exception. On 
the 8th of June, 1793, by the additional instructions 
issued by the British government, it was ordered : — 

" 1. That it shall be lawful to stop and detain all ves- 
sels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour, or meal, 
bound to any port in France, or any port occupied by 
the armies of France, and to send them to such ports as 
shall be most convenient, in order that such corn, meal, 
or flour may be purchased on behalf of his Majesty's 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 93 

government, and the ships be released after such pur- 
chases, and after a due allowance for freight ; or that 
the masters of such ships, on giving due security, to be 
approved of by the Court of Admiralty, be permitted 
to proceed to dispose of their cargoes of corn, meal, or 
flour in the ports of any country in amity with his 
Majesty." 

The other instructions were the usual ones in relation 
to blockaded ports, making a slight modification in re- 
gard to ships of Sweden and Denmark. 

Less fortunate than Mr. Morris, Mr. Pinckney re- 
monstrated in vain. " If," said he, in language that act- 
ually represented the condition to which the country 
was soon reduced, " If one nation had a right to shut 
up to the produce of another all the ports of the earth 
except her own and those of her friends, she may shut 
them up also, whereby the neutral nation would be con- 
fined to her own ports ; or if, from motives of policy, 
she were to abstain from this last exclusion, yet the op- 
posite party would certainly have an equal right to pur- 
sue the same measure, whereby the same consequence 
would ensue. But for a nation to have its peaceable 
industry suspended, and its citizens reduced to idleness 
and want ])y the act of another, is a restriction which 
reason and justice do not authorize. . . . This act, too, 
tends directly to draw the United States from that state 
of peace in which they wish to remain ; for it is an es- 
sential character of neutrality to furnish no aids not 
stipulated by previous treaties to one party, which are 



94 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

not furnished with equal readiness to the other. If the 
United States permit corn to be sent to Great Britain 
and her friends, they are equally bound to permit it to 
France ; to restrain it, would lead to war with France ; 
and between restraining it themselves, and acquiescing 
in the restraint by her enemies, is no difference. She 
will consider this acquiescence as a pretext, and the 
United States will see themselves plunged by this meas- 
ure into a war with which they meddle not, and which 
they wish to avoid, if justice to all parties and from all 
parties will enable them to avoid it. In the case where 
they found themselves obliged by treaty to withhold from 
the enemies of France the right of coming into their 
ports, they thought themselves in justice bound to with- 
hold the same right from France also, and they did it ; 
were they to withhold supplies of provisions, they would, 
by the same principle of impartial neutrality, be bound 
to withhold them from her enemies also, and thus either 
shut to themselves all the ports of Europe where corn is 
in demand, or make themselves parties in the war." * 
But argument was useless. Great Britain was resolved 
upon her course, and it was soon evident, from the re- 
ciprocal treaty obligations of the allies in this, the first, 
coalition against France, that the policy of England was 

* 1. T. P. MSS. Letter Book, Vol. I. p. 479. 

2. These orders are to be found under their various dates in the 
1st vol., American State Papers : Foreign Relations. On page 183, 
Vol. I., of his " Diplomacy of the United States," Mr. Lyman has 
collected them together. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 95 

the policy of Europe. A series of other maritime in- 
structions followed these, by which the property of ene- 
mies was seized in neutral ships ; the trade between 
the United States and the French West Indian col- 
onies was forbidden under the rule of ^56, by which 
the principle was established, that neutrals could con- 
duct no trade in time of war with colonial possessions 
of a belligerent, not allowed by the same belligerent in 
time of peace ; a general system of fictitious blockade 
was established ; and provisions were declared contra- 
band of war. These proceedings on the one side pro- 
voked, of course, retaliation on the other ; and from this 
date the relations of the United States became more 
and more embarrassed. Their ships were confiscated, 
their seamen impressed, the sovereignty of their harbors 
violated, their neutral rights, in every way and on all 
occasions, disregarded ; while the bureaux of their embas- 
sies were piled Avith Ireaps of impotent protests and un- 
heeded reclamations. The exemption permitted by 
France was soon withdrawn ; for as soon as it was evi- 
dent that the United States had not the power to pre- 
vent the seizure of her vessels by England, France re- 
fused to allow her enemies only to profit by the weakness 
of a neutral ; and as soon as it was clear that the 
United States did not intend to be forced into a war 
by the exactions of England, France abandoned a pol- 
icy which was intended to win an ally, and not merely 
to protect a lukewarm friend. It would be idle now to 
resume the diplomatic debates of that day, and to draw 



96 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

^'^out, in balanced argument, the international reasonings 
and learned quotations with which all the parties con- 
ducted their discussion of neutral rights. No jurist 
would hesitate to admit, that neutral rights were vio- 
lently abused and disregarded. No statesman would 
undertake to measure the actions of great nations, en- 
gaged in the fiercest contest that history has recorded, 
by the technical rules of any code, however strong in 
the logic of its morality, or wise in the consequences of 
its peaceful justice. The war between Europe and 
France was a war for existence. It was confined in its 
u scope to the settlement of no commercial interests, the 
vindication of no territorial aggrandizement, the adjust- 
ment of no narrow balance of national power. Its 
terrible tempest shook the foundations of society ; and 
the very heart of Christendom was hot with a passion, 
to be cooled only when the lifeblood of a full genera- 
tion of men had the whole globe ' incarnardined.' It 
would have been folly to expect, that, in a conflict like 
this, the interests of any one nation would be permitted 
to stand between the destructive energies of the com- 
batants ; still less, those of a nation young, weak, un- 
considered, and barely admitted into that national soci- 
ety whose very life was now in deadly peril. And it 
must in candor be acknowledged, that the weakness of 
the United States was their salvation. Had their active 
participation on either side been a positive advantage, 
they would, like all the second-rate powers of Europe, 
have been dragged into the struggle. Had they pos- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTOKY. 97 

sessed such a tolerable naval force as would have 
tempted them to maintain by arms their neutral rights, 
they would have been committed to the conflict. For, 
between the two enemies, to act against one, on grounds 
ever so special to the United States, would have been 
alliance with the other ; and the interests of the country 
would, with the certainty of incalculable damage, have 
been involved for ever in the complications of European 
politics. And the great credit of Washington's admin- 
istration was, that it realized the strength of the coun- 
try's weakness. To have tried the tempting diplomatic 
game of playing off the supposed advantage of alliance 
with one party against the other, would have led to com- 
plete defeat with both. While, by accepting the real 
condition of the country as the basis of a frank nego- 
tiation with both England and France, Gen. Washing- 
ton was enabled to preserve the nation safe through a 
storm which threatened to drag it from its moorings, 
and sweep it defenceless and adrift upon the tempestu- 
ous sea of revolutionary politics. But, however im- 
pressed with a sense of its own weakness, it was impos- 
sible for the administration to keep the country in tliis 
embarrassing position. It was necessary to make some 
effort to better its relation to one or both of the contend- 
ing parties. In the country, at this time, putting out of 
view those who, as is always the case in times of ex- 
cited political differences, held impossible and extreme 
opinions, there were two clearly defined parties, each 
led by able men, actuated by an earnest, patriotic spirit, 

9 



98 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

and sustained in its connections by strong argument. 
One party recognized the commercial dependence of the 
United States on England, felt an honest sympathy 
with the spirit, and great admiration for the forms, of 
the British constitution, were at first disquieted, and 
then horrified, at the progress of the French Revolution, 
and resented with indignant vehemence the insolent 
tone of the French government. They believed that 
much of the wrong to which they were subjected could 
not, in such stormy times, be hindered ; and that time 
and the manifest interests of the country would open 
the eyes of the English statesmen, and gradually unite 
more closely and afiectionately the American and Eng- 
lish people. They were anxious, therefore, to approach 
as near to England as they could, consistently with 
what was due to the character of the country ; to avoid 
every possible relation with France, other than was ab- 
solutely necessary to the strictest and narrowest treaty 
obligation ; and thus gain time to strengthen their own 
forces. 

The other party sympathized earnestly and naturally 
with the efforts of the French republic. They regarded 
the horrors of the revolution as the terrible but unavoid- 
able convulsions of a dying despotism, and pitied and 
palliated what they could not justify. They regarded 
the conduct of Great Britain in holding on to the posts, 
restricting our West Indian commerce, and violating 
our neutral privileges, as an insolent manifestation of 
superior force, intended to mortify the national pride, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 99 

and injure the national interests ; and they would have 
rejoiced at any means which would possibly have sev- 
ered the commercial connection between England and 
the United States, and transferred those relations to 
France. But even this party did not wish war with 
England. They would have interpreted the treaty 
with France liberally, gone to the furthest edge of their 
duties as neutrals, while at the same time they replied 
to the commercial restrictions of Great Britain by simi- 
lar restrictions on the British trade with the United 
States. At the outset, the administration took a course 
between these two parties, but its tendencies were evi- 
dently towards the former ; and just when the conse- 
quences of its neutrality were beginning to be most 
embarrassing^ Mr. Jefferson resigned. He could scarcely 
have done otherwise; for all his sympathies and convic- 
tions were with that second party to whom reference 
has just been made, and which was fast becoming an 
organized opposition party. And immediately after his 
resignation, the administration resolved upon a proceed- 
ing, to which, as will be demonstrated, he could never 
consistently have consented. This was a solemn and 
special mission to Great Britain, in the hope of finally 
and promptly settling the differences between the two 
countries. It cannot be denied that this mission was a 
step beyond the first position of the government, in 
which direction the history of its action will show. It 
must be borne in mind, that, at the date of this mission, 
the position of the United States between England and 



100 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

France was not that of a neutral standing in equally 
amicable relations to two hostile nations, but that of an 
independent power, complaining with equal justice of 
arbitrary and hostile conduct on the part of two gov- 
ernments waging internecine war against each other, 
and so hampered by treaty obligations and old and 
peculiar relations, that a change of relation to either 
laid them open to the reprisals of both. The fact that 
the French minister had been dismissed, that serious 
differences existed between the two governments, and 
that, in face of their treaties and past connection, the 
United States had proclaimed, and were observing, a 
strict neutrality, permitted the English government to 
ho])e a change in the policy of the United States favor- 
able to British views ; while the retention of the posts, 
the popular irritation arising from England's commer- 
cial illiberality, and her violation of the American neu- 
tral rights, allowed the French government to anticipate 
a final rupture, before very long, between England and 
the United States, which would further French inter- 
ests. A deviation, therefore, towards either, was closely 
watched by each. But it must be allowed, that Eng- 
land seemed much the least concerned of the two as to 
the course of the United States. Secure in her com- 
mercial connection, in possession of the frontier posts, 
and wielding an immense naval power, England looked 
rather superciliously upon the advances, and very indif- 
ferently upon the complaints, of the American govern- 
ment. A treaty with England, it was obvious, could 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 101 

be negotiated only at great disadvantage ; but it was 
unquestionably worth the trial. For one thing was cer- 
tain, — the United States could not stand still, and the 
state of public opinion was such, that, unless they could 
approach nearer to Great Britain, unless some settle- 
ment of the many points in controversy could be ob- 
tained, the United States would drift into closer and 
dangerous relations to France. And this is the just and 
only ground of defence for the mission at that time. 
The administration believed that it could reconcile 
some of its difficulties with England without compro- 
mising its neutrality with France ; but that it could not 
draw nearer to France without putting itself in hostile 
relation to England, — a position which the interests of 
the country imperatively forbade it to occupy. The 
mission was therefore resolved on, in face of the violent 
denunciation of all those who sympathized with France, 
and with much misgiving on the part of many, who, 
without any undue French sympathy, felt an honest and 
natural indignation against the course of British policy. 
The selection of the individual for the mission was not 
a happy one. Mr. Jay, who received the appointment, 
was, in point of ability and character, one of the fore- 
most men of his day and generation, and General 
Washington could have found for the public service no 
purer, truer, nobler citizen. But Mr. Jay was Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States ; 
and, however willing we may be to-admit, that, in the 
infancy of a nation's political life, it is impossible, per- 

9* 



102 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

haps unnecessary, to separate with stringent exchisive- 
ness the departments of public service, yet it was not 
seemly to permit the chief of the national judiciary to 
be mixed up with questions which excited the most vio- 
lent party feeling ; nor did it become the head of the 
Supreme Court to make a treaty, which, as the law" of the 
land, it was his duty to expound. There was, however, 
another and more fatal objection. It will be recollected, 
that one of the very first acts of General Washington, 
after his inauguration, was to send his instructions to 
Mr. Morris in reference to the points in controversy 
between the two countries ; and that Mr. Jefferson, as 
Secretary of State and authorized exponent of the gov- 
ernment, had, in his correspondence with the British 
minister, distinctly stated the position of the United 
States. Both General Washington and himself had 
demanded the immediate delivery of the posts, vindi- 
cated the good faith of the United States in their 
efforts to carry out the treaty of peace, and insisted 
upon the return of the negroes carried off, or upon rea- 
sonable compensation. Now it so happened that Mr. 
Jay, during the time he held the office of Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs under the Confederation, had gone over 
this very ground of the difference between the two 
countries, with that fearless candor which was his hon- 
orable characteristic under all circumstances ; he had 
expressed opinions not in consonance with the present 
official language of the administration. In reference to 
the restoration of the negroes, and more especially in 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 103 

regard to such as, confiding in proclamations and prom- 
ises of freedom and protection, fled from their masters, 
and were received and protected within the British 
camps and lines, he had said : — 

" Whenever the conduct of nations or of individuals 
becomes the subject of investigation, truth and candor 
should direct the inquiry. The circumstances under 
which these last-mentioned negroes were carried away, 
make a strong impression on the mind of your Secre- 
tary, and place that transaction before him in a point of 
view less unfavorable to Britain than it appears in to 
his countrymen at large. He is aware he is about to 
say unpopular things ; but higher motives than personal 
considerations press him to proceed. 

" If a war should take place between France and 
Algiers, and, in the course of it, France should invite 
the American slaves there to run away from their mas- 
ters, and actually receive and protect them in their 
camp, what would Congress, and, indeed, the world, 
think and say of France, if, on making peace with Al- 
giers, she should give up those American slaves to their 
former Algerine masters ? Is there any other difference: 
between the two cases than this, namely, that the Amer- 
ican slaves at Algiers are ivhite people, whereas the 
African slaves at New York were black people ? It 
may be said that these remarks are made out of season ; 
for, whether they be well or ill-founded, the fact is that 
Britain expressly agreed to give them up, and therefore 
ought to have done it. 



104 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

" How far an obligation to do wrong may, consistent 
with morality, be so modified in the execution as to 
avoid doing injury, and yet do essential justice, merits 
consideration. By this agreement, Britain bound her- 
self to do great wrong to these slaves, and yet, by not 
executing it, she would do great wrong to their masters. 
This was a painful dilemma ; for, as on the one hand 
she had invited, tempted, and assisted these slaves to 
escape from their masters, and, on escaping, had re- 
ceived and protected them, it would have been cruelly 
perfidious to have afterwards delivered them up to their 
former bondage, and to the severities to which such 
slaves are usually subjected; so, on the other hand, 
after contracting to leave these slaves to their masters, 
then to refuse to execute that contract, and in the face 
of it to carry them away, w^ould have been highly in- 
consistent with justice and good faith. But one way 
appears to your Secretary, in which Britain could extri- 
cate herself from these embarrassments : that was, to 
keep faith with the slaves by carrying them away, and 
to do substantial justice to their masters by paying 
them the value of those slaves. In this way, neither 
could have just cause to complain ; for, although no 
price can compensate a man for bondage for life, yet 
every master may be compensated for a runaway 
slave." * And, further on in the same report, discussing 

* Secret Journals of Congress, Foreign Affairs, Vol. IV. p. 277, 
278, 280. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 105 

the question as upon whom the responsibility of the 

first treaty violation rested, he said : " In whatever light, 

therefore, deviations from the treaty, prior to its final 

conclusion and ratification, may be viewed, it is certain 

that deviations on our part preceded any on the part of || 

Britain, and therefore, instead of being justified by 

them, afford excuse to them. 

"As to the detention of our posts, your Secretary 
thinks that Britain was not bound to surrender them 
until we had ratified the treaty. Congress ratified it on ji 

the 14th of January, 1784, and Britain on the 9th of 
April following. From that time to this, the fourth and 
fifth articles of the treaty have been constantly violated 
on our part by legislative acts, then and still existing 
and operating. 

" Under such circumstances, it is not a matter of sur- 
prise to your Secretary that the posts are detained ; nor, 
in his opinion, would Britain be to blame in continuing 
to hold them, until America shall cease to impede her 
enjoying every essential right secured to her and her 
people and adherents by the treaty." This report was 
a public and official document, of which it could not be 
supposed that the English government was ignorant. 
To send a minister, holding such opinions, at such a 
time, was unquestionably to withdraw from the original 
ground which the administration had occupied, and in 
direct contradiction to the whole tenor of IVIr. Jefferson's 
despatches as Secretary of State. 



106 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Mr. Jay arrived in England early in June, 1794.* His 
instructions, furnished by Mr. Edmund Randolph, who 
had succeeded Mr. Jefferson, covered four points. He 
was instructed, — 

First, to protest against, and demand compensation 

y 

* Mr. Jay's mission was not intended to supersede Mr. Pinckney, 
and he was accordingly instructed to confine himself to the special 
objects of his negotiation, and to communicate fully and freely with 
that gentleman. Mr. Pinckney could not, however, help feeling that 
his own consideration was diminished, and the regular mission very 
much sunk in importance by this special appointment. This feeling 
he expressed with frankness to the Secretary of State, in announcing 
Mr. Jay's arrival in London. 

" With respect to this gentleman's mission, as it personally concerns 
me, if I were to say I had no unpleasant feelings on the occasion, I 
should not be sincere ; but the sincerity with which I make this dec- 
laration will, I trust, entitle me to credit, when I add that I am con- 
vinced of the expediency of adopting any honorable measures which 
may tend to avert the calamities of war, or, by its failure, cement 
our union at home ; that I consider Mr. Jay's appointment, from the 
solemnity of the mission, supported by his established reputation, 
diplomatic experience, and general talents, as the most probable 
method of effecting this purpose ; and that I am sensible of the deli- 
cacy, respecting myself, with which the measure has been cai'ried 
into execution. Under these impressions, it will be scarcely neces- 
sary for me to say further, that I will cheerfully embrace every op- 
portunity of promoting the objects of Mr. Jay's mission, and of ren- 
dering his residence here agreeable." He kept his word ; and in 
the political excitement which followed the treaty, gave strong and 
generous testimony to Mr. Jay's services. — T. P. MSS. Letter Book, 
Vol. U. p. 120. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 107 

for, the vexations and spoliations to which the com- 
merce of the United States was subjected. 

Second, and " subsequent in order," he was to draw 
to a conclusion all points of difference between the 
United States and Great Britain, concerning the treaty 
of peace. And in reference to this portion of his mis- 
sion, his instructions contained a clause, singular to 
say the least, and certainly implying extraordinary con- 
sideration for the person of the ambassador : " Except 
in this negotiation," said Mr. Randolph, " you have 
been personally conversant with the whole of the trans- 
actions connected with the treaty of peace. You were 
a minister at its formation, the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs when the sentiments of the CongTess, under the 
Confederation, were announced through your office ; 
and, as Chief Justice, you have been witness to what 
has passed in our courts, and know the real state of 
our laws with regard to British debts. It v^all be super- 
fluous, therefore, to add more to you than to express a 
wish that these debts and the interest claimed upon 
them, and all things relating to them, may be put aside in 
a diplomatic discussion, as being certainly of a judicial 
nature, to be decided by our courts ; and if this cannot 
be accomplished, that you support the doctrines of gov- 
ernment with arguments proper for the occasion, and 
witji that attention to your former public opinions u'hich 
self-respect ivill justify, without relaxing the pretensions 
which have hitherto been maintained." 

Thirdly. " In case that the two preceding points 



108 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

should be so accommodated as to promise the continu- 
ance of tranquilhty between the United States and 
Great Britain," it was referred to his discretion to pro- 
pose a commercial treaty between the two countries, 
on certain bases included in the instructions. And, 
fourthly, " You will have no difficulty in gaining access 
to the ministers of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, at 
the court of London. The principles of the armed 
neutrality would abundantly cover our neutral rights. 
If, therefore, the situation of things with respect to 
Great Britain should dictate the necessity of taking the 
precaution of foreign cooperation on this head, if no 
prospect of accommodation should be thwarted by the 
danger of such a measure being known to the British 
court, and if an entire view of all our political relations 
shall, in your judgment, permit the step, you will sound 
those ministers upon the probability of an alliance with 
their nations to support those principles." And the 
instructions concluded with this plenary power : — 

" Such are the outlines of the conduct which the 
President wishes you to pursue. He is aware that at 
this distance, and during the present instability of pub- 
lic events, he cannot undertake to prescribe rules which 
shall be irrevocable. You will, therefore, consider the 
ideas herein expressed as amounting to recommendations 
only, which, in your discretion, you may modify as seems 
most beneficial to the United States, except in the two 
following cases, which are immutable : 1st. That as the 
British ministry will doubtless be solicitous to detach us 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 109 

from France, and may probably make some overture of 
this kind, you will inform them that the government of 
the United States will not derogate from our treaties 
and engagements with France, and that experience has 
shown that we can be honest in our duties to the Brit- 
ish nation ^^dthout laying ourselves under any particu- 
lar restraints as to other nations. And, 2d. That no 
treaty of commerce be concluded or signed contrary to 
the foregoing prohibition." 

After a few informal conversations with Lord Gren- 
ville, the negotiation proceeded rapidly to its conclu- 
sion ; and before the opinion of the United States gov- 
ernment on its details could reach their minister, the 
ti'caty was signed. It was evident, very early in the 
progress of the discussion, that most of the positions 
taken by the United States would have to be aban- 
doned ; and some of them the American negotiator was 
only too ready to abandon. Thus, in his letter to Mr. 
Randolph, of the 13th of September, 1794, Mr. Jay 
said : " A nvimber of informal conversations on other 
points then took place, and every difficulty which 
attended them came into view, and was discussed with 
great fairness and temper ; the inquiry naturally led to 
the fact which constituted the first violation of the 
treaty of peace? The carrying away of the negroes 
contrary to the 7th article of the treaty of peace was 
insisted upon as the first aggression. "To this it was 
answered, in substance, that Great Britain understood 
10 



110 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

the stipulation contained in that article in the obvious 
sense of the words which expressed it ; namely, as an 
engagement not to cause any destruction nor to carry 
away any negroes or other property of the American 
inhabitants ; or, in other Avords, that the evacuation 
should be made without depredation ; that no alteration 
in the actual state of property was operated or intended 
by that article ; that every slave, like every horse which 
escaped or estrayed from within the American lines and 
came into the possession of the British army, became, 
by the laws and rights of war, British property, and 
therefore ceasing to be American property, the exporta- 
tion thereof was not inhibited by the stipulation in 
question ; that to extend it to the negroes, who, under 
the faith of proclamations, had come into them, and to 
whom, according to promise, liberty had been given, 
was to give to the article a greater latitude than the 
terms of it would warrant, and was also, unnecessarily, 
to give it a construction, which, being odious, could not 
be supported by the known and established rules for 
construing treaties. To this was replied the several 
remarks and considerations which are mentioned in a 
report which I once made to Congress on this subject, 
and which, for that reason, it would be useless here to 
repeat; on this point we could not agree. . . . Here, 
again, the affair of the negroes emerged, and was in- 
sisted upon, and was answered as before. I confess, 
however, that this construction of that article has made 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. Ill 

an impression upon my mind, and induced me to sus- 
pect that my former opinions on that head may not be 
well founded." * That Mr. Jay should have been im- 
pressed by the transparent sophistry of this reasoning, 
can only be accounted for by the fact of his sympathy 
with its conclusion, as manifested in the opinions of his 
report, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This con- 
struction of the treaty was thoroughly refuted by IVIr. 
Randolph, in his reply of the 15th of December, 1794. 

" But really, sir, the force of Lord Grenville's reason- 
ings appears to fall very far short of its objects. 

" That a property is acquired in movables as soon as 
they come within the power of the enemy, is acknowl- 
edged. But it will not be denied that rights, even in 
movables, acquired by war, may, by the treaty of 
peace, be renounced. In this instance, there was great 
reason for such a renunciation. Negroes were not, like 
movables in general, difficult to be distinguished. They 
carried an infallible mark, British debts were stipu- 
lated to be paid, and the States in which the mass of 
them lay, depended for their payment principally on the 

* American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. I. p. 485, 486. The 
opinion to wbicli Mr. Jay refers, is tliat expressed in his report as 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, under the Confederation, and a portion 
of which has been quoted above. " But however capable of pallia- 
tion the conduct of Britain respecting these negroes may be, it un- 
questionably was an iufraction of the seventh article." — Secret 
Journal, Vol. IV. p. 279. That ^Ir. Jay found it easy to change his 
opinion will surprise no one who reads the report. 



112 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

culture of their soil, and for the culture of their soil, on 
this species of labor. As property, the British govern- 
ment could not have been tenacious of negroes ; and it 
may therefore be supposed, that, in this view, they were 
so indifferent as to be the more easily given up. 

" If the stipulation as to the negroes did not mean an 
alteration in the actual state of property, and imported 
only an engagement not to cause any destruction, or 
carry away any negroes or other American property, 
why was it made ? The cessation of war impUed the 
cessation of further depredation ; the renewal of depre- 
dation would have been the renewal of war. The 
words of treaties, if they can be construed in an oper- 
ative sense, ought not to be turned to signify merely 
what would have existed without them. It was a 
thing of course that orders should be given by the Brit- 
ish government against plundering on the evacuation ; 
or, if they should not be given by the government, it 
became incumbent upon the commander, in behalf of 
the British army in America, to issue them under his 
own authority. The essence of Lord Grenville's argu- 
ment seems to consist in a refinement of interpretation 
which he gives to the words ' other property of the 
American inhabitants,' as if they confined the word 
' negroes ' to those negroes who should thereafter be 
captured from the Americans by the British arms, and 
included such as were then denominated, by the rights 
of war, British property. The use of the term 'negroes' 
by itself, proves that the inquiry was simply to be, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 113 

whether the persons who were not to be carried away 
came within the description of negi'oes, generally ; and 
it is as fair to conclude from the words ' other properly 
of the American inhabitants,' that the opinion of the 
negotiators was, that negroes within the British power 
were made thereby American property, as the reverse. 
The fact too is, that the original proprietors of the ne- 
groes never lost entirely the hope of recovering them, 
still called them theirs, would have reclaimed them upon 
the principles of postliminy, if they had been retaken 
by the army of America or its ally, and thus even the 
plenipotentiaries themselves might, without any impro- 
priety, have talked of the negroes in British possession 
as the negroes of American inhabitants. These ideas 
are supported by other parts of the seventh article. 
Why is the ' carrying' away ' only mentioned, if ne- 
groes which might be thereafter seized were chiefly 
contemplated ? Is it not reasonable to believe, that, 
with this impression, it would have been said that ne- 
groes shall not be captured and carried away? If a 
critical exposition must be resorted to, ' carrying away ' 
implies that the thing to be carried is abeady m posses- 
sion. Another part of the stipulation is, that the Amer- 
ican artillery that may be in the fortifications shall be 
left therein. That is, not artillery made in America, but 
artillery the property of America, or, in other words, of 
the United States. Now this artillery was surely the 
property of the British at the moment of capture, and 
10* 



114 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

yet no pretence, as far as I can learn, was hatched up 
to carry away our cannon. 

" For the interpretation of treaties, as well as in moral 
reasoning, general rules are prescribed ; but your own 
experience must have satisfied you that these rules can 
seldom be apphed with mathematical precision. We 
have an example of this in Lord Grenville sheltering 
himself from the true construction of the article of the 
treaty, by branding it with the epithet ' odious.' What 
is more customary than for nations to surrender rights ? 
What more common than for them to surrender, on a 
peace, rights acquired purely and solely through a war ? 
The construction is not odious because the British gov- 
ernment hate slavery. No, sir ; they established it in 
the United States while colonies ; they continued the 
importation of slaves against the A\dll of most of the 
States ; it exists, by their authority, in many of their 
foreign dominions. The odium, then, of the business 
must be in depriving the slaves of the liberty granted to 
them ; that is, in fact, giving and then taking away. 
Li answer to this, I observe, that the construction is not 
so doubtful as to let in any remarks upon odium, for 
vague ideas of this kind are inadmissible, except in 
truly doubtful cases. There might, perhaps, have been 
some countenance to this plea, if we should insist that 
slaves originally belonging to the British, and afterwards 
manumitted by them, were now demanded by us to 
return to then* former condition. But those in question 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 115 

belonged to our citizens ; — the war only presented the 
chance of liberation. They were covered, in their flight 
from their masters, by the operation of war. They must 
have been conscious (and such is the law of nations) 
that if they had been regained by their former propri- 
etors in the course of the Avar, they would have reverted 
to the condition of slaves, and that what the war gave, 
might, by a peace, be taken away. 

" You must be too sensible of the anxiety of many 
parts of the United States upon this subject, to pass it 
over unnoticed. Permit me, therefore, to beg your at- 
tention to the foregoing ideas, since I have it greatly at 
heart that your negotiation may not be incumbered by 
any objection which may be anticipated." * 

This letter, unfortunately, did not reach London until 
some time after the treaty had been concluded ; for, 
with such disposition on the part of the American nego- 
tiator, discussion was rapidly exhausted, and, on the 
19th of November, 1794, a treaty was signed by Mr. 
Jay and Lord Grenville. The consideration of the 
treaty may be divided under four heads : 1. The ques- 
tions arising under the treaty of peace of 1783 ; 2. The 
questions of neutral rights springing out of the immedi- 
ate circumstances of the day ; 3. The commercial ques- 
tions ; and 4. Such miscellaneous provisions as the gen- 
eral interests of tlie countries required. 

1. The questions under the old treaty were those per- 

* Am. State Papers, For. Aff., Vol. I. p. 510. 



116 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

taining to the delivery of the posts, the abstraction of 
the negroes, the collection of the British debts, and the 
north-eastern boundary line. As to the first, it was 
agreed, by article 2, that the posts should be evacuated 
by the 1st of June, 1796, about two years more being 
thus allowed the British government to withdraw its 
troops. As to the negroes, the subject was dropped, 
and no mention, either of restoration or compensation, 
was made in the treaty. As to the debts, by article 6, 
a joint commission was appointed to decide upon all 
cases where it was alleged that lawful impediments had 
been placed in the way of their collection, and the 
United States undertook the payment of all claims 
awarded by the' board. The settlement of the north- 
eastern boundary line was also referred to a joint com- 
mission. 

2. The second class of cases included the difficulties 
arising from the right of impressment claimed by Great 
Britain, accompanied by the exercise of the right of 
search ; from the violation of the clear neutral rights of 
the United States ; and from the orders in council, by 
which grain, on its way to France, was treated as con- 
traband. Of these, the question of impressment was 
abandoned, as impossible of settlement, between the 
two countries. A commission was appointed by article 
7 similar to that provided for the adjustment of the 
British debts, which was to decide upon all claims for 
violation of neutral rights. And as it was found im- 
possible to reconcile the opinions of the negotiators on 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 117 

the question of making provisions contraband, it was 
agreed, in article 18, which was almost a transcript of 
the obnoxious order, that, "wliereas the difficulty of 
agreeing on the precise cases in which, alone, provisions 
and other articles not generally contraband may be re- 
garded as such, renders it expedient to provide against 
the inconveniences and misunderstandins^s which mie^ht 
thence arise," such articles should not be confiscated, 
but the owner should be by the captors speedily and 
completely indemnified, " and the captors or, in their 
default, the government under whose authority they act, 
shall pay, to the masters or owners of such vessels, the 
full value of such articles, with a reasonable profit 
thereon, together with freight, and also the damage 
incident to such detention." 

3. As to the commercial interests of the country, it 
was provided by the 11th, 13th, loth, and 14th articles, 
that there should be a reciprocal and perfect liberty of 
navigation between all the dominions of Great Britain 
in Europe and the territories of the United States ; that 
the citizens of the United States may freely carry on a 
trade between the British territories in the East Indies 
and the United States, in all articles, the importation 
and exportation of which should not be entirely forbid- 
den. And that, as regarded the British West Indian 
possessions, the United States should be permitted to 
carry and bring away, in their own vessels, all articles of 
commerce, the produce of the two countries, which 
could be carried or brought in British vessels : Provided 



118 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

the vessels of the United States were not above seventy 
tons burden, and that the cargoes should be landed in 
the United States only ; it being also agreed, that, dur- 
ing the continuance of the article in relation to the 
West Indian trade, the United States should prohibit 
and restrain the carrying; any molasses, sugar, coffee, or 
cotton, in American vessels, either from his Majesty^s 
islands, or from the United Slates, to any part of the 
world except the United States. 

The other articles related to the Indian trade on the 
borders, defined contraband according to the strictness 
of English pretension, established the right of sending 
consuls, and contained the usual stipulations as to pri- 
vateers and the right of bringing prizes into port, that 
generally belong to friendly relations, stipulating, how- 
ever, that nothing in the treaty should operate or be 
construed contrary to former and existing treaties with 
other sovereigns or States. 

When the treaty was received in the United States, 
it became the subject of long discussion in the cabinet, 
and the most violent agitation in public. The question 
of its ratification became complicated with the re-issue 
of the obnoxious orders of 1793, and by the unwilling- 
ness of the government to accept the 12th article, in 
relation to the West India trade. But, after much de- 
liberation, the Senate advised the President to ratify the 
treaty, subject to the suspension of the West Indian 
provisos by a supplementary article. Accordingly,, as 
IVIr. Jay had niturned home, and Mr. Pinckney was 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 119 

absent in Madrid on a special mission, the ratifications 
were exchanged, on the 28th of October, 1795, between 
Lord Grenville and William Allen Deas, Esq., the Sec- 
retary of the United States Legation, the British gov- 
ernment making no objection to the suspension of ,the 
12th article.* No act in our political history has, either 

* Mr. Lyman, in his " Di^jlomacy of the United States," Vol. I. p. 
204, says, referring to the ratification of this treaty, " This act was 
performed by Mr. J. Q. Adams, minister resident at the Hague, de- 
S2>atched for that purpose to London, Mr. Pinckuey being then in 
Madrid." It is not a matter of much importance ; but as the volume 
of treaties, published by the United States In their Statutes at Large, 
does not contain the ratification, it may be as well to quote the au- 
thority for my statement. In the third volume of Mr. Pinckney's 
Letter Book, containing the correspondence between Mr. Deas, act- 
ing as Charge d' Affaires, and the Secretary of State, and also be- 
tween himself and Mr. Piuckney, will be found his letters, giving an 
account of the ratification. Under date of 23d of October, 1795, he 
writes to the Secretary of State : " Mr. Adams not having arrived in 
London by the 20th instant, I opened, agreeably to your direction, 
the despatches addressed to him, and on the same day acquainted 
Lord Grenville, the minister of the foreign department, by note, that 
I was authorized to exchange the ratifications, and transact what 
remained to be accomplished respecting it, and requested a confer- 
ence on the subject. He appointed this morning, when I waited 
upon him. Upon stating that I was possessed of the President's rat- 
ification of the treaty, conformably to the advice of the Senate, and 
offering to exchange the same for an equivalent ratification on the 
part of this government, his Lordship observed, unofficially^ that he 
had no reason to think such an exchange would not take place, but 
that it would be necessary to lay the business before the King for his 
determination. He requested a copy of the President's ratification, 



120 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

in its inception or execution, provoked a more violent or 
prejudiced popular excitement, or a warmer discussion 
in Congress. At public meetings throughout the coun- 
try, and in private correspondence, in voluminous essays 
and sharp pamphlets, the controversy raged, dealing in 
extravagant denunciation or labored panegyric. In the 
national legislature, it provoked the discussion of the 
gravest constitutional issues, and, in some sections of 
the country, excited the most discreditable riots. With 
the details of this great party contest, these pages have 

wliicli I have since sent him, and appointed Wednesday next, the 
28th, to conclude the business. . . . 

" The letter of credence was absolutely necessary ; for, upon open- 
ing my business, Lord Grenville remarked, that, it being unusual for 
the ratifications of a treaty to be exchanged by any other than the 
persons who negotiated it, it was necessary that he should see my 
powers. I handed to liim a copy of your letter of 25th August, which, 
after perusing, he observed was rather informal, and begged to know 
if I was furnished with any other ^japers. I then produced the letter 
of credence, with which he expressed himself perfectly satisfied." 
— pp. 262-205. 

On the oOth of October, writing to Mr. PInckney, he says, " The 
ratifications of the treaty were exchanged, on the 28th, without any 
objections to the additional article, which is inserted immediately 
after Mr. Jefferson's letter, and is in the words following." — p. 275. 
Writing to the same, on the 13th of November, 1795, he says: "Mr. 
Adams arrived from Holland the day before yesterday. As the rati- 
fications of the treaty had taken place, he of course waits until in- 
structions arrive relative to further negotiations, before he takes any 
steps." — p. 304. Mr. Pinckney returned from Spain before the arrival 
of any such instructions, and of course resumed his place as minister. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 121 

properly no concern ; and the lapse of more than half a 
century of national life, equivalent in its events and 
wonderful developments to centuries of older and 
slower years, has carried us far beyond an active sym- 
pathy with the partisan struggles of that day. This 
famous treaty has become part of our ancient history; 
and we ought to be able to do impartial justice to the 
exaggerations of honest patriotism in either party, to 
neutralize distempered invective by extravagant eulogi- 
um, and to pronounce calmly upon the character of this 
important transaction ; for, as in all such cases, " the 
debatable land " of party politics has long since passed 
under the "eminent domain" of history.* 

* On the 7th of March, 1796, after the ratification of the treaty 
with Great Britain, and before the motion was made in the House of 
Representatives for the appi-opriatiou necessary to its execution, Mr. 
Livingston, of New York, made in the House the following motion : 

" Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested 
to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the Minister 
of the United States, who' negotiated the treaty with the King of 
Great Britain, communicated by his message of the first of INIarch, 
with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said 
treaty." 

Upon this resolution ensued one of the most interesting and im- 
portant debates in our political annals. After a long discussion, in 
which the leaders of the House on both sides participated, the resolu- 
tion was adopted by a vote of 62 to 37. " Thus," says Mr. Benton, 
in whose valuable abridgment of Congressional Debates this debate 
will be found, " the House, by a majority of 25, passed the call upon 
the President for the papers, and ui)0u the declared ground of a 

11 



122 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

As a mere trial of diplomatic skill, this treaty is a 
confessed faihire ; for, with a solitary exception, the 

riglit to judge the treaty, as it contained a regulation of commerce, 
and also required an appi'opriation of money. President Washing- 
ton received the call in the sense In which it was made ; and although 
he had no objection to furnishing the papers, and liad laid them be- 
fore the Senate, (whence they became public,) yet he deemed it his 
duty to resist the claim of right asserted by the House, and therefore 
to refuse the papers, which he did In a closely reasoned message, an 
epitome of the arguments used in the House on that side." The 
House, in reply, by a vote of 57 to ^35, then passed the following 
resolutions : — 

" Resolved, That It being declared by the second section of the 
second article of the Constitution, ' that the President shall have 
power, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treaties, 2)ro- 
vided two thirds of the Senate present concur,' the House of Kep- 
resentatives do not claim any agency in making treaties; but that, 
when a treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted 
by the Constltutio)! to tlie power of Congress, it must depend for its 
execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laAvs to be passed by 
Congress, and it Is the constitutional right and duty of the House of 
Representatives, In all such cases, to deliberate on the ex2)edlency or 
inexpediency of cai'rylng such treaty into effect, and to determine 
and act thereon as, in their judgment, may be n\ost conducive to the 
public good. 

" Resolved, That it is not necessary to the propriety of any appli- 
cation from this House to the executive, for information desired by 
them, and which may relate to any constitutional functions of the 
House, that the purj)ose for which such Information may be wanted, 
or to which the same may be applied, should be stated In the appli- 
cation." 

The House of Representatives and the President were thus 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 123 

tardy evacuation of the posts, its ratification abandoned 
every position which the government had assumed in 
the preliminary discussions, and its formal diplomatic 
instructions. The condition of the country was too 
weak to insist upon an equality of exchanges ; and Mr. 

directly at issue ; but upon the final vote to make tlie necessary 
appropriation to carry tlie treaty into effect, after a protracted dis- 
cussion, the resolution to carry the treaty into effect was adopted by 
a vote of o 7 to 48. 

" This vote of the House," says Mr. Benton, " to carry the treaty 
into effect, was no abandonment of the right it had asserted to judge 
its merits, and to grant or withhold the appi-opriation according to 
its discretion." 

This may be so. And it is possible to suppose extreme cases, 
where a treaty may be so injurious that the patriotism of a House 
would be sorely tried in executing its provisions. But the vote of 
the House does not agree with what, I think, may now be fairly con- 
sidered the authoritative exposition of the Constitution. See Story 
and Kent. 

Where the Senate has acted with the President, within the Hmits 
of their constitutional prerogative, their action is final and binding. 
To give the House any power of revision or check can only spring 
from confounding the ideas oi power and right. That the House can, 
without violatipg any express clause of the Constitution, refuse an 
appropriation, is clear ; but that is far from proving the moral right of 
such refusal. It is impossible to create a government with any free- 
dom of action at all, without affording an opportunity for the abuse 
of that power ; and a capacity to do wrong does not surely imply a 
right to do so. And, however plausible certain extreme cases may be 
made to appear, it is certain, that, to adopt this theory would be to 
introduce inconsistency in the principles, and confusion in the 2)rac- 
tice, of the government. 



124 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Jay had little else to do than to accept or reject what 
the British government chose to offer. Nor, in the 
details of the treaty, considered as a regulation of our 
interests and a settlement of our difficulties, is there any 
thing to excite our pride. The posts were delivered up 
only after an additional and unnecessary delay ; — the 
question of the negroes, which involved a princi])le of 
the deepest import to one half the country, was aban- 
doned ; — impressment was not prevented ; — the injuri- 
ous and presumptuous interpolation into the law of 
nations, contained in the British orders of 1793, was 
acquiesced in ; — and the only concession offered to the 
conmierce of the country was so small, and its accom- 
panying conditions were so distasteful and injurious, 
that, after mature deliberation, the United States re- 
fused to accept it. 

But true as is all this, and paradoxical as it may seem, 
it is equally true that the ratification of the treaty of 
1794 was an immense benefit to the country. The con- 
dition of things was such, that some arrangement of 
the open questions between Great Britain and the 
United States, or war, 'was the impending alternative. 
For the policy of which Mr. Jefferson was the represent- 
ative, and which he had the opportunity of carrying out 
a few years after, was impracticable. That policy con- 
sisted in preserving neutrality between the contending 
parties, according to the strict letter of existing treaties ; 
but to infuse a warmer and friendlier temper into the 
relations with France on the one hand, and at the same 



DIPLOMATIC niSTor. Y. 125 

time to oppose the commercial illiberality of CTi-eat 
Britain by a system of reciprocal domestic restriction 
at home. A Httle examination will show, that this pol- 
icy would have efiectually injured our own commerce, 
excited strong sectional irritation, checked very consid- 
erably the spirit of commercial and maritime enterprise, 
which, in spite of all dilficulties, was rapidly developing 
itself, and failed entirely to remove any one of the causes 
of ill feehng between the two nations. Gen. Washing- 
ton thought differently. The tone of France was be- 
coming every day more insolent, and her demands more 
exacting, while the progress of the Revolution was 
diminishing constantly the real material interests which 
connected her with the United States. But it was im- 
possible to reply to France with becoming temper, while 
the presence of British troops on the soil of the United 
States, and the unscrupulous disregard of neutral rights 
by England, kept alive and strengthened the bitter 
popular animosity, wliich the events of the revolu- 
tionary Vv^ar had excited. Some arrangement with 
England was therefore indispensable ; such an arrange- 
ment as he desired he could not obtain, and he there- 
fore wisely determined to take what he could get. In 
the first place, the negotiation of any treaty was a 
point gained. For in this, as in every difficulty be- 
tween England and the United States, grave as were 
the issues, they were complicated by a conviction on 
the mind of the American people, of a supercilious in- 
difference on the part of England as to their feelings, 
11* 



126 DIPLOMi\TIC HISTORY. 

accompanied by a shrewd and active desire to injure 
their interests. The fact that questions of prime im- 
portance to them had been wilfully left open by Great 
Britain, that remonstrance after remonstrance had been 
neglected, that discussion was provokingly delayed, and 
that the reciprocity of diplomatic representation had 
been slowly conceded and barely sustained, were sources 
of perpetual comijlaint. A treaty put an end to this 
vague but powerful dissatisfaction. The discussion of 
differences implied a certain respect and consideration 
for the parties w4th whom they were conducted ; and 
although there might be sti-ong, perhaps insuperable, 
difficulties, a frank commencement of explanation was 
a great step to satisfactory settlement. Then the evac- 
uation of the posts removed one great offence ; the as- 
sumption of the British debts by the United States, sub- 
ject to the decision of a joint commission, however 
doubtful in principle, put an end to a clamor on the part 
of a large and influential class in England, which was 
always provoking angry retorts from the United States, 
and thus keeping up the bad blood between the two 
countries; and the appointment of another commission 
to decide upon the alleged violation of neutral rights 
might fairly be represented as an approach towards 
justice. Unpopular, too, as the treaty might be, it had 
this great advantage. As long as the popular feeling 
was excited against Great Britain as the direct cause of 
all these evils, its expression tended to the encourage- 
ment of actual hostilities ; and in connection with the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 127 

sympathy for France, growing stronger every day, could 
not have been long repressed. But as soon as the 
treaty — an act of the United States government — 
was interposed between England and the ])opular feel- 
ing, the excitement, though concentrated in its current, 
was diverted in its channel ; and the same popular in- 
dignation, which, directed against England, w^as almost 
too strong for control, when directed against the treaty, 
encountered an opposition equally national in its char- 
acter and patriotic in its motive. And thus questions, 
which at one time threatened to involve the country in 
foreign war, passed passionately, but harmlessly, into 
the safer arena of domestic politics. For it must be 
recollected, that the basis upon which the justification 
of this treaty rests is, that it was the alternative of 
war, — a war in which the United States could, accord- 
ing to the confession of s- contemporary statesmf n, have 
barely maintained their existence and their honor; and 
that, by accepting this treaty, while they avoided war 
with England, they so strengthened their position that 
they were enabled to avoid a war with France, and so 
preserved the opportunity for that development which 
enabled them, in future years, to deal with both powders 
on the footing of the most perfect equality. The great 
merit, therefore, of Gen. Washington's administration 
is, that it was. wise enough to recognize, and firm 
enough to accept, a great national necessity. And this 
is no slight praise. It is an easy and pleasant thing 
for a statesman to become the instrument of naiional 



128 DIPLOMATIC n I S T n Y . 

strengil), the iiioutli-piece of naiional pride; but only 
to a few chief spirits of history is it given to create 
strength from their weakness, and to develop a noble 
pride from a wise humility. This high privilege was, 
however, granted to Washington and the great men 
who supported him in that momentous struggle. They 
were forced to stand with folded arn)s in the presence 
of wrongs which 1he}r resented; to check national sym- 
pathies Avhich they shared ; to confess national weakness 
which they deplored. Bat tliey looked beyond the 
wonnded pride of the present moment to the sober cer- 
tainly of a future recompense. They had failh enongh 
in their work to trust the future to posterity, and -suffi- 
ciently and successfully has that posterity vindicated 
their jiolicy. 

This view of the treaty, while it authorizes the pro- 
foujidest admiration for those who negotiated and main- 
tained it, allows us at the same time to comprehend 
thoroughly, and appreciate fairly, the earnest patriotism 
of that great party which opposed it. Tr is easy to un- 
derstand how rej)ugnant to many sincere convictions, 
how odious to many ]io)iest prejudices, how injurious 
to many important interests, this treaty must have ap- 
peared ; and we may well be grateful that the elements 
of political strife were so temj:)ered that mutual con- 
cession and opposition worked together upon the popu- 
lar mind, and the very progress of the ado))tion of an 
unsalisfaclory and unpopular treaty tended to that 
unitj and energy of national senliment, which was sure, 
in time, to render all such treaties unnecessary. 



CHAPTER III. 

NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTENTION ATITH FRANCE. 

■Whex Mr. Jefferson was appointed Secretary of 
State, it became necessary to nominate a successor for 
the French mission ; and certainly, a more perfect con- 
trast to Mr. Jefferson than- that successor it would 
have been impossible to find. Gouverneur Morris 
sprang from a family which had for generations pos- 
sessed large wealth and wielded great political influ- 
ence in New York. His grandfather had been Gov- 
ernor of New Jersey, and Chief Justice of New York. 
His father had held high judicial office in New York, 
wdth jurisdiction extending into the neighboring colo- 
nies. His uncle had held both judicial and executive 
office of the highest rank in New Jersey and Pennsyl- 
vania. Of his three brothers, one was a signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, another was Chief Jus- 
tice of New Y'^ork, and the third had been for some 
years an officer in the British army, and a member of 
Parliament. Mr. Morris himself had taken an active 
part in the politics of the United States, He was a 
member of the Continental Congress, assistant finan- 



130 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

cier to bis eminent kinsman, Robert Morris, who was 
the fiijancial genius of the Revolution, and a member 
of the convention which framed the Constitution. He 
was one of Washington's most intimate friends, and 
had been intrusted by him with the informal negotia- 
tions with England, the history of which has already 
been narrated. He was an accomj)lished scholar, a 
thiiiker of some deptJi and great quickness, and as an 
orator he had dislinguislied himself both in the Con- 
gress and ii] the convention, where his manner ^vas 
eminently graceful, and his style both pointed and 
fluent. In spite of an accident by u-hich he had lost 
a leg, he \vas a man of elegant address and coiu'tly 
mannc^rs, fond of the pleasant courtesies of society, and 
an e\j)e"rt in tluit delicate social science which adds a 
charm to the warmlli of hospitality by the relincment 
of its tlisplay. h\ more regular times, his presence in 
Paris would Iiave becMi agreeable to the court of France, 
and serviceable to his own government. As it Vv^as, 
never was an anibassador more miserably misplaced. 
He received his appointment — an appointment very 
reluctanlly confirmed by tlte Sejiate — in 179.2, in 
Paris, where he had been residing, with short absences, 
since 1789. In connnunicating the appointment. Gen- 
eral Washingto)! addressed him specially and privately, 
and stated the ol)jeclions which had been made to his 
nomination. " L was urged," said he, "that, in France 
you were considered as a favorer of the aristocracy, and 
unfriendly to its Revolution (I suppose they meant the 



I 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 131 

constitution) ; that under this impression, you could not 
be an acceptable character, and, of consequence, you 
would not be able, however willing, to promote the 
interest of this country in an essential degree." Wheth- 
er, at this time, anyljody could have served the coun- 
try "in an essential degree," may well be doubled; but 
if there was one man who must have been peculiarly 
unacceptable to every adminisi ration with which he had 
to deal, from, Dumourier, who was Minister of Foreign 
Affairs when he was presented, to the bloodthirsty ruf- 
fians who were in power when he was recalled, Mr. 
Morris was that man. During the two or three years 
previous to his appointment, in wliich he had resided 
in Paris, he had identified himself, as completely as it 
was possible for a stranger, with the King's friends. 
He expressed openly his conviction that the new consti- 
tution was a faihu'e; and, through those connected 
with the court, had submitted to his Majesty the draft 
of an address to be made when accepting the constitu- 
tion. The address commences thus : — 

"GENTLEMEN: It is no longer your King who ad- 
dresses you. Louis XVI. is only a private individual. 
You have just offered liim the crovrn, and informed liiin 
on what conditions he i))ust accept it. I assure you, 
gentlemen, that if I were a stranger in France, I wtrnld 
not mount the slippery steps of the throne." It con- 
cludes: '• I have been a king. Notliing remains for me 
now either of authority or of infhience. Vet I have a 
last duty to fulfil. It is that of imparting to you my 



132 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

reflections on your work. I pray you to hear them 
with serious attention." And then follows a very long, 
but not very profound political essay, on the faults of 
the constitution which he had just accepted. Accom- 
panying this strange paper was a still stranger memoir, 
given to Mons. Montmorin on the 31st of August, 
1791. It appears not to have reached the King until 
after his acceptance of the constitution, and was re- 
turned to Mr. Morris, with a request for a translation. 
It would be useless to review this document, but one 
paragraph deserves notice. Speaking of the King in 
the third person, Mr. Morris says: "But it is important 
for him to show that he has acted consistently. And 
yet this should be accomplished in such a manner as to 
produce the effect, without appearing to intend it ; be- 
cause such appearance would place him in the situation 
of one who defends himself before his judges ; and a 
king should never forget Lliat he is accountable only to 
Godr 

That Mr. Morris was entitled to hold his own opin- 
ions, and, so long as he was a private person, to advise 
any policy to which his Majesty thought fit to listen, 
and to act with any party who had his sympathies, and 
whose confidence he had, nobody will dispute. But it 
is equally as indisputable, that any one holding such 
opinions, and so connected, could be of no possible ser- 
vice either to France or the United States, in a diplo- 
matic capacity, at that time. But Mr. Morris's inter- 
ference did not end when his public character began. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 133 

As minister of the United States, he contrived, and 
very nearly accompHshed, the escape of Louis XVI. 
from Paris. He became that monarch's agent, by re- 
ceiving and disbursing a large amount of money ; and 
the unexpended balance of that fund he preserved and 
accounted for, after the termination of his mission. 
While it is impossible to attach any moral blame to 
this conduct, while it is impossible not to sympathize 
with Mr. Morris's righteous indignation at the horrors 
with which he was surrounded, while every instinct of 
common humanity would rejoice at the success of his 
earnest endeavor, it is impossible to justify his conduct 
as the diplomatic representative of the United States. 
The minister of any other pow^er occupied a different 
position. The representatives of the kindred Bourbon 
dynasties, the ambassadors of allied monarchs, woidd 
have been justified in regarding Louis as France. Not 
so with the minister of the United States. They had 
received from Louis himself notice of his acceptance 
of the new constitution, and they had expressed their 
joy at the prospect of a freer life to the French nation. 
Any difference between the French monarch and the 
Assembly was a subject purely domestic, and their min- 
ister could not interfere with decency. If, after that 
constitution had gone into operation, such disorganiza- 
tion was the result as dissolved all authority, the course 
of Mr. Mon-is was clear; either to disembarrass himself 
promptly of his diplomatic character, or inform liis gov- 
ernment of the state of things, and wait their decision. 
12 



134 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

His action, such as it was, was injudicious, inconsist- 
ent, and not mischievous only because it was useless.* 
As may be supposed, his residence in Paris was far 
from agreeable. The majesty which he reverenced and 
would have served was humiliated, persecuted, mur- 
dered. The graceful and generous society which he 
loved was scattered by death, and into exile. The gov- 
ernment to which he was accredited was administered 
by fierce fanatics or rude and ribald ruffians. His 
house was thronged with pale and trembling fugitives, 
whose prosperity he had shared, and whose weakness 
he protected with a courage worthy of his character and 
his country. His differences with the government be- 
came every day more serious, and his personal annoy- 
ances more irritating. Almost his only diplomatic 
duties were to protest, and to protest vainly, against 
French decrees which violated neutral rights, and the 
lawless depredation of French privateers. His diplo- 
matic colleagues, one after another, had withdrawn 
from the dismal and bloody city ; and he, finally, with- 

* While commenting thus freely upon the conduct of Mr. Morris 
in permitting his honorable and natural sympathies to govern his 
public course, it is but fair to add the following extract from a letter 
of the Duke of Dorset, the English ambassador at Paris. Writing 
to Mr. Pitt, July 9, 1789, he said: "Mr. Jefferson, the American 
minister at this court, has been a great deal consulted by the prin- 
cipal leaders of the tiers etat ; and I have great reason to think it 
was owing to his advice that order called itself L'AssemUee Na- 
tionale." — Tomline's Life of Pitt, Vol. II. p. 260. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 135 

out abandoning his diplomatic character, removed to 
Sainport, about thirty miles from Paris, where he pur- 
chased a country residence, and remained until his 
recall. 

While the presence of IVIr. Morris in Paris was far 
from beneficial to the relations of the two countries, 
the extraordinary conduct of the French minister at 
Philadelphia was forcing the governments to an im- 
mediate issue. M. Genet had been sent from Paris in 
1793, just after the declaration of war against England. 
When he left France, the feeble virtues of the Giron- 
dists were fast yielding before the unscrupulous energy 
of their opponents, and, as a party, they were sinking 
from power to persecution ; while the Jacobin party, 
under the lead of Robespierre, was gathering to itself 
those elements of fierce and relentless strength with 
which, soon after, it terrified and trampled over the 
allied monarchies of Europe. M. Genet did not share 
the ferocious fanaticism of the Jacobins ; but the smell 
of blood was on his ambassadorial garments. As the 
representative of the Convention, he spoke from the 
scaffold of Louis, the true and tried friend of the peo- 
ple among whom he had come. His conduct could not 
be discreet nor his language moderate, as, unfortunately 
for himself, whatever may been his private virtues, he 
was the mouth-piece of a usurped and selfish despot- 
ism. Scarcely had he landed, therefore, before he ex- 
hibited in his words and deeds that reckless insolence 
which is the constant accompaniment of a false and 



136 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

forced authority. He had come to the country to use 
it, — as a commissioner of the Convention, to draft its 
men, convert its money, and constrain its laws, in sub- 
servience to the policy of France. He began where he 
landed ; and, from Charleston to New York, he organ- 
ized public opinion, enlisted men, equipped vessels, and 
commissioned privateers. In vain the government re- 
monstrated with him, warned him, checked him. Every 
remonstrance provoked a more extravagant reply ; every 
warning was followed by a renewed violation of law 
and courtesy; and, finally, when a positive prohibition 
stopped him in his violent career, he denounced the 
conduct of the government in language unparalleled in 
the diplomatic intercourse of the world. " In vain," 
was his insulting reply, " in vain the desire to preserve 
peace leads you to sacrifice the interests of France to 
this interest of the moment ; in vain the thirst for riches 
preponderates against honor, in the political balance of 
America ; all this management, all these condescen- 
sions, all this humiliation, end in nothing. Our enemies 
laugh at it ; and the French, too confident, are punished 
for having believed that the American nation had a 
flag ; that it had some respect for its laws, some convic- 
tion of its force, and that it had some sentiment of its 
dignity. ... If our fellow-citizens have been deceived, 
if you are not in a condition to maintain the sover- 
eignty of your people, speak. We have guaranteed it 
when slaves : we know how to render it respectable hav- 
ing become free." This language forced the govern- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 137 

mcnt to demand his immediate recall. The French 
government complied with the demand, but it accom- 
panied its acquiescence with a desire that Mr. Morris 
should be likewise recalled from Paris, a request which 
was immediately granted. But the personal career of 
these two ministers, useless in one case, and mischiev- 
ous in the other, was only an incident among greater 
events, and a symptom of the working of those princi- 
ples which shaped the policy of the country, and to the 
course of which, disembarrassed of their personal con- 
nection, attention must now be directed. 

However public sentiment may have been affected 
towards the events and principles of the French Rev- 
olution, the declaration of war by the new republic 
against England, in February, 1793, made the relation 
of the United States to France a question of practical 
politics. For, by the treaty and convention negotiated 
with the old French monarchy, the United States had 
bound themselves to perform certain duties, and had 
assumed certain responsibilities. By the treaty of alli- 
ance, they had guaranteed the French possessions in 
America, had pledged themselves to put France com- 
mercially on the footing of the most favored nation, had 
undertaken a system of mutual convoy and protection, 
had entered into a special agreement as to contraband, 
had assured to France the right of bringing into Ameri- 
can ports all prizes without restraint or question, had 
excluded all prizes of her enemies from the same ])rivi- 
lege, and, by the consular convention, had permitted 
12 • 



138 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

the organization of a consular jurisdiction, which might 
easily, if not legitimately, be expanded into an exclusive 
authority on the most important and delicate neutral 
questions. The declaration of war summoned the 
United States distinctly to the discharge of these obli- 
gations, the faithful execution of which must necessarily 
have involved them in a war with England. But with 
that nation they were at peace, and the commercial 
interests of the country required that they should con- 
tinue so ; while the condition both of their military 
strength and financial capacity made the idea of war 
impossible. And yet, unfortunately, both England and 
France deemed it necessary, not indeed to compel the 
participation of the United States in actual war, but to 
disregard altogether the neutral position which it was 
their great policy to occupy. At the outset, therefore, 
there were two courses open to the United States ; — 
either to give way to the pressure of circumstances, and 
join one or the other of the contending parties, or to de- 
clare the French treaties null and void, and, without 
approaching England, hold themselves free and neutral. 
Neither their wishes nor their weakness permitted the 
first course. And although the execution of the treaties 
in their spirit was scarcely reconcilable with a genuine 
neutrality, the second course was opposed by a strong 
public sentiment, which naturally sympathized with 
France ; by the unfriendly, if not hostile relations with 
England ; and by the fact that it was doubtful if France 
would admit any such right of abrogation, and would 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 139 

not consider its exercise as a declaration of war. It is 
true, that, when the treaty of amity and alliance was 
concluded, it was concluded with France occupying an 
established position in the European system ; a position, 
which, involving certain well-known relations with other 
powers, afforded to both governments the means of a 
reasonable calculation as to the nature, extent, and con- 
sequences of their obligations. Now the Revolution in 
France had destroyed that position, altered those rela- 
tions, and forced consequences upon those obligations 
such as the original parties could never have contem- 
plated. Besides which, the French government had, in 
Condorcet's famous report on the declaration of war 
against Austria, claimed the right, under her changed 
circumstances, of detemaining for herself what treaties of 
the old monarchy she would accept, and what reject, — 
a right which she could not, therefore, deny to any 
other parties to her treaties. But such an abrogation 
carried with it an implied condemnation of the French 
Revolution, and an inferential denial of popular rights, 
which were totally inconsistent with the historical posi- 
tion of the United States ; while, in case of a general 
war, great benefits might be drawn from the faithful 
execution, by France, of certain articles in the treaty. 
After long and conscientious deliberation. General 
Washington determined upon a course which was 
neither one nor the other ; and which, notwithstanding 
its fair and honest spirit, combined, it must be acknowl- 
edged, the difficulties of both. He resolved to main- 



140 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

tain neutrality and the French treaty together ; and, on 
(^ the 22d of April, 1793, published his proclamation of 
^^ neutrality : — 

" Whereas it appears that a state of war exists be- 
tween Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and 
the United Netherlands on the one part, and France on 
the other; and the duty and interest of the United 
States require that they should, with sincerity and good 
faith, adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impar- 
tial towards the belligerent powers : — 

" I have, therefore, thought fit, by these presents, to 
declare the disposition of the United States to observe 
the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively, 
and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United 
States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings what- 
soever, which may in any manner tend to contravene 
such disposition. 

" And I do hereby also make known, that whoso- 
ever of the citizens of the United States shall render 
himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law 
of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities 
against any one of the said powers, or by carrying to 
any of them those articles which are deemed contra- 
band by the modern usage of nations, will not receive 
the protection of the United States against such pun- 
ishment or forfeiture ; and, further, that I have given 
instructions to those officers to whom it belongs, to 
cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons 
who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTOKY. 141 

United States, violate the law of nations with respect 
to the powers at war, or any of them. 

" George Washington. 
" By the President, Thomas Jefferson." 
Scarcely had this proclamation been published, than 
the difficulties of the course resolved on began to de- 
velop themselves. From one end of the country to the 
other, public opinion was in a ferment. Public meet- 
ings, under the influence of passionate speeches, passed 
resolutions of the most extravagant sympathy with 
France. Turbulent spirits everywhere hastened to 
the French minister with offers of material aid ; arms 
were purchased, privateers fitted out, commissions 
issued, and the French minister superintended these 
illegal proceedings with ail the insolent effrontery that 
sprang from the consciousness of a popular power 
which he deemed above the administration. Every 
day brought a new subject of complaint ; and the 
Department of State was involved in perpetual and ini- 
tating controversy Avith M. Genet, who apjjealed, not 
without a show of reason, to the covenanted friend- 
ship of the treaty of alliance. 

Besides complaints of so trivial a character that they 
would have been simply ridiculous, but for the studied 
impertinence of tone in which they were couched, 
M. Genet, under the 22d article of the treaty, which 
provided that " it shall not be lawful for any foreign 
privateers, not belonging to the subjects of the most 
Christian King, nor citizens of the said United States 



142 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

who have commissions from any prince or state in 
amity with either nation, to fit their ships in the ports 
of either the one or the other of the aforesaid parties," 
claimed the right of arming privateers in the ports, and 
enlisting the citizens, of the United States. To this, 
Mr. Jefferson rejjlied, that the right of arming privateers, 
not being a natural right, and depending upon express 
treaty provision, could not be claimed by inference ; 
and that prohibition of this right to one nation, did not 
necessarily imply permission to another; that it was 
one thing to forbid any nation at war with France to 
arm in American ports, but another and a very differ- 
ent thing to permit French privateers to arm therein 
against any other nation; that to give such negative 
stipulations an affirmative effect would be to render 
them inconsistent, and, in good faith, impossible. 
France herself was, previous to the war with Eng- 
land, bound by treaty stipulation not to allow the 
arming of privateers in her ports of nations at war 
with England. If, then, the United States had been 
at war with England, and the 22d article of the treaty 
with France was construed according to the French 
interpretation, she would be bound by one treaty to 
allow American privateers to arm in her ports, while by 
another, equally positive, she was bound to forbid such 
a proceeding. If, therefore, such a right was not the 
strict and inevitable consequence of the treaty, to per- 
mit it in the present case would be so far distinctly to 
abandon the neutrality between France and her ene- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 143 

mies, upon which the government had formally re- 
solved. 

Several British vessels having been taken within the 
waters of the United States by French privateers, the 
government demanded their restitution, stating ex- 
plicitly, that, in case of refusal, it would itself make the 
necessary compensation, and hold the French govern- 
ment responsible for repayment. In reply to this, 
M. Genet claimed, that, under the treaty, and espe- 
cially in view of the consular convention, the courts 
of the United States could take no cognizance as to 
whether vessels held by the French as prizes were 
lawful prizes or not ; that such jurisdiction belonged 
exclusively to their consulates, which had recently, by 
decree of the Assembly, been erected into complete 
courts of admiralty. In reply, Mr. Jefferson denied the 
right of the French government to extend their consular 
jurisdiction by investing their consuls with admiralty 
powers, unless with consent expressly given by the 
United States. But without dwelling upon this point, 
which the unfortunate consular convention perhaps 
rendered disputable, he declared that the United States 
claimed no right to determine the question of prize as 
to captures made on the high seas, but that the United 
States were bound, in virtue of their voluntarily as- 
sumed neutrality, to protect their own waters, and to 
maintain the inviolability of every vessel within their 
maritime limits ; that they had, therefore, in every case, 
a perfect right to determine whether a capture had been 



144 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

made within their waters, and if it had, they were fur- 
ther bound to dissolve such illegal seizure. 

M. Genet further demanded that the United States, 
having stipulated with France, that, as hetiveen them, 
free ships should make free goods, they were bound to 
enforce that doctrine, as a principle of international law, 
against all the belligerents in the present war ; — that 
merchant vessels, coming into American ports with such 
armaments as are usually carried for self-protection, 
should be treated as privateers, or at least not allowed 
to return to sea with such armament; — and that all 
goods captured by French privateers should be sold in 
the ports of the United States without the imposition 
of the customs duty usually charged on ordinary 
merchandise. In other words, M. Genet demanded 
that the United States should do every thing which 
an ally could, without committing an overt and direct 
act of hostility to England. The United States, on the 
other hand, had resolved to carry out a system of com- 
plete neutrality, and to allow it to be infringed only 
where the narrowest and strictest interpretation of the 
treaties with France compelled them to deviate in the 
discharge of treaty obligations. The real condition of 
the two nations was evidently inconsistent with their 
treaty relations. The treaties had been formed at a 
time when the interests and sympathies of the two na- 
tions were identical, and they reflected correctly both 
the public sentiment and the political necessities of 
their dates. But circumstances had gi'eatly changed, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 145 

and it was possible for neither party to discharge their 
obligations with reciprocal advantage. The French 
Republic demanded that the alliance made with the old 
monarchy should be carried out in the spirit of frank and 
friendly reciprocity in which it was formed ; forgetting 
that their revolution had literally obliterated one of the 
contracting parties, and that they could prove no suc- 
cession to its sentiments, interests, or rights. While 
the United States were compelled to reply to these de- 
mands, exacting in tone and disastrous in consequence, 
by that sort of special pleading which, however logical 
and necessary, is scarcely ever in conformity w^ith the 
temper " of a true and sincere friendship." 

While the French minister was making reclamations 
and claiming the privileges of the treaty in one interest, 
the British legation was clamorous in the other. Mr. 
Hammond watched the proceedings of the French 
minister closely ; and whenever a complaint could be 
supported or an argument made, he appealed to the 
principles of the proclamation against M. Genet's 
interpretation of the treaties. Between the two, the 
course of the government was difficult and dangerous ; 
but having entered upon it in good faith, the adminis- 
tration advanced with firmness and ability. But the 
contest in Europe was fast assuming colossal propor- 
tions. The whole world was in arms, and in the ter- 
rible sti'ugglc for existence upon which the nations soon 
entered, all rules of right, all those sacred principles 

which, in times of ordinary strife, protect truth and 

13 



146 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

weakness, were swept before the storm. Whenever 
neutral duties served the purpose of the combatants, 
they were sternly exacted ; whenever neutral rights in- 
terfered with the violence of conquest, or stood in the 
>path of destruction, they were relentlessly stricken 
down ; and again, in the history of the world, there 
opened a sorrowful period, when might, red and ruth- 
less, put its foot in bloody triumph on the neck of shud- 
dering humanity. 

It was at this period of distress and danger that 
General Washington, in pursuance of the policy which 
has been described, undertook those negotiations with 
England which terminated in the treaty of 1794, and 
the progress and results of which have been related in 
the preceding chapter. 

The first consequences of this treaty tended greatly 
to increase the embarrassment of the government. At 
the same time that Mr. Jay had been sent to England, 
Mr. Morris had been recalled from Paris ; and it became 
necessary to appoint a successor. The selection was a 
matter of grave and pressing importance, not only as 
indicating, by the character of the party from whom the 
selection was made, the tendencies of the administra- 
tion, but also on account of the delicacy of the negotia- 
tions committed to the charge of the new minister ; for 
it was his business, not merely to maintain, but if pos- 
sible to improve, the relations between France and the 
United States, and to reconcile France to the results of 
the negotiation with England. In making the selec- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 147 

tion, General Washington gave striking evidejice of 
that disregard of mere party connection, which was one 
of the special traits of his administration. But it must 
be confessed that his choice only proved, by its conse- 
quences, how entirely impracticable such a principle is, 
in ajjplication to the necessities of political life. The 
mission was tendered to, and accepted by, James Mon- 
roe of Virginia, who had served with credit during the 
war of the Revolution, and was, at the time of his ap- 
pointment, United States Senator from his native State. 
The singular character of this appointment will best 
appear from Mr. Monroe's own description of his polit- 
ical position at that time : — 

" I was at this time a member of the Senate of the 
United States, for the State of Virginia, which station 
I had held for several years before. It had been, too, 
my fortune to differ from the administration upon 
many of our most important public measures. It is not 
necessary to specify here the several instances in which 
this variance in political sentiment took place between 
the administration and myself. I think proper, how- 
ever, to notice two examples of it, since they serve to 
illustrate the principles on which that variance was 
founded, and the light in whicli I was known to the 
administration and my country, before the proposal 
was made to me. The first took place when Mr. Mor- 
ris was nominated Minister Plenipotentiary to the 
French Republic ; which nomination I opposed, because 
I was persuaded, from INIr. Morris's known political 



148 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

character and principles, that his appointment — espec- 
ially at a period when the French nation was in a 
course of revolution from an arbitrary to a free govern- 
ment — w^ould tend to discountenance the republican 
cause there and at home, and otherwise weaken, and 
greatly to our prejudice, the connection subsisting be- 
tween the two countries. The second took place when 
JMi". Jay was nominated to Great Britain ; which nomi- 
nation, too, I opposed, because, under ail the well- 
known circumstances of the moment, I was of opinion 
we could not adopt such a measure consistently either 
with propriety or any reasonable prospect of adequate 
success ; since, being a measure without tone, and one 
which secured to that power time, which of all things 
it wished to secure, it seemed better calculated to 
aaiswer its purposes than, ours ; moreover, because 
I was of opinion, in the then state of European 
affairs, it would be made by the enemies of the two 
republics the means of embroiling us with France, the 
other party to the European war; and because I 
thought it was unconstitutional to appoint a member 
of the judiciary into an executive office ; and, lastly, 
because I also thought, from a variety of considera- 
tions, that it would be difficult to find, within the 
limits of the United States, a person who was more 
likely to improve, to the gi-eatest possible extent, the 
mischief to which the measure naturally exposed us. 
This last example took place only a few weeks before 
my appointment, which was on the 28th of May, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 140 

1794." * The effect of this appointment was most 
unfortunate ; for it forbade what was, at the moment, 
of prime importance to the success of either mission, — 
a complete understanding and sympathy between the 
administration at home and their minister in Paris, 
and tliat mutual confidence between the ministers to 
England and France, which was absolutely necessary 
if they were to work together harmoniously for a com- 
mon purpose. 

Besides the general directions relative to such points 
as required special negotiation, Mr. Monroe was re- 
minded by the Secretary of State, in his official instruc- 
tions, that — 

" The President has been an early and decided friend 
of the French Revolution, and whatever reason there 
may have been, under our ignorance of facts and policy , 
to suspend an opinion upon some of its important 
transactions, yet is he immutable in his wishes for its 
accomplishment, — incapable of assenting to the right 
of any foreign prince to meddle with its interior ar- 
rangements, and persuaded that success will attend 
their efforts ; and particularly, that union among them- 
selves is an impregnable barrier against external as- 
saults. . . . We have, therefore, pursued neutrality with 
faithfulness ; we have paid more of our debt to France 
than was absolutely due, as the Secretary of the Treas- 

* Monroe's View of the Conduct of tlie Executive in Foreign 
Affairs, etc. etc. Philadelphia, 1797. p. Ill, iv. 

13* 



150 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ury asserts ; and we should have paid more, if the state 
of our affairs did not require us to be prepared with 
funds for the possible event of war. We mean to con- 
tinue the same line of conduct in future ; and, to 
remove all jealousy with respect to Mr. Jay's mission 
to London, you may say, that he is positively forbidden 
to weaken the engagements between this country and 
France. It is not improbable that you will be obliged 
to encounter, on this head, suspicions of various kinds. 
But you may declare the motives of that mission to be 
to obtain immediate compensation for our plundered 
property, and restitution of the posts. You may inti- 
mate, by way of argument, without ascribing it to the 
government, that if war should be necessary, the affec- 
tions of the people of the United States towards it 
would be better secured by a manifestation that every 
step had been taken to avoid it ; and that the British 
nation would be divided when they found that we had 
been forced into it. . . . To this matter you cannot be 
too attentive ; and you will be amply justified in repel- 
ling with firmness any imputation of the most distant 
intention to sacrifice our connection with France to 
any connection with England. You may back your 
assertions by a late determination of the President to 
have it signified abroad, that he is averse to admit into 
his public room, which is free to all the world beside, 
any Frenchmen who are obnoxious to the French 
Republic. . . . To conclude ; you go, sir, to France to 
strengthen our friendship with that country; and you 



I 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 151 

are well acquainted with the line of freedom and ease 
to which you may advance without betraying the dig- 
nity of the United States. You will show our confi- 
dence in the French Republic, without betraying the 
most remote mark of undue complaisance. You will 
let it be seen, that, in case of war with any nation on 
earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural 
ally. You may dwell upon the sense which we enter- 
tain of past services, and for the more recent interposi- 
tion, on our behalf, with the Dey of Algiers. Among 
the great events with which the world is teeming, there 
may be an opening for France to become instrumental 
in securing to us the free navigation of the Mississippi. 
Spain may perhaps negotiate a peace, separate from 
Great Britain, with France. If she does, the JVIissis- 
sippi may be acquired through this channel, especially 
if you contrive to have our mediation in any manner 
solicited." 

Along with these instructions. My. Monroe received 
the official reply of the House of Representatives to 
the French Committee of Public Safety, which was 
made through the Secretary of State. In making 
this response, the Secretary said : " The President of 
the United States has consigned this honorable and 
grateful function to the Department of State. In no 
manner can it be more properly discharged than by 
seizing the occasion of declaring to the ally of the 
United States, that the cause of liberty, in the defence 
of which so much American blood and treasure have 



152 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

been lavished, is cherished by our Republic with increas- 
ing enthusiasm ; that under the standard of liberty, 
wheresoever it shall be displayed, the affections of the 
United States will always rally ; and that the successes 
of those who stand forth as her avengers, will be gloried 
in by the United States, and w411 be felt as the suc- 
cesses of themselves and the other friends of humanity." 
With these instructions to guide him, Mr. Monroe 
arrived in Paris on the 2d of August, 1794, about two 
months after the arrival of Mr. Jay in London. He 
found the commercial interests of the country suffering 
under legislative enactments, impolitic in themselves, 
and at variance with the explicit stipulations of exist- 
ing treaties ; general distrust of the sentiments and 
intentions of the United States ; great dissatisfaction 
with the course and sympathies of his predecessor; a 
special jealousy of Mr. Jay's mission to London, and 
an apparent conviction that his own embassy was a 
mere feint to withdraw the attention of the French 
government, and to amuse it with warm expressions 
of friendship until the conclusion of the English nego- 
tiation should enable them to droji the mask. The 
objects of his mission were : — 1. To raise the embargo 
wdiich had been laid at Bourdeaux, as far as it affected 
American vessels, and to obtain compensation for any 
loss under its previous action. 2. To obtain compensa- 
tion for the illegal captures which American commerce 
had suffered at the hands of French privateers. 3. To 
correct certain violations of the explicit provisions of 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 153 

the ti-eaties between the two countries. 4. To explain 
the objects of Mr. Jay's mission, and to remove any 
suspicion entertained by the French government as to 
the character of its objects. And, 5. To obtain, if 
possible, the cooperation of France in an effort to 
secure from Spain the free navigation of the Missis- 
sippi. The first and second points were easily and 
promptly put in train for friendly solution. The third 
somewhat embarrassed him, for he was afraid to de- 
mand explicitly the fulfilment of the treaty stipulations, 
lest the French government should reciprocate by a 
demand for the execution of the guarantee of the 
West Indian possessions by the United States. In- 
deed, when he approached the subject, he was met by 
the question, directly put, " Do you demand the strict 
execution of the treaties ? " And it was only by a 
judicious evasion that he avoided the consequences of a 
rejily, and succeeded, after some negotiation, in obtain- 
ing the repeal of the decrees by which the treaty was 
violated. As to the fifth object, he took the necessary 
measures to secure its accomplishment, and was, to 
some extent, favored by circumstances in advancing the 
views of his government, when the negotiations with 
Spain were transferred to Mr. Pinckney, and he was 
relieved of further attention to them. But the fourth 
object of his mission was surrounded with difficulties, 
and not only created perpetual embarrassment with 
the French government, but involved him in unpleasant 
misunderstandinof witii the administration at home. 



154 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Under the circumstances of his appointment, and 
resting upon the explicit language of his instructions, 
Mr. Monroe felt authorized to assure the French gov- 
ernment, that the mission to England was intended 
simply to obtain the evacuation of the posts, and com- 
pensation for losses sustained by American commerce 
from the English naval and privateering forces, and 
that it contemplated no negotiation which could affect 
the relations between France and the United States, or 
weaken in any degree the sincere friendship which 
existed between them ; and these opinions he undoubt- 
edly expressed in language of very highly colored en- 
thusiasm. The French government w^atched the prog- 
ress of the British treaty with suspicious jealousy ; and 
IVIr. Monroe soon found that he needed the most ac- 
curate information in reference to its probable character, 
in order to meet the constant and unfriendly references 
made to it. He accordingly applied to Mr. Jay. But 
between Mr. Jay and Mr. Monroe there existed, very 
naturally, no political confidence ; and as he was not 
instructed to that effect, Mr. Jay declined furnishing 
Mr. Monroe the information he sought during the prog- 
ress of the negotiation. When the treaty was signed, 
he offered to inform him confidentially of its provisions, 
stating generally, that it contained nothing in deroga- 
tion of the treaty with France. Tliis information Mr. 
Monroe declined to receive, as he considered that a 
knowledge of the treaty, without the right of using 
that knowled£:e in his conferences with the French 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 155 

government, would only embarrass Ms position. That 
government manifested a growing uneasiness, which, 
upon the publication of the treaty, became openly and 
angrily avowed dissatisfaction. It suspended, how- 
ever, any definite action, until the Senate had advised 
the President to ratify Mr. Jay's treaty. Upon the 
receipt of this news, Mr. Monroe was unofficially in- 
formed that the French government considered the 
treaties between France and the United States sus- 
pended, and that a special minister would be sent to 
Philadelphia to protest against this violation of Ameri- 
can faith. Mr. INIonroe immediately demanded an inter- 
view with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. " I attended 
him," says Mr. Monroe, " again on the day following 
(February 16, 1796), and remonstrated most earnestly 
against the measure, urging every argument that I 
could avail myself of to divert the government from it ; 
offering to enter with him, whenever he thought fit, into 
a discussion of his objections to our treaty, or any other 
act of our government ; assuring him that I should not 
only be always ready to enter with him into such expla- 
nations, but, in the present instance, should do it with 
pleasure, since, by being possessed of our view of the 
subject, they would be better able to decide whether the 
complaint was well or ill founded, and, of course, how 
far it merited to be considered in that light. Upon this 
occasion, as upon the prececUng one, the minister de- 
clined stating any specific objections to the treaty or 
any other act of oiu" government, and, therefore, I could 



156 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

make no specific defence." * On the 12th of March, 
1796, M. De la Croix, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
furnished Mr. INIonroe with " a summary exposition of 
the complaints of the French Republic against; the 
United States of America." The complaints were 
divided under three heads : 1. The inexecution of the 
treaties, which comprised almost identically the same 
subjects of dissatisfaction which had been discussed 
between M. Genet and Mr. Jefferson, and to which ref- 
erence has already been made; namely, — 1. the cogni- 
zance taken by the United States courts of prizes carried 
by French vessels into American ports, notwithstanding 
the express clause in the treaty, which, the French gov- 
ernment contend, forbade it ; 2. the admission of Eng- 
lish vessels of war into the ports of the United States 
against the express stipulation of the 17th article of the 
treaty; 3. the unequal execution of the consular con- 
vention ; 4. the arrest of a captain of a French corvette 
for acts done on the high seas. In reply to these, Mr. 
Monroe reiterated the argument made by Mr. Jeffer- 
son. The second head of complaint was the arrest, in 
the waters of the United States, by an English ship of 
war, of the vessel in which M. Fauchet, the French 
minister, sailed for Europe, and the search of his trunks 
and papers. To this Mr. Monroe replied, that the 
United States had done all it could to punish the out- 
rage, had revoked the exequatur of the British consul at 

* Monroe's View, p. xlix. 



DIPLOMATIC niSTORY. 157 

the port where the violation had been committed, or- 
dered all supplies to be withheld from the offending ves- 
sel, and her immediate departure from the waters of the 
United States; and had instructed the United States 
minister in London to make the conduct of his Majes- 
ty's officer a subject of formal and special complaint, 
and to demand such immediate and ample satisfaction 
as the nature of the case required. 

The third cause of complaint was the treaty with * 
England, inasmuch as by it the United States had " not 
only departed from the principles that were consecrated 
by the armed neutrality during the War of Independ- 
ence, but they had also given to England, to the injury 
of their first allies, a mark of the most striking conde- 
scension without limits, in abandonmg the rule which 
the rights of nations, their treaties with all other pow- 
ers, and even the treaties of England with most of the 
maritime powers, had given to contraband," and had 
" consented to extend the denomination of contraband 
even to provisions. Instead of restricting it, as all trea- 
ties had done, to the case of an effectual blockade of a 
port, as proving the only exception to the complete free- 
dom of this article, they had tacitly acknowledged the 
pretensions of England, the blockade to our (the French) 
colonies, and even to France, by the force of a procla- 
mation alone," To which JVIr. Morris replied, "that ^i~-2. 
although the principles of the armed neutrality were very 
dear to his government, yet it w^as not in their power 
to force them upon England, and they could not be held 

14 



158 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

censurable for this incapacity ; and that, whatever they 
might desire, they stood in the same position as to con- 
traband. That with regard to allowing provisions to 
be made contraband, the treaty recognized no such 
principle, but simply, acknowledging the impossibility 
of settling the question, waived it, providing that, as it 
"was doubtful, compensation should be always made in 
case of seizure." Here the discussion rested until July, 
when the news reached France that the House of Rep- 
resentatives, after long and violent discussion, had de- 
termined that the treaty should be carried into effect. 
The tone of the French government became immedi- 
ately more imperative. M. Adet was recalled, and his 
place — the grade being reduced — was about to be 
filled by a gentleman who, as consul in Charleston, had 
made himself peculiarly unacceptable to tlie United 
States government; but this appointment Mr. Monroe 
had still influence enough to prevent. In the mean 
time, great changes had taken place at home. Mr. Ran- 
dolph had been compelled to resign, under cii'cum stances 
which excited great irritation, on the part of Gen. Wash- 
ington, against that party whose sympathies were 
French ; and the policy of his cabinet, more harmonious 
in opinion than it had ever yet been, manifested the 
change in his temper.* The political struggle over the 

* Tlie circumstances of Mr. Randolpli's resignation belong rather 
to the personal and party history of the day, than to its diplomatic 
history. For, although they tended directly to increase the bias of 
Gen. Washington's prejudice in favor of one section of his cabinet, I 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 159 

treaty, unsurjDassed in bitterness of spirit and language, 
had ended in victory for the administration. The treaty 

do not think tliey seriously affected the course of events. To review 
them in detail vrould require a special chapter on the personal history 
of the times, a subject to me alike impleasant and unprofitable. The 
misconstruction of Mr. Randolph's conduct, which, in the then distem- 
pered state of public opinion, was both natural and unfair, has not 
received historical sanction. The facts may be very briefly stated thus. 
A despatch from M. Fauchet, the French minister at Philadelphia, 
was intercepted by a British vessel, sent by the British government 
to their minister, INIr. Hammond, and by him transmitted to the Pres- 
ident through the Secretary of the Treasury. This despatch pur- 
ported to be a full report of several conversations between Mr. Ran- 
dolph and the French minister, in which, according to the latter, Mr. 
Randolph had given him a very distressing account of the factions 
in the country, and the divisions in the cabinet, entered into a mi- 
nute and indiscreet detail of the President's private views, and sug- 
gested to the French minister certain ways of meeting a local com- 
bination against the government in some of the States, which he 
construed into an implication of the venality of certain public char- 
acters. These conversations were vaguely reported, and accompa- 
nied by a running commentary of insolent and inflated sentiment, 
that makes it almost impossible to say what is fact and what fancy. 
This document was exhibited to Gen. Washington just at the time 
when he was most troubled and annoyed by the opposition to Mr. 
Jay's treat)'', — that treaty being then under his consideration for rati- 
fication. He submitted the despatch to Mr. Randolph in a personal 
interview, and demanded an explanation in a manner that Mr. Ran- 
dolph considered evidence of a foregone conclusion and of confidence 
already forfeited. He accordingly resigned, and addressed his vin- 
dication to the public. In reference to the facts, I would only ob- 
serve, that no mere statement of the French ministers in the United 



160 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

with Spain, which, at the outset of Mr. Monroe's mis- 
sion, was doubtful, had been negotiated without the aid 

States, during the period of their Revolution, has any value as evi- 
dence. For without deliberately intending to misrepresent, they 
took such strange and extravagant views of men and things, and 
misunderstood so completely the relation of measures and parties, 
that their ojiinions cannot be trusted ; and the whole of this very de- 
spatch is conceived in that spirit of ingenious, clever, but extravagant 
misconception, which is the characteristic of the French Revolution- 
ary diplomacy ; a spirit which insisted upon treating the wildest po- 
litical dreams as the realities of political life. It is impossible to 
separate what the French minister calls Mr. Randolph's " precious 
confessions " from his own general nai'rative of American politics ; 
and the absurd inconsistency of this fancy sketch of our politics is 
manifest to every student of our earlier history. But the charge of 
corruption, I cannot believe, was ever really believed, even by those 
small partisans who mistake malignity for honesty. Mr. Randolj^h 
belonged to a class of men who had faults, and grave ones ; they 
were passionate and prejudiced, but not treacherous ; they were 
reckless and extravagant, but not corrupt ; and whatever were their 
failings, it might be said of that great old Virginia stock, as Fuller 
said of Woolsey, " Truly, nothing mean could enter this man's 
mind." 

As to the indiscretion of such conferences with Fauchet, especially 
after the experience of French ministers which the government had 
suffered, that will depend upon the view taken of Mr. Randolph's 
position in the cabinet, and the political sympathies of the student. 
He endeavored to hold middle ground between the two sections, and, 
in consequence, and I think unavoidably, was sacrificed. 

I would not have said this much, were it not that Mr. Gibbs, in 
his Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, a 
work to which I have specially referred elsewhere, has devoted many 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 161 

of France. The treaty with England was secured, and 
the government felt able to speak a higher and firmer 

pages of malicious ingenuity to the examination of Mr. Randolph's 
conduct, and concludes his review with these sentences : " Mr. Ran- 
dolph, in his vindication, gave many reasons against the probability 
of his guilt. There was produced, soon after his resignation, one in 
favor of the supposition. The investigation of his accounts con- 
ferred ujion him the distinguished honor of being the first cabinet 
officer who was a Defaulter." — Vol. I. p. 280. 

The facts are these, as proved by the official records in the proper 
Departments. Immediately upon his resignation, he surrendered 
the key of his public office to the door-keeper, and refused to 
cross its threshold again, thus leaving all his official papers to the 
custody of his successor, Mr. Pickering. An account of his admin- 
istration was ordered and reported, covering the receipt and dis- 
bursement of over $1,000,000, which, according to the custom then, 
but no longer existing, passed through his hands, on account of the 
maintenance of foreign diplomatic agents and intercourse. This ac- 
count brought him in debt to the government. On his part, he im- 
mediately stated his account, making the government in debt to him, 
asserting his perfect confidence in the correctness of his account, and 
sustaining it by vouchers, so far as they were in his possession, and 
calling for the production of other vouchers, which he positively al- 
leged were deposited by him in his own and other public offices, and 
remained in the custody of other public officers, but some of which 
were never obtained. A suit was instituted by government to re- 
cover of him the balance reported against him ; but upon several tri- 
als, the juries were divided, and no verdict could be obtained. Mr. 
Randolph then proposed to leave the decision to the Solicitor of the 
Treasury, — a proposition which clearly vindicated his confidence in 
his own integrity. That officer confirmed the precise balance re- 
ported against Mr. Randolph by the government account ; and accord- 

14* 



162 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

language ; and early in November, Mr. Monroe was re - 
called. This recall was inevitable, but its manner was 

ing to his agreement, judgment was entered np against him for that 
amount. To satisfy this judgment, Mr. Randolph devoted every 
cent he possessed, by conveying it to a trustee for that purpose ; and 
it apjiears from the record of the Treasury Department, that not only 
the entire balance, principal and interest, was discharged, but that, 
in consequence of the government having become the purchaser of a 
portion of the property conveyed in the deed of trust for its benefit, 
it had actually received, by a resale of that jaroperty, some seven 
thousand dollars more than the balance it claimed from Mr. Ran- 
dolph. In addition to this, the official records of this transaction 
show, that, while every cent received by Mr. Randolph was charged 
to him with interest, no credit was allowed him which was not svip- 
ported by the voucher of the receipt of the agent of the government, 
to whose use it was ultimately applied ; and that, where bills of ex- 
change had been bought by Mr. Randolph, as Secretary of State, of 
merchants or bankers in the country, drawn on foreign merchants 
or bankers resident in the country to which the reinittance to our 
foreign agent had been sent, the receipt of the person of whom the 
bill was bought was not allowed as a voucher, but that of the gov- 
ernment agent abroad was required as indispensable ; so that, if by 
any casualty resulting from the dangers of the sea, the existence of 
a general state of war in Europe, or the bankruptcy of foreign mer- 
chants or bankers, the foreign agent of our government failed to 
receive the remittance jjurchased for him here, the Secretary of State 
had to hear the loss ; and instances of this to large amounts are dis- 
closed on the face of the accounts reported against Mr. Randolph, 
and acknowledged in the documents accompanying them. In one of 
these cases, the usual channel of remittance abroad, through Amster- 
dam, was cut oir by the blockade of the coast of Holland ; and it 
becoming necessary to remit to our minister at Madrid, through bills 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 163 

not considerate, nor its alleged motives just. The 
grounds of his removal may be gathered from the letter 
of Mr. Pickering, who had succeeded Mr. Randolph, 
under date of July 13, 1796. 

"As early as October last, you predicted that if Mr. 
Jay's treaty should be ratified, it would excite great dis- 
content in France. Early in November, you men- 
tioned the arrival of M. Fauchet, extremely dissatisfied 
with the treaty, adding that he was well received, and 
would therefore be attended to. On the 6th of Decem- 
ber, you acknowledge the receipt of my letter of Sep- 
tember 12th, written subsequently to the ratification of 
the treaty, to repeat and further explain the principles 
and views of the government concerning it. M. Adet's 

on Madrid bankers purchased here, the bankruptcy of the parties to 
the bill, occurring after the purchase of the bill, devolved upon Mr. 
Randolph a heavy loss under the rule mentioned. Add to this the 
principle universally adopted in government accounts, of charging 
interest on all sums received from, and allowing no interest on sums 
due from government, and it will be readily seen how easy it is to 
make out an account against a public officer, receiving and disburs- 
ing over one million of dollars, and that at a time when the adminis- 
trative details of all the executive departments were more or less 
imperfect. 

In concluding this note, I ought to say, that I was not able to con- 
duct the above interesting and, I think, conclusive investigation, 
directly. I am Indebted for It to one whose interest In j\Ir. Ran- 
dolph's fair fame guarantees the thoroughness, and whose character 
assures the conscientious accuracy, of Its details. To say that I am 
responsible for the accuracy of its statements, may be proper, but it 
can add nothing to Its authority. 



164 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

objections to the treaty, and their refutation, accompa- 
nied my letter. And with such means in your hands, — 
means amply sufficient to vindicate the conduct of the 
United States, — not less regret than surprise is excited 
that no attempt was made to apply them to the highly 
important use for which they were sent. Although you 
anticipated discontents ; although the symptoms of dis- 
content appeared; although these symptoms, unattend- 
ed to and unaUayed, might increase to an inflammation, 
and M. Fauchet's arrival, with all his dissatisfaction 
and prejudices about him, would assuredly add to the 
irritation, yet you were silent and inactive, until, on the 
15th of February, you were alarmed by the project of 
the Directory, accidentally communicated to you by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, of sending to this country 
an envoy extraordinary to represent to our government 
their decision concerning the treaty with Great Britain, 
" that they considered the treaty of alliance between us 
as ceasing to exist from the moment the treaty was rat- 
ified." Your letter of the 20th of the same month 
describes your second interview with the minister on 
the project of sending an envoy extraordinary ; and the 
reasons you urged to dissuade them from it were cer- 
tainly very cogent. Your letter of the 10th of March 
informs us that the project was laid aside ; and your 
letter of the 25th of March, that you had an audience 
of the Directory on the subject, and that they had 
agreed to suspend their proposed extraordinary mission 
until the points in question should be discussed be- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 165 

tween you and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The 
result of this audience appears satisfactory ; and from 
the good effect produced by the partial explanations 
then given may be calculated the happy consequences 
of the full communications which might have been 
made, and which for so long a time you had possessed 
the means of making, in vindication of the measures, 
of the government you represent. That these were not 
made even so late as ]\Iarch 2oth, is again to be ex- 
tremely regretted, because the justice, the honor, and 
the faith of our country, were questioned, and conse- 
quently their most important interests were at stake." 
The point of this censure was, that Mr. Monroe had 
been for some time aware that dissatisfaction wdth the 
treaty existed, and that, having in his hands a full vindi- 
cation of that treaty, he had not used it ; the proof 
being, that, when he did produce the defence of the 
treaty, he obtained from the Directory a suspension of 
hostile proceedings. Now this argument assumes two 
facts, neither of which the future confirmed : 1. That 
the reply of the Secretary of State in Mr. Monroe's 
possession was a satisfactory justification of the treaty ; 
and, 2. that its production by Mr. Monroe did affect 
the action of the Directory. And as to the proof on 
which the argument rested, Mr. Monroe rejoined with 
perfect success, if you admit that great dissatisfaction 
against the treaty did exist, is it not a fair presumption 
that to my conduct is due the delay of the Directory in 



166 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

openly expressing that discontent. The truth was, that 
the French government did not care for any argument, 
however able ; it was beyond the reach of the subtlest 
diplomatic dialectic. The hope of the Directory — and 
that alone caused delay — was, first, that the treaty 
would not be ratified, and next, that the House of Rep- 
resentatives would interpose obstacles to its execution. 
They believed that the country was divided into two 
parties, the French and English. They expected that 
popular strength would secure victory to the first, and 
considering Mr. Monroe as the representative of the 
French party, they were willing, through him, to concil- 
iate and strengthen his friends at home. But when the 
action of the Senate and the vote of the House con- 
firmed the ti-iumph of the administration, they gave up 
all hope, and determined to follow their original course. 
Mr. Monroe's recall at such a moment was a great 
relief to them ; for anxiety to maintain their influence 
with the party to which he belonged, and his personal 
sympathy with themselves, prevented them from visit- 
ing on him the burden of their displeasure, while his 
removal freed them from any such embarrassment, and 
allowed them to represent the action of the United 
States as the work of the opposite English faction. 
And accordingly, in taking leave of him, they drew an 
unwarrantable but politic distinction between him and 
his government. "As for you," said the President of 
the Directory, "As for you, Mr. Minister Plenipotentiary, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 167 

you have combated for principles ; you have known 
the true interests of your country. Depart Avith our 
regret. We restore in you a representative to America, 
and we preserve tlie remembrance of the citizen whose 
personal qualities did honor to that title." 

That Mr. Monroe's identification with the party in 
the United States who sympathized with France, and 
opposed the English treaty, rendered him an unfit ex- 
ponent of the administration, cannot be denied ; but 
then in justice it must be recollected, that he had ex- 
pressed that opposition in the senate chamber before 
his appointment ; that he had declared the mission to 
England unwise, and the minister most objectionable ; 
that his strong sympathies with the French Revolution 
were among the alleged motives of his choice ; and that 
during his mission he had acted in strict consistency 
with his professions. And the administration which 
authorized Mr. Jay to conduct his negotiations "with 
that attention to your (his) former public opinions 
which self-respect will justify," was surely bound to 
measure Mr. Monroe by the same charitable standard. 
Besides, Mr. Monroe had really done effectual service 
during his mission. He conciliated the temper of the 
French government, carried out three of the four points 
which were committed to his care, and, without doubt, 
delayed the expression of the French discontent for a 
long time ; and this, too, when he knew that he had not 
the confidence of his own government, and when the 
want of frank intercourse between himself and the 



168 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

minister in London seriously embarrassed his action.* 
The government, however, found it absolutely neces- 

* It is very much to be regretted that Mr. Monroe, upon his 
return home, felt warranted in vindicating his conduct before the 
people. It led to an undignified controversy between himself and 
the Secretary of State, which could only diminish the consideration 
of both parties in the public eye. 

A diplomatist, who necessarily assumes confidential relations to his 
government, is not at liberty to dissolve that confidential connection 
for his own vindication. One of the consequences of his position is, 
that, without the consent of his government, his lips are closed, even 
as to his own conduct. He runs the risk of being misunderstood, 
.misrepresented, and even sacrificed ; and, if the interests of the 
country require it, he must be content with his martyrdom. Time 
will surely do him justice ; and even if extraordinary circumstances 
warrant his demand for justice, the Senate is the proper channel 
through which to seek it. They are impartial enough to judge truly, 
and powerful enough to act efiectively, if his case requires their in- 
terference. 

I am no advocate of the mystification on foreign affairs which has 
been the besetting sin of the cabinet pohcy of Europe ; and it is only 
wholesome and right that the people should have clear notions and 
proper information as to their foreign interests. But there is such a 
thing as a wise reticence ; and if, whenever a foreign minister is 
superseded, he is at liberty to publish despatches and attack the gov- 
ernment, the whole diplomatic system had better be abandoned. 
For it was meant to guarantee moderation, prudence, and temper, in 
the conduct of international relations. A foreign minister has noth- 
ing to do with the people. He is the instrument of the executive. 
The executive is responsible to the nation, but he is responsible to 
the executive. Our diplomatic history has furnished more than one 
unfortunate illustration of the neglect of this truth ; and it may 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 169 

sary, in carrying out its policy, to have a minister in 
Paris who should sympathize with its sentiments, as 
well as represent its opinions ; and Washington ten- 
dered the French mission to General Charles Cotes- 
worth Pinckney, of South Carolina, the brother of 
Thomas Pinckney, at that time minister to England. 
A better selection it would have been impossible to 
make. Representing an old and honored name, habitu- 
ated to the exercise of that acknowledged influence 
which belongs to large fortune, established position, and 
individual ability, — an eminent jurist, an active and ex- 
perienced soldier, a distinguished member of the con- 
vention which framed the Constitution, — General 
Pinckney had worked faithfully and fruitfully in every 
department of his country's service. To these claims 
upon public consideration, he added the charm of a 
character singularly frank, simple, and unselfish, and he 
was one of that small band of Revolutionary worthies 
who shared not only the confidence, but the warm ]3er- 
sonal affection, of their gi-eat chief. After the adoption 
of the Constitution, he had withdrawn from the wdder 
field of federal politics, and devoted his still vigorous 

safely be asserted, that in every case the ex-official vindication has 
sprung rather from wounded pride than public spirit, and that the 
interests of the country have suffered more from the exposure than 
the character of the minister could possibly have done fiom his 
silence. With a Senate constituted as is ours, the legal and natural 
council of the President in foreign affairs, injustice to a foreign min- 
ister can always be corrected. 
15 



170 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

energies to the interests of his family and State. Gen- 
eral Washington made more than one effort to draw 
him into the national service ; but he declined, on differ- 
ent occasions, the departments both of war and state, 
and it was with great reluctance that he accepted the 
almost hopeless mission that was now pressed upon 
him. In a history lilve the present, it would be scarcely 
possible or proper to dwell at any length on the general 
character of the public men to whom reference is made, 
as it is concerned with their career simply in connec- 
tion with a special employment. But it is difficult to 
resist the strong desire to linger with affectionate regard 
in sight of characters so high, so pure, so " true and 
just.in all their dealings," as the two Pinckneys. Culti- 
vated in their tastes and simple in then* manners, 
placed by fortune where the exercise of a graceful and 
Hberal hospitality was the habit of their daily life, and 
the assumption of high duties the natural consequence 
of their position, brave and gentle, free, with all the 
genuine frankness of the southern nature, and yet grave 
as became earnest men in trying times, able, unselfish, 
active, their success in life was free from all the feverish 
excitement of political adventure. They sought nei- 
ther place nor power, but rose gi-adually from duty to 
duty, illustrating, in the fulness of their lives and ser- 
vices, the virtues of the class to which they belonged, 
and bearing, through a long and spotless career, 

" Without abuse 
The irrand old name of gentleman." 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 171 

At the date of his appointment, General Pinckney rep- 
resented, as fairly as possible, the real sentiment of the 
large conservative party in the country. His experience 
during the war, which, in South Carolina, assumed a 
peculiarly bitter and bloody character, guaranteed him 
against any extravagant British sympathies; and, in 
common with his native State, he felt a warm and 
direct interest in the success of the French Revolution. 
But he was eminently an American patriot; and his 
correspondence, both public and private, is filled with 
indignant protests against the spirit which would sub- 
ordinate the national policy to the interests or caprice 
of any foreign power. The motive and purpose of his 
appointment were clearly and strongly set forth in his 
instructions.* 

* These insti-uctions are quoted from the original, among General 
Pinckney's MSS. lam surprised that thev have never been.pub- 
lished, for they are exceedingly creditable to Mr. Pincknc r. As an 
illustration of General Pinckney's character, I shall cite the following 
letter from the same MSS. collection. It was written to the Secre- 
tary of State, upon the rumor that Mr. Madison had arrived in Paris 
to take his place, he having been superseded on account of his 
failure. 

" All the Paris papers which were received here two nights ago 
brought accounts tiiat Mr. Madison had arrived in that city as Envoy 
Extraordinary from the United States of America to the French 
Republic. My letters from Paris, this morning, do not mention any 
thing about it, and I therefore conclude it is without foundation. It 
may, however, not be improper to explain myself on this subject. It 
may not be within your knowledge, sir, but the fact is so, that it was 
with very great reluctance I quitted private life to accept of public 



172 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

" Your own observation will furnish abundant proof 
of the zeal, and even enthusiasm, with which the people 
of the United States embraced the cause of the French 
Revolution. Having recently closed a contest for the 
maintenance and establishment of their own liberties, 
the attempt of any nation to recover its long lost rights 
could not fail to attract the good wishes of the people 
of the United States, But such an attempt by the peo- 
ple of France, who had rendered them important aid in 

office. The inconvenience to my affairs was considerable. No con- 
sideration would have induced me to accept my appointment, but the 
flattering one of being serviceable to my country. If, therefore, the 
service I was sent to perform can be better executed by Mr. Madi- 
son, or any other gentleman, I earnestly entreat that no idea of deli- 
cacy with regard to me may prevent the nomination from immedi- 
ately taking place. Perhaps political circumstances might render 
some other character a more acceptable agent than myself It is 
generally thought in France, and my heart swells jJi'Oudly at the 
idea, that I am the friend, and beloved by our illustrious Washington. 
To men determined to see no neutrality but what is partial in their 
favor, and to allow of no independence but wliat is submission to 
their will, the friend of Washington cannot be acceptable. Act, 
therefore, in the case, as the honor and interest of our countr)- 
require. At the same time, do not misunderstand me, and think that 
when my country is embarrassed, I mean to shrink from public ser- 
vice. If it is thought necessary for me to remain on this side of the 
Atlantic, I will cheerfully remain. If it is thought my country's in- 
terest would be probably promoted by my recall, I will with pleasure 
return. In a word, while my country is in danger, the little abilities 
I possess, whether in the cabinet or the field, when she calls for them, 
are devoted to her." — C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. lOG. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 173 

their own Revolution, was sure to excite the liveliest 
sensibility; for every nerve was in unison, and the 
slightest motion there produced here a corresponding 
vibration. You have felt, and you have witnessed, in 
your fellow-citizens, a solicitude for the success of the 
French Revolution scarcely surpassed, and hardly to be 
distinguished from that which was manifested in our 
own struggle for independence. This strong sympathy 
demanded all the prudence and energy of our rulers to 
restrain it within the limits of that neutrality which our 
duty and safety, and the interests of France herself, 
required us to maintain. Unhappily, during the course 
of the successive and violent revolutions of parties in 
that country, attempts were made tending to produce 
one in our own. You will perceive that I refer to the 
extraordinary proceedings of M. Genet, during the 
short period in which he was the accredited minister of 
the French Republic to the United States. Neverthe- 
less, to the anarchical proceedings of himself and his 
agents, to their flagrant insults to the authority of the 
laws, and to their endeavors to involve us in a foreign 
war, was opposed only the exercise of the established 
powers of government. Where the danger from these 
acts was not imminent, they were borne with from 
sentiments of regard to his nation ; from a sense of 
their friendship towards us, and from a conviction that 
they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the 
actions of a person who so little represented our mutual 
dispositions. To this forbearance, indeed, a reliance 
15* 



174 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

on the firmness of our citizens, in their principles of 
peace and order, proportionally contributed. 

" This man, agreeably to our request, was speedily 
recalled ; and in his successor we hoped to find that 
candor and moderation which, superseding all suspi- 
cions, would permit us to indulge in that pleasing 
amity and those cordial good wishes which our orig- 
inal sentiments inspired. But here, too, we were in no 
small degree disappointed. Prompt to complain, on 
the slightest cause, and not seldom on mistaken 
ground ; equally ready to charge, as violations of our 
treaty, acts which, on a fair exposition of the articles, 
were perfectly innocent, and founded on the neutral 
ground we had taken ; an unpleasant altercation soon 
began, and towards the close of his mission rose to a 
degree of asperity, accompanied with a marked aliena- 
tion from the government, and a studied neglect of 
those civilities which foreign ministers were accus- 
tomed to render to the chief magistrate of the United 
States. A simple remark might seem to account for 
this issue of M. Fauchet's mission. He received his 
appointment under the administration of Robespierre. 
The change of system consequent on the death of that 
scourge of France and opprobrium of human nature 
was followed by a change in the representation of 
France to the United States. In M. Adet we trusted 
to experience all that frankness and all those evidences 
of confidence which the sincerity of our government 
and its real good-will to France might justly challenge. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 175 

He was informed by the President himself of the true 
situation of the United States, and in the most friendly 
as well as the most serious manner, cautioned to avoid 
the rock on which the harmony that attended the com- 
mencement of his predecessor's mission had been 
wa'ccked. M. Adet received this information and these 
cautions with that propriety and apparent cordiality 
which might be looked for in a man of sense and a well- 
disposed minister. But, although no interruption of 
customary civilities has ever happened, although the 
external appearance of harmony subsists, his conduct 
has plainly indicated a distrust in the government, — a 
distrust probably cherished, perhaps excited, by those of 
our own citizens, with whom he was chiefly associated. 
Under such circums'tances, the best interests of the two 
nations may be injured by mutual jealousies ; for dis- 
trust on one side begets suspicion on the other. Un- 
happily, as was natural, the distrusts and jealousies of 
the ministers have been communicated to their nation, 
to the government of their nation, and while they con- 
sider the people of the United States as the warm and 
invariable friends of France, they have been persuaded 
to believe that the government is hostile to their inter- 
ests, and perhaps even to the principles of the Revolu- 
tion. Nothing can be more unfounded than this opin- 
ion concerning the government of the United States, 
and nothing is more important to the interests of the 
two countries than its eradication, — than the restora- 
tion of mutual confidence as the basis of mutual good- 



176 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

will, and of the exercise of offices highly and recipro- 
cally beneficial. 

" Faithfully to represent the disposition of the govern- 
ment and people of the United States (for their dis- 
jDOsition is one), to remove jealousies and to obviate 
complaints by showing that they are groundless, to 
restore that mutual confidence which has been so un- 
fortunately and injuriously impaired, and to explain 
the relative interests of both countries, and the real 
sentiment of your own, are the immediate objects of 
your mission." 

The French government, however, did not intend to 
be conciliated. Trusting to the erroneous and exag- 
gerated representations of their ministers, — all of them 
men of most distempered political fancy, — they as- 
sumed that there was a broad gulf between the sympa- 
thies of the American people and the sentiment of their 
government; that the final triumph of the popular pas- 
sion was certain, and that they could, by the influence 
of their agents, direct and control the national policy of 
the Uinted States. Considering Mr. Monroe's appoint- 
ment as a concession by the government to the popular 
sentiment, they conciliated him in order to strengthen 
the party of which he was a distinguished member, 
relying upon that party to defeat the English treaty. 
When these anticipations were disappointed, — when 
the result of the discussion in both the House and the 
Senate proved the strength of the government, and the 
recall of Mr. Monroe its resolution to maintain its 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 177 

ground, dissatisfaction wamicd into anger. The a})poiiit- 
ment of General Pinckney, the brother of the minister 
to England, the known personal friend of the President, 
and one of the most eminent members of the Federal 
party, put an end to all hesitation. For some time 
before his recall, the Directory had treated Mr. Monroe 
with marked coolness;* but immediately upon the news 
of this change, their attentions were renewed, and until 
his departure, he was the object of most flattering 
attention. 

General Pinckney arrived at Bourdeaux on the 15th 
of November, 1796, and was received with all the 
courtesy and distinction to which his official character 
entitled him. He proceeded overland to Paris, where 
the usual preliminary steps were taken, in order to his 
formal presentation to the constituted authorities ; 
when, without the slightest previous intimation, M. 
De la Croix addressed the following note to Mr. IVIon- 
roe, December 11, 1796 : — 

" Citizen Minister : I hastened to lay before the 
Executive Directory the copies of your letters of recall, 
and of the letters of credence of Mr. Pinckney, whom 
the President has appointed to succeed you in quality of 
Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States near 
the French Republic. The Directory has charged me 
to notify you, ' that it will not acknowledge nor re- 
ceive another Minister Plenipotentiary from the United 

* C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. 37. 



178 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

States, until after the redress of the grievances de- 
manded of the American government, and which the 
French Republic has a right to expect from it.' 

" I pray you to be persuaded, citizen minister, that this 
determination having become necessary, allows to sub- 
sist between the French Republic and the American 
people the affection founded upon former benefits and 
reciprocal interests ; an affection which you yourself 
have taken a pleasure in cultivating by every means in 
your power." 

The personal treatment of General Pinckney, after 
this letter, was marked by intentional and aggravated 
discourtesy. Refusing to recognize hiin as an accred- 
ited minister, they refused also to furnish him with the 
permit necessary to warrant his stay in Paris as a pri- 
vate stranger. In violation of his official character, 
which was indisputable, he was subjected to the super- 
vision of the police, and finally enjoined to leave the 
territory of the Republic. Accordingly, after two or 
three spirited attempts to vindicate his position and 
maintain his diplomatic privilege, he removed, early in 
1797, to Amsterdam, and, informing his government of 
the recent occuiTcnces, there waited further instruc- 
tions. During this period. General Pinckney was not 
idle. He kept up a constant correspondence with 
Paris, and had, at one time, great reason to hope that 
his mission would be re-opened with fairer chances of 
success. On June 28, 1797, he wrote to the depart- 
ment, from the Hague : — 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 179 

" On the 20th, M. Pastoret, in the council of Five 
Hundred, referred to the article of the constitution 
which vests in the legislature the right of declaring war 
on the requisition of the Directory : ' There exists,' 
said he, ' a people to whom we are united by treaties, 
and yet whose particular situation with regard to us 
we are ignorant of. The Directory appears to treat the 
Americans as enemies, and yet the legislature have 
not declared war against them. The arrets of the 12th 
Ventose seems to suppose, that, in violation of the 
treaty of 1778, the Americans had committed hos- 
tilities against us. The commissioners of the Directory, 
in the colonies, applaud themselves for having taken 
measures by which French privateers have made a great 
number of American prizes. But what right had they 
to fit out privateers against this people ? What law 
authorizes them to do so ? 

" ' It is true, that the treaty of 1794, concluded with 
England, our most inveterate enemy, excites well- 
grounded suspicion with respect to the intentions of the 
government of the United States ; but this cannot be a 
sufficient reason for the Directory violating, with respect 
to them, both the constitution and the law ; besides, at 
that time, we had no marine to assist us in protect- 
ing their commerce, and our miserable country was a 
prey to the most dreadful anarchy.' 

" He finished with moving, first, that the Directory be 
required to give an account of the actual political rela- 
tions of France and the United States. Secondly, that 



180 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

the arrele of the 12th Ventose and the 17th Germinale, 
concerning the treaties with the American government, 
should be referred to a commission to report on the 
question, whether the legislature can annul the arretes 
of the Directory. Both these propositions were referred 
to a committee of five members, and the speech was 
ordered to be printed. . . . The measure was recom- 
mended by the new Director. By means of , at 

Paris, I am informed that Barras will join Barthelemy 
in our favor. Astonishing ; but though the authority 
appears good, I can hardly credit it. Your letter to me, 
of the 16th of January, has been read, not only by the 
members of the legislature in France, but also by most 
of the officers of government. M. Segur, who writes 
sometimes in our favor, wishes the case of gratitude 
had been treated more moderately; but it was abso- 
lutely necessary to answer the continual charges of 
ingTatitude and perfidy, nor do I conceive it could have 
been done with greater mildness. To the thousand 
copies I directed originally to be distributed, I have 
added five hundred more, as many of our consuls in the 
ports of France are writing for them, saying they have 
had a wonderful effect upon the minds of many per- 
sons, both in and out of office, who neither knew the 
facts, nor were aware of the arguments used." * 

From further despatches it appears, that, although the 
majority of the commission were disposed to make a 

* C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. 143-145. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 181 

favorable report, they felt constrained, in view of the 
immediate circumstances of their domestic policy, 
and the negotiations with England then pending at 
Lisle, to postpone their action ; and before General 
Pinckney had an opportunity to test the sincerity of the 
feeling, which seemed evidently growing more friendly, 
a change in the character of his mission, as well as 
great changes in the political relations of French par- 
ties, altered the character of the negotiation. 

Owing to the immense time then necessary to the 
transmission of communications between Europe and 
America, General Pinckney's despatch, announcing his 
rejection, did not reach Philadelphia until after the 
Presidential election. General Washington's official 
life had closed, and John Adams, the Vice-President 
during his administration, had been chosen President. 
Although party spirit still ran high, and the sympathies 
of a large party in the country were unduly excited in 
behalf of French politics, the news of General Pinck- 
ney's rejection provoked universal and patriotic indig- 
nation. But the condition of the country was too per- 
ilous to be trusted to the council of passion, however 
natural. While some difference of opinion existed, the 
wisest and best men of both parties desired reconcilia- 
tion. Alexander Hamilton, the former Secretary of the 
Treasury, and leader of the Federal party, and who, 
indeed, possessed a larger influence with that great 
party than the President himself, was urgent for a 

resumption of negotiations. In a letter, dated April 5, 
16 



182 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

1797, in reply to a member of the Cabinet, with whom 
he differed, he said : — 

" The situation of our country, my dear sir, is singu- 
larly critical. . . . Either to be in rupture with France, 
united with England alone, or singly, as is possible, 
would be a most unwelcome situation. Divided as we 
are, who can say what would be hazarded by it ? In 
such a situation, it appears to me we should rather err 
on the side of condescension, than on the opposite side. 
We ought to do every thing to avoid a rupture, with- 
out unworthy sacrifices. No measure can tend more to 
this than an extraordinary mission. And it is certain, 
that, to fulfil the ends proposed, it ought to embrace a 
character in whom France and the opposition have full 
credit. . . . Besides, there ought to be certain leading 
instructions, from which they may not deviate. I agree 
with you, that we have nothing to retract; that we 
ought to risk every thing before we submit to any dis- 
honorable terms. But we may remould our treaties ; 
we may agree to put France on the same. footing as 
Great Britain, by our treaty with her. We may also 
liquidate, with a view to future wars, the import of the 
mutual guaranty in the treaty of alliance ; substituting 
specific succors, and defining the casus foederis. But 
this last may or may not be done, though with me it is 
a favorite object." * 

When, therefore, the President, in his special mes- 

* Gibbs's Administration, Vol. I. p. 489-490. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 183 

sage to Congress, an extra session of which he had 
immediately convened, declared, after giving a history 
of the transaction : — 

" It is my desire, and in this I presume I concur with 
you and our constituents, to preserve peace and friend- 
ship with all nations ; and believing that neither the 
honor nor the interest of the United States absolutely 
forbid the repetition of advances for securing these de- 
sirable objects with France, I shall institute a fresh 
attempt at negotiation, and shall not fail to promote 
and accelerate an accommodation, on terms compat- 
ible with the rights, duties, interests, and honor of the 
nation ; " 

The Senate, in their address, responded : — 
" We do, therefore, most sincerely approve of your 
determination to promote and accelerate an accommo- 
dation of our existing differences with that republic, on 
terms compatible with the rights, duties, interests, and 
honor of our nation, and you may rest assured of our 
cordial cooperation, so far as it may become necessary 
in this pursuit." 

And the House of Representatives replied : — 
" Sensibly as we feel the wound which has been 
inflicted by the transactions disclosed in your com- 
munications, yet we think with you, that neither the 
honor nor the interest of the United States forbid the 
repetition of advances for preserving peace. We, there- 
fore, receive with the utmost satisfaction your informa- 



184 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

tion that a fresh attempt at negotiation will be insti- 
tuted." 

The wisdom of this resolution can scarcely be dis- 
puted, but- the mode of its execution was open to very 
grave objections. Mr. Adams determined to appoint 
two additional ministers, to assist General Pinckney in 
resuming the negotiations. 

Now, in the first place, General Pinckney's de- 
spatches, although in justice it must be said that they 
did not arrive in time to influence the President's de- 
cision, indicated that there was a growing feeling in 
favor of the American cause. A large majority in the 
Council of Five Hundred disapproved of the impolitic 
and discourteous proceedings of the Minister for For- 
eign Affairs ; the committee to whom the whole matter 
had been referred were prepared to report against the 
conduct of their government, and only delayed the pre- 
sentation of their report from motives of prudential 
policy; public opinion had been reached by means of 
the American state papers, which General Pinckney 
had translated and circulated in France ; and Talley- 
rand himself, as late as July, 1797, had courteously 
expressed the hope that he would soon have the pleas- 
ure of seeing General Pinckney again in Paris.* The 
return and recognition of General Pinckney wonld 
have been altogether the fittest and fullest acknowledg- 

* C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. 173 et passim. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 185 

ment of the wrong which had been done; and in view 
of his integrity, firmness, and ability, would have been 
the best guarantee for the sincerity and success of the 
negotiations. 

In the next place, the appointment of a commission, 
including men of opposite political opinions in refer- 
ence to the very subject of negotiation, was only sow- 
ing, in advance, the seeds of difference in the commis- 
sion itself, and of discontent among parties at home. 
For, it was certain, that, in a commission of three, one 
party must be in a powerless minority ; and the private 
history of the time proves that it was impossible to per- 
suade a firstrate man of the opposition to accept, in 
face of the experience of Mr. Monroe's mission, so dis- 
tasteful and responsible a position. 

And, finally, the presence of the representatives of 
differing opinions in the commission subjected it to 
the wily intrigues of the accomplished diplomatist then 
at the head of foreign affairs in France, — kept alive 
the belief in the French mind that there was a party in 
the United States whom they could conciliate at the 
expense of the government, and thus weakened the 
strength of the negotiators in a contest where they 
needed firmness, energy, and, above all, unanimity. 

In pursuance of his plan, however, Mr. Adams nom- 
inated, to join General Pinckney, John Marshall of Vir- 
ginia, one of the most distinguished Federalists of the 
day, and, in after times, one of the most illustrious of all 
the great men of the country, and Elbridge Gerry of 
16* 



186 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 

Massachusetts, who was a very conspicuous member 
of the opposition, and who, coming from the same 
State as the President, shared his friendship, and pos- 
sessed more of his confidence than any other public 
man of the same political party. The history of this 
mission is painful and unprofitable, for it effected noth- 
ing, and ended in sore humiliation to the country. 

On the 4th of October, 1797, the three envoys 
reached Paris, and on the 8th were formally and courte- 
ously received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But 
this first step was their only one ; for while all direct 
conference with the minister upon the business of their 
mission was perseveringly postponed, they were ap- 
proached by informal agents, and through them sounded 
as to propositions alike dishonorable to him from whom 
they came, and vmworthy of those before whom they 
were laid. The details of this miserable intrigue, and 
the conduct and character of the agents who managed 
it, do not deserve historical record. It combined all the 
meanness of cunning and the tenacious energy of 
avarice ; but it was base in conception, clumsy in con- 
trivance, and fruitless in result.* 

* The history of this intrigue, generally known as the X. Y. Z. 
correspondence, can be found at length in the published despatches 
of the ministers, and in the general histories of the United States. 
Another, and very full account, will be found in the Life of Talley- 
rand, published in the continuation of the Biographic Universelle. In 
this latter, Talleyrand's character is more unscrupulously attacked 
than even by American histories. I cannot attach much importance 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 187 

It is sufficient to state, that through agents whom he 
afterwards, but in vain, disavowed, Talleyrand endeav- 
ored to compromise the American envoys in prelimi- 
nary discussions. He made three propositions, the ante- 
cedent conditions of any serious negotiation : — 1. An 
apology for the language used by the President of the 
United States in his message to Congress in reference 
to the conduct of the French government, both in their 
farewell of Mr. Monroe and their reception, or rather 
rejection, of Mr. Pinckney. 2. A loan from the United 
States government to the French Republic. And, 3. a 
point which was urged with scandalous pertinacity, — 
the gift of a large sum of money to the members of the 
Directory, with the exception of Merlin, who, the envoys 
were frankly informed, derived, as Minister of Justice, 
sufficient perquisites from the prizes which he con- 
fiscated in violation of the solemn treaties between the 
two governments. 

The American ministers listened with long suffering 
patience to the discussion of these points, varied, as 
they occasionally were, by reference to the real points at 
issue between the two governments. But they were 
decided, that any explanation of the language of the 
President addressed to the national legislature France 
had no right to demand, and no hope to obtain ; that 
any negotiation touching a loan was clearly beyond 

to the transaction, and have not therefore dwelt upon it in de- 
tail. 



188 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

their powers, and must be referred back for instructions ; 
and that they could not even consider the proposition 
of personal remuneration to the Directory. 

Having waited in vain for months, in hopes of direct 
communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
they addressed to him, January 27, 1798, a long and 
very able letter, reviewing the various grounds of differ- 
ence between the two countries, and concluding wdth 
the following language : — 

" Perceiving no probability of being allowed to enter, 
in the usual forms, on those discussions which might 
tend to restore harmony between the two republics, 
they have deemed it most advisable, even under the cir- 
cumstances of informality which attend the measure, to 
address to your government, through you, this candid 
review of the conduct, and this true representation of 
the sentiments and wishes, of the government of the 
United States. They pray that it may be received in 
the temper with which it is written, and considered as 
an additional effort, growing out of a disposition com- 
mon to the government and people of America, to cul- 
tivate and restore, if it be possible, harmony between 
the two republics. If, citizen minister, there remains a 
hope that these desirable objects can be effected by any 
means which the United States have authorized, the 
undersigned will still solicit, and will still respectfully 
attend, the development of those means. 

" If, on the contrary, no such hope remains, they have 
only to pray that their return to their owm country may 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 189. 

be facilitated ; and they will leave France with the 
most deep-felt regret, that neither the real and i<incere 
friendship which the government of the United States 
has so uniformly and unequivocally displayed for this 
great republic, nor its continued efforts to demonstrate 
the purity of its conduct and intentions, can protect its 
citizens, or preserve them from the calamities which 
they have sought, by a just and upright conduct, to 
avert." 

Two very unsatisfactory interviews with Talleyrand 
followed this communication; and on the 18th of 
March, he replied at length to the despatch of the en- 
voys. The spirit of this reply would, in itself, have 
precluded all further discussion ; but it contained a 
paragraph which effectually closed all communication. 

" It is, therefore," said Talleyrand, " only in order to 
smooth the way of discussion that the undersigned has 
entered into the preceding explanations. It is with the 
same view that he declares to the commissioners and 
envoys extraordinary, that, notwithstanding the kind 
of prejudice that has been entertained with respect 
to them, the Executive Directory is disposed to treat 
with that one of the three, whose opinions, presumed 
to be more impartial, promise in the course of the ex- 
planation more of that reciprocal confidence which is 
indis])ensable." 

Upon the receipt of this letter, Messrs. Pinckney and 
Marshall terminated their mission. That they fully 
represented the sentiment of their government, was 



.190 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

manifested in a despatch, which did not, however, reach 
them, until after their withdrawal. That despatch, 
dated March 23, 1798, conveyed the following explicit 
instructions : — 

" 1. That if you are in treaty with persons authorized 
by the Directory, on the subjects of your mission, then 
you are to remain and expedite the completion of the 
treaty, if it should not be concluded. Before this letter 
gets to your hand, you will have ascertained whether 
the negotiation is or is not conducted with candor on 
the part of the French government ; and if you shall 
have discovered a clear design to procrastinate, you are 
to break off the negotiation, demand your passports, 
and return home. For you will consider that suspense 
is ruinous to the essential interests of your country. 

" 2. That if, on the receipt of this letter, you shall not 
have been received, or, whether received or not, if you 
shall not be in treaty with persons duly authorized by 
the Directory, with full and equal powers, you are to 
demand your passports and return. 

" 3. In no event is a treaty to be purchased v\ ith 
money, by loan or otherwise. There can be no safety 
in a treaty so obtained. A loan to the Republic would 
violate our neutrality, and a douceur to the men now in 
power might, by their successors, be urged as a reason 
for annulling the treaty, or as a precedent for further 
and repeated demands." 

Unfortunately, the history of this mission does not 
close here. Mr. Gerry became the dupe of the astute 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 191 

but unprincipled minister with whom he dealt. He 
consented at the outset of the negotiations to receive 
and discuss propositions which he M^as pledged to keep 
secret from his colleagues ; he committed himself in 
private to opinions which contradicted the record of the 
despatches which bore his signature ; and when, having 
exhausted all honorable expedients, his fellow ministers 
withdrew in patriotic indignation, he became a party to 
their humiliation, and remained in Paris to renew dis- 
cussions which were idle, upon propositions which were 
dishonorable. 

It is true, that, in reply to a note from Talleyrand, 
proposing " a day upon which to resume our reciprocal 
communications upon the interests of the French Re- 
public and the United States of America," he said, " I 
can only, then, confer informally and unaccredited on 
any subject respecting our mission, and communicate 
to the government of the United States the result of 
such conferences ; being, in my individual capacity, un- 
authorized to give them an official stamp." It is true, 
that he said and beheved that w' ar would be the result 
of his departure ; but his duty was clear, and the rebuke 
administered by the Secretary of State, in a despatch of 
June 25th, most justly deserved. 

" The respect due to yourselves and to your country 
irresistibly required that you should turn your backs to 
a government that treated both with contempt, a con- 
tempt not diminished but aggravated by the flattering 
but insidious distinction in your favor, in disparage- 



192 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 

ment of men of such respectable talents, untainted 
honor, and pure patriotism, as Generals Pinckney and 
Marshall, and in whom their government and country 
reposed entire confidence ; and, especially, when the real 
object of the distinction was to enable the French gov- 
ernment, trampling on the authority and dignity of our 
own, to designate an envoy with whom they would con- 
descend to negotiate. ... It is presumed that you will 
consider the instructions of the 23d of March, before 
mentioned, as an effectual recall ; lest, however, by any 
possibility, those instructions should not have reached 
you, and yon should still be in France, I am directed by 
the President to transmit you this letter, and to inform 
you that you are to consider it as a positive letter of re- 
call." 

The communications between IVIr. Gerry and Tal- 
leyrand, after the departure of his colleagues, are of 
no historical consequence. Talleyrand's letters mani- 
fest but slender regard for so weak an instrument as 
he soon foand he had secured; and when the publica- 
tion of the despatches at home gave to the world the 
history of the small and disgraceful intrigue which 
Talleyrand had conducted through his informal agents, 
that minister with bold effrontery disavowed his sub- 
alterns, appealed to Mr. Gerry to vindicate his inno- 
cence, and involved him in a correspondence which 
only added to the bitterness of the unfortunate envoy's 
mortification. Whatever may have been Mr. Gerry's 
private virtues, and virtues he undoubtedly had, — 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 193 

whatever may have been his public services, and some 
he had rendered, — of his conduct in this negotiation 
impartial history can only record, that it was false to 
himself, faithless to his colleagues, and fatal to the 
honor and interest of his country.* 

The news of this second, and, in its accompanying 
circumstances, even more aggravating failure, the suc- 
cessive arrival of the baffled plenipotentiaries, and the 
publication of the despatches, excited in the country 
universal indignation. Mr. Adams called an extra 
session of Congress, and, by his message, rallied to the 
support of his administration the full and active sym- 
pathy of the whole nation. The national legislature 
responded promptly to the popular feeling, and adopted 
measures which indicated both their conviction of the 
gravity of the crisis and their resolution to meet it. 
The necessary legislation was passed to increase the 
army and navy, and to provide for the requisite means 
of defence. The command-in-chief was offered to and 

* In the second volume of the Life of Gerry, by James T. Austin, 
Boston, 1829, will Ije found an earnest and elaborate defence of Mr. 
Gerry's conduct in this mission. I cannot think it satisfactory, but it 
ought to be carefully read by any one who wishes to form an impartial 
opinion. I have, in the text of this volume, confined myself to con- 
clusions without the detail of the argument. To have reasoned out 
every conclusion would have made this a book of episodes, or re- 
quired another volume of notes. Besides which, I know nothing 
more unprofitable than a repetition of the personal controversies of 
that day, which were more numerous and more bitter than at any 
other period of our history. 

17 



194 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

accepted by Washington. Merchant vessels were per- 
mitted to arm in their own protection, and the Presi- 
dent was authorized to instruct the public armed ves- 
sels, and issue commissions to private ones, to capture 
French armed vessels, wherever found. And an act 
was passed, alleging the repeated violation of the 
treaties between the two countries, the just claims of 
the United States for reparation, and the complete fail- 
ure of all attempts at honorable settlement, and, for 
these reasons, declaring the treaties with France void. 

While urging upon Congress these and kindred 
measures, Mr. Adams still expressed his readiness to 
accept any amicable adjustment of these national dif- 
ficulties consistent with the country's honor ; but in his 
message of June, 1798, he expressly declared, " I will 
never send another minister to France without assur- 
ances that he will be received, respected, and honored 
as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and 
independent nation." Earnest and resolute to prepare 
the country for the conflict that seemed inevitable, Mr. 
Adams yet realized fully the perilous condition in 
which a war with France would involve the nation, 
and while these preparations were in progress, without 
abating one jot of zeal in their conduct, influenced by 
what he considered a change of conditions in France, 
he resolved once more to attempt negotiation. 

The effect of this resolution upon politics at home 
was decisive, and, as far as the great Federal party was 
concerned, destructive ; and these consequences have, in 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 195 

a large measure, prevented an impartial consideration 
of its merits as a measure of foreign policy. As such it 
deserves the gravest attention. For the circumstances 
under which he was compelled to act, Mr. Adams was 
in no way responsible. The policy of neutrality, a 
policy eminently wise and honorable, had been initi- 
ated and persevered in by Washington's administration. 
To avoid a war with England, negotiation had been 
resorted to, which evidenced no foolish sensitiveness as 
to national honor, and resulted in no extravagant advan- 
tage to the national interest. The very success of this 
negotiation had complicated our relations with France ; 
and the natural, the necessary, consequence of Jay's 
treaty was, that the succeeding administration was 
compelled to do in reference to France what that treaty 
had done in reference to England, or else the whole 
neutral policy of the country had to be abandoned. To 
abandon this neutrality was to render useless the 
laborious diplomacy of the last eight years ; and, in 
fact, to pass the most pointed condemnation upon Mr. 
Jay's treaty, for that treaty would have been the osten- 
sible cause of the French dissatisfaction. Justice, there- 
fore, to the administration of Washington, as well as to 
the great interests of the nation, required Mr. Adams to 
exhaust every honorable means of amicable adjustment 
before he resorted to the perilous venture of war. The 
country was no better prepared for hostilities at this 
time than at the signature of the treaty of London. 
Public opinion, though for the moment roused into 



196 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

unanimous indignation at the insolence of the Direc- 
tory, was still very much divided, both as to men and to 
measures ; and the increased and onerous taxation 
necessary to a war policy would have aggravated the 
difference. Besides this, a war with France almost 
necessarily implied an alliance with England ; and, 
terminate how it might, seemed to involve the unavoid- W 
able sacrifice of national independence. For, scarcely 
able to stand alone, with an amount of domestic legis- 
lation to perfect which required all the temper, time, 
and talent of its rulers, how was it possible, in such a 
conflict, that the interest and honor of the country could 
escape being crushed between the upper and nether 
mill-stone of the contending nations ? More than this, 
a war with France was war with Spain ; and already, 
at Lisle, where England and France were endeavoring 
to adjust a peace, propositions had been suggested 
looking to the cession of New Orleans to England.* It 
involved probable difficulty with Portugal, with whom, 
on account of its relations with the Barbary powers, the 
United States were particularly anxious to be on ami- 
cable terms. For, although Portugal had been the 
nominal ally of England, yet during the negotiations at 
Lisle, in which England made the interests of Portugal 
a subject of indispensable settlement, the Portuguese 

* " Trinidad in our hands, Pleville said, would turn to great 
account. So would New Orleans, and he immediately saw its conse- 
quences as to the Americans." — Lord Malmesbury's Diary, July 8, 
1797, Vol. III., p. 370. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 197 

minister at Paris treacherously concluded a most unex- 
pected peace with Talleyrand, a step which seriously 
and most unfairly embarrassed the English negotiator. 
It promised trouble at the Hague, and, in fact, interfered 
directly with all our European relations : and, by mix- 
ing up the only independent power in America with 
the contest in Europe, suggested and excused the dis- 
position of possessions in America as a means of terri- 
torial adjustment in the final arrangement of an Euro- 
pean peace. 

To avoid war, therefore, at almost any hazard, was 
clearly the interest of the United States. All that ]\L'. 
Adams was bound to consider on the other hand, was, 
first, that the country should not be humiliated in its 
advances ; and secondly, that there should exist some 
reasonable prospect of a fair settlement. 

It cannot be denied that the conduct of the Directory 
had been insolent in the extreme ; but this diplomatic 
impertinence was not displayed for the sole or special 
benefit of the United States. At the same time that 
they refused to receive Mr. Pinckney, they dismissed 
Lord Malmesbury from Paris, with almost contemptu- 
ous rudeness.* The negotiations at Lisle, resumed by 

* " Burke was strongly opposed -to pacific negotiations with 
France, and taxed the government with meanness in proposing 
them. Somebody observing that the badness of the roads had ren- 
dered Lord Malmesbury's journey a slow one, he replied, ' no won- 
der, as he went the whole way on his knees.' " — Diary and Corresp. 
of Lord Malmesbury, Vol. IIL, p. 311, note. 

17* 



198 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

the English government very much in the same man- 
ner as the United States renewed their discussion 
through Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, were 
characterized by the same dishonoring and irritating 
traits. These negotiations were terminated, unsuccess- 
fully, only a few days before the arrival in Paris of the 
American commissioners. And the diary of Lord 
Malmesbury, the English minister, and one of the most 
celebrated diplomatists of any age or country, and his 
correspondence with Lord Grenville and Mr. Canning, 
are full of constant complaint. The same deceitful delay, 
the same vague discussion, the same secret intermedi- 
aries, the same suspicion, almost certainty, of diplomatic 
manoeuvring on the part of the Directory for the base 
purposes of stockjobbing and money making. Besides 
this, it is clear that this dishonorable conduct was not 
the action of the French people. As the extract already 
quoted from Mr. Pinckney's despatches shows, and other 
sources confirm, there were two parties in the country, 
the one following Barras, Eewbell, and Lareveilliere, the 
other siding with Carnot and Barthelemy : the fir.st, rude, 
Jacobinical, aggressive, insolent ; the other, disposed to 
act in good faith, and with a view to broad and fair 
national interests. The uncertainty of these parallel 
negotiations with England and the United States fur- 
nishes continual evidence of the fluctuating strength of 
those parties in the Directory. And thus the United 
States might very well have resolved to retort the policy 
of Genet, Fauchet, and Adet, and refuse to acknowl- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 199 

edge the discourteous diplomacy of the Directory as an 
expression of the French national feeling. But, fortu- 
nately for Mr. Adams, he was not forced to any such 
palliating construction. Just before the arrival of the 
American commissioners, this contest in the Directory 
had resulted in the triumph of one party, and Barras 
and his friends were confirmed in power, while, at the 
same time, the peace of Carnpo Formio crowned with 
victory the pohcy of the French Republic. From this 
period the diplomacy of France assumed a more regular, 
if not a more moderate, character; and although the 
American ministers derived no immediate advantage 
from the change, although their negotiation seemed 
rather the expiring effort of the disgraceful system which 
had hitherto existed, yet they had scarcely returned 
home before an improvement began to manifest itself 
in the conduct of French affairs. Talleyrand himself, 
in a manner, — indirect, it is true, but recognized and 
constantly repeated in diplomatic history, — made ad- 
vances to the government of the United States. The 
negotiations had been closed, and the ministers had re- 
turned home early in 1798. In the August of the same 
year, M. Pichon, the Secretary of the French Legation 
at the Hague, acting evidently under instructions, had 
an informal conversation with Mr. Vans Murray, the 
newly appointed American minister to that place. In 
the course of his conferences with the American min- 
ister, he showed him the coiTespondence between Tal- 
leyrand and himself, in which the former signified his 



i 



200 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

satisfaction at the step taken by M. Pichoii, expressed 
his own anxiety to see the negotiation resumed and 
terminated amicably, and declared the readiness of his 
government to receive and treat with the fullest consid- 
eration any minister from the United States. These 
letters were forwarded l)y Mr. Murray to the President ; 
and in February, 1799, Mr. Adams, basing his action 
upon this correspondence, nominated Mr. Murray as 
minister to France. This nomination not giving satis- 
faction, he joined with Mr. Murray, Chief Justice Ells- 
worth, of Connecticut, and Governor Davie, of North 
Carolina. But this commission — and it is to be re- 
gretted that it was a commission instead of a single 
minister — was not to enter France until distinct and 
official assurance had been received of their certain and 
honorable reception. 

On the 12th of May, 1799, Talleyrand, in reply to 
Mr. Murray's notification of his appointment and its 
condition, said, " Be pleased to transmit to your col- 
leagues, and to receive yourself, the frank and explicit 
assurance that it (the government) will receive the en- 
voys of the United States in the official character with 
which they are invested; that they shall enjoy all the 
prerogatives which are attached to it by the law of 
nations, and that one or more ministers shall be duly 
authorized to treat with them." 

On the 30th of March, 1800, the American envoys 
met in Paris, and on the 7th were officially presented to 
the First Consul ; for since their appointment, another 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 201 

and greater revolution had occurred in the form of the 
French government. 

The position of the American ministers on tliis occa- 
sion differed very materially from that occupied by 
General Pinckney, or the commission which succeeded 
him. The former ambassadors had borne the remon- 
strances of one friendly and allied nation to another, 
and their representations v^^ere based upon existing 
treaties, which determined the relations of the two gov- 
ernments to each other. And these treaties indicated a 
connection of such mutual advantage as to recommend 
to both a prompt and an amicable solution of their 
difficulties. But, by the act of the American Congress, 
these treaties were now declared void, and the question 
of the indemnity for the wrongs complained of stood 
unsupported by the consequential advantages of the 
treaties, and would, therefore, inevitably involve in its 
discussion a new arrangement of equivalents. The task 
of the first ministers had been to settle a difficulty ; the 
object of the present was to negotiate a treaty, in every 
respect a more arduous undertaking. The instructions 
to the new ministers exhibited this difference. The 
business details of the instructions were prefaced by a 
statement of the circumstances under which the nego- 
tiation was undertaken. 

" You have been witnesses of the enduring patience 
of the United States itnder the unexampled aggressions, 
depredations, and hostilities, authorized and sanctioned 
by the French Republic, against the commerce and 



202 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

citizens of the United States ; and you are well in- 
formed of the measures adopted by our government to 
put a stop to these evils, to obtain redress for the in- 
jured, and real peace and security to our country. And 
you know, that, instead of indemnity for past wrongs, 
oar very moderate demands have been immediately 
followed by new aggressions and more extended dep- 
redations; while our ministers, seeking redress and 
reconciliation, have been refused a reception, treated 
with indignities, and finally driven from its territo- 
ries. 

" The conduct of the French Republic would well 
have justified an immediate declaration of war on the 
part of the United States ; but, desirous of maintaining 
peace, and still willing to leave open the door of recon- 
ciliation with France, the United States contented 
themselves with preparations for defence, and measures 
calculated to protect their commerce. 

" The treatment experienced by the former envoys of 
the United States to the French Republic having de- 
termined the President not to send thither other min- 
isters, without direct and unequivocal assurances, previ- 
ously signified by its Minister of Foreign Relations, that 
they would be received in character to an audience of 
the Directory, and that they should enjoy all the pre- 
rogatives attached to that character by the law of na- 
tions, and that a minister or ministers of equal powers 
should be appointed and commissioned to treat with 
them ; the French government, by M. Talleyrand, its 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 203 

Minister of Foreign Relations, has declared that it will 
receive the envoys of the United States in the official 
character with which they are invested ; that they shall 
enjoy all the privileges annexed to it by the law of 
nations, and that one or more ministers shall be duly 
authorized to treat with them. This the President 
deems to be substantially the assurance which he re- 
quired as the previous condition of the envoys entering 
on their mission. It now belongs to you, gentlemen, 
that this assurance be verified. Your country will not 
submit to any new indignity or neglect. It is expected, 
when you shall have assembled at Paris, and have 
given official notice of it to the Minister of Foreign 
Relations, that you will be received to an audience of 
the Executive Directory ; that a minister or ministers, 
with powers equal to yours, will be appointed to treat 
with you; and that within twenty days at furthest, after 
your arrival at Paris, your negotiation will be com- 
menced. If, however, your passports to Paris should 
be unseasonably withheld ; if an audience of the Direc- 
tory should be denied or procrastinated ; if the appoint- 
ment of a minister or ministers with equal powers to 
treat with you should be delayed ; or if, when appointed, 
they postpone the intended negotiation ; you are to 
relinquish your mission, demand your passports, and 
leave France ; and, having once resolved to terminate 
the mission, you are not to resume it, whatever fresh 
overtures or assurances may be made to you by the 
French government. 



204 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

" One more limitation. The subjects of diflference 
between the United States and France have often been 
discussed, and are well understood, and therefore admit 
of a speedy decision. The negotiation is expected to 
be concluded in such time that you may certainly em- 
bark for the United States by the 1st of next April. 
This is highly important, in order that, on your return. 
Congress may be found in session to take those meas- 
ures which the result of your mission shall require. If 
it can be earlier concluded, it will be still better. 

" If any of the periods above mentioned should be 
prolonged with your assent, it is expected that the cir- 
cumstances will be stated for your justification." 

They were then instructed to demand, as an indis- 
pensable condition of any treaty, a stipulation for in- 
demnity for all condemnation or captures made con- 
trary to the law of nations, and in violation of the pro- 
visions of the treaty of 1778, while that treaty was 
in force, especially where such condemnation or cap- 
ture was made on either of the three following pre- 
texts : — 

1. Because the vessel's lading, or any part thereof, 
consisted of provisions or merchandise coming from 
England or her possessions. 

2. Because the vessels were not provided with the 
roles dC equipage prescribed by the laws of France, and 
which, it had been pretended, were also required by 
treaty. 

3« Because sea letters or other papers were wanting, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 205 

or said to be wanting, where the property was admitted, 
or proved, to be American. 

4. Where the owners, masters, or supercargoes had 
been refused a hearing, or placed in situations rendering 
their presence at the trials impossible. 

5. When the vessels or other property captured had 
been sold or otherwise disposed of, without a regular 
trial or condemnation. 

These indemnities were to be ascertained by a joint 
commission. These claims being admitted, the minis- 
ters were directed to negotiate a treaty which should 
determine the political and commercial relations of the 
two nations. Their instructions under this head were 
minute ; but the XXI. Section, only, need be quoted. 

" XXI. The 17th and 22d articles of the commercial 
treaty between the United States and France, of Febru- 
ary 6th, 1778, have been the source of much altercation 
between the two nations during the present war. The 
dissolution of that and our other treaties with France 
leaves us at liberty with respect to future arrangements ; 
with the exception of the now preferable right, secured 
to Great Britain by the 25th article of the treaty of am- 
ity and commerce. In that article, we promise mutually, 
that, while we continue in amity, neither party will in 
future make any treaty that shall be inconsistent with 
that article or the preceding one. We cannot, there- 
fore, renew with France the 17th and 22d articles of 
the treaty of 1778. Her aggressions, which occasioned 
the dissolution of that treaty, have deprived her of tlie 
18 



206 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

priority of rights and advantages there stipulated. In- 
deed, if the public faith pledged in the British treaty 
did not forbid a renewal of those engagements with 
France, sound policy should prevent it. We should 
preserve to ourselves the right of allowing every com- 
mercial nation, in amity with us, the like shelter, sup- 
plies, and assistance under like circumstances ; and by 
excluding all equally when engaged in war, (saving to 
each the rights of humanity and hospitality,) we may 
keep the calamities of war at a distance. The engage- 
ments with Great Britain may cease in two years after 
the close of the present war ; but under the stipulations 
contained in the 28th and last articles of the British 
treaty, the engagement in question may be continued 
to a longer period. If, therefore, you should find any 
cogent reasons for renewing in substance the 17th and 
22d articles of the commercial treaty with France of 
1778, it must be with the explicit declaration, that, 
neither at the present or any future time, shall the said 
articles be construed to derogate from the whole or any 
part of the 24th and 25th articles of the treaty of amity 
and commerce and navigation between the United 
States and his Britannic Majesty, concluded at London 
on the 19th of November, 1794." 

The instructions concluded with this explicit declara- 
tion : — 

" The following points are to be considered ulti- 
mated — 

" 1. That an article be inserted for establishing a 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 207 

board with suitable powers, to hear and determine the 
claims of our citizens for the causes hereinbefore ex- 
pressed, and binding France to pay or secure pay- 
ment of the sums which shall be awarded. 

"2,. That the treaties and consular convention, de- 
clared to be no longer obligatory by act of Congress, be 
not, in whole or in part, revived by the new treaty ; but 
that all engagements, to which the United States are 
to become parties, be specified in the new treaty. 

" 3. That no guaranty of the whole or any part of 
the dominions of France be stipulated, nor any engage- 
ment made in the nature of an alliance. 

"4. That no aid or loan be promised in any form 
whatever. 

" 5. That no engagement be made inconsistent with 
the obligations of any prior treaty, and, as it may 
respect our treaty with Great Britain, the instruc- 
tion herein marked XXI. is to be particularly ob- 
served. 

" 6. That no stipulation be made granting powers 
to consuls or others, under color of which tribunals can 
be established within our jurisdiction, or personal privi- 
leges be claimed by Frenchmen, incompatible with the 
complete sovereignty of the United States in matters of 
policy, commerce, and government. 

" 7. That the duration of the proposed treaty be 
limited to twelve years, at furthest, from the day of the 
exchange of the ratifications, with the exceptions respect- 



208 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ing its permanence in certain cases specified under the 
instructions marked XXX." * 

The plenipotentiaries opened their conferences by 
exchanging their powers ; and the American envoys 
having objected to the language of the French powers 
as not equal in extent with their own, the French gov- 
ernment, although not admitting the justice of the criti- 
cism, issued new powers to their ministers, in conform- 
ity to the wishes of the American commissioners. 

In order to comprehend fully the three distinct stages 
through which the negotiation passed, the following 
facts must always be borne in mind. 

1. That by the 11th article of the treaty of alliance, 
France and the United States had mutually guaranteed 
their American possessions, and that by the 17th and 

} 22d articles of the treaty of commerce of 177S, they 
/ granted to each other the mutual and exclusive privi- 
lege of taking their prizes and privateers into each 
other's ports. 

2. That by the treaty of 1794 with England, this 
same exclusive privilege had been granted by the 

I United States to that power; but that, owing to the 
priority of the French treaty, and the exclusive char- 
acter of the privilege, it remained in abeyance, as far as 
England was concerned, so long as the French treaty 
lasted. 

* Tliis instruction referred merely to the permanence of such arti- 
cles as concerned the settlement of claims, as long as there should be 
any subject-matter for their action. 



I 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 209 

3. That by the act of July, 1798, the United States 
government had cancelled the French treaties of 1778, 
and thus given priority and activity to the exclusive 
privilege stipulated in the treaty with England. 

After the exchange of one or two notes between the 
plenipotentiaries, conveying their general ideas as to 
the mode and principles of their negotiation, the Amer- 
ican commission, conceiving that the way was now pre- 
pared, submitted certain propositions in the form of a 
treaty, both as the frankest method of expressing their 
opinions, and drawing the discussion to a clear, practi- 
cal point. These propositions contained a general 
sketch of such a treaty as their instructions warranted, 
the leading article of which provided for a commission 
to ascertain the indemnities mutually due. And the 
draft of this article, in necessary conformity with the 
views and action of the United States, provided, in 
reference to the commissioners, that — 

" They shall decide the claims in question according 
to the original merits of the several cases, and to justice, 
equity, and the law of nations, and in all cases of com- 
plaint existing prior to the 1th of July^ 1798, according 
to the treaties and considar convention then existing 
betiveen France and the United States.^^ 

The French commissioners replied to this communi- 
cation, stating that, in their opinion, the liquidation and 
discharge of damages, which were the result of mutual 
misunderstanding, could only be considered as the con- 
sequence of such a common interpretation of the exist- 
18' 



210 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ing treaties as the plenipotentiaries could agree upon ; 
and they then proceeded. 

" The ministers of the French Republic would, for 
this reason, have seized the present moment to develop 
their views respecting the various interpretations which, 
for years past, have been given to the treaties, if, upon 
reading the second article of the project which has been 
submitted, they had not been struck with an interpreta- 
tion, of which they can conceive neither the cause nor 
the object, and which, therefore, seems to require expla- 
nation ; " and quoting the article of the American project 
just cited, they added : — 

" The ministers plenipotentiary of the French Re- 
public are not aware of any reason which can authorize 
a distinction between the time prior to the 7th of July, 
1798, and the time subsequent to that date, in order to 
apply the stipulations of the treaties to the damages 
which have arisen during the first period, and only the 
princi]3les of the law of nations to those which have 
occurred during the second." 

To this demand for explanation the American min- 
isters immediately replied, that they would cheerfully 
explain why they assumed the date of the 7th of July, 
1798, as a dividing point between the two periods, and 
also why they could not regard the treaties with France 
as the basis of the present negotiation for any other 
purpose than that of giving a rule by which causes of 
complaint, prior to that date, were to be tested. 

" It was not till after the treaty of amity and com- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 211 

merce of February, 1778, had been violated to a great 
extent on the part of the French Republic, nor till after 
explanations and an amicable adjustment, sought by 
the United States, had been refused, that they did, on 
the 7th day of July, 1798, by a solemn public act, 
declare that they were freed and exonerated from the 
treaties and consular convention which had been en- 
tered into between them and France ; nor would such 
a declaration, though justified by the law of nature and 
of nations, have even then been made, if it had been 
possible for the United States, while continuing the 
treaties and consular convention as the rule of their 
conduct, to guard against injuries which daily in- 
creased, and threatened their commerce with total 
destruction. That declaration cannot be recalled ; 
and the United States must abide its effects with 
respect to the priority of treaties, whatever inconven- 
iences may result to themselves. The government, it 
was understood, could not with good faith give to the 
undersigned powers to change or affect such priorities, 
and they do not possess them." v 

Upon the receipt of this reply, the French ministers 
informed the American plenipotentiaries that the nego- 
tiation was at a stand ; that their instructions would 
not permit them to negotiate on any such basis ; that 
their commission had designated the treaty of alliance, 
and of friendship and commerce, and the consular con- 
vention, as the sole basis of their negotiation, and that 
they must refer the matter back to their government for 



212 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

further instructions. While waiting the result of this 
reference, which was delayed in consequence of the 
absence of the First Consul, who was negotiating after 
another fashion at Marengo, the plenipotentiaries had 
several informal conversations, and exchanged some 
explanatory notes. In reference to the abrogation of 
the treaties, the American ministers took two positions. 

1. That a treaty being a mutual compact, its viola- 
tion by one party justified its abrogation by the other; 
and 2. " That it had become impossible for the United 
States to save their commerce from the depredations of 
the French cruisers, but by resorting to defensive meas- 
ures ; and that, as by their constitution existing trea- 
ties were the supreme law of the land, and the judicial 
department, who must be governed by them, is not un- 
der the control of the executive or legislative, it \vas 
also impossible for them to legalize defensive measures, 
incompatible with the French treaties, while they con- 
tinued to exist. Then it was they were formally re- 
nounced, and from that renunciation, there resulted, 
necessarily, a priority in favor of the British treaty, as 
to the exclusive asylum for privateers and prizes." 

To these arguments the French government replied 
with great force, " that, when on the one hand Congress 
declare that France has contravened these treaties, and 
that the United States are released from their stipula- 
tions ; and when France declares that she has con- 
formed to these treaties, that she desires their execution, 
and that the United States alone have infringed them. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 213 

where is the tribunal or law to enforce the exoneration 
in preference to the execution ? 

" So lone: as a difference exists between two contract- 
ing parties, respecting the existence or abrogation of a 
treaty, no right or benefit can result to a third party 
from the abrogation contended for by one. 

" If France had declared the treaties annulled, and the 
United States had maintained their validity, England 
would have no ground for saying to America, 'we suc- 
ceed to the rights of France.' ... If one of two con- 
tracting parties is at liberty, whenever he may please, to 
cancel his obligations in virtue of his own judgment 
concerning facts or men or things, no binding force can 
be attached to treaties, and the term itself should be 
erased from every language. If the right of anteriority 
can be destroyed to the prejudice of the nation that 
possesses it, by the sole act of one of the parties by 
whom that right has been recognized, it must be ac- 
knowledged as a principle, that the nation making the 
second treaty converts the one with whom she first con- 
tracted into an enemy, and that she may be certain of 
being despoiled by that enemy whenever the time may 
be propitious for an open explanation." 

It must be admitted that the American positions 
were untenable. The first position contradicted the 
fundamental idea of a treaty ; but admitting its princi- 
ple, it is clear that it can only apply to cases where the 
offsets are distinctly reciprocal, and the mutual obliga- 
tion expressly refused. To admit its application to 



214 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

treaties for both special and general purposes, where 
the stipulations had been, in a large measure, and for a 
long time, carried out in good faith and effectively, sim- 
ply on account of temporary misunderstanding, would 
be to sacrifice the whole system of international law to 
a loose, rather than to a liberal, interpretation. Now the 
treaty of 1778, under which, and to a large extent by 
which, the independence of the United States had been 
achieved, had in good faith, on the part of France, 
effected this special purpose, and its general provisions 
had, for twenty years, regulated the relations between 
the two countries. That at the outbreak of the Revolu- 
tion they had a perfect right not to regard the republic 
as the legitimate successor of the old monarchy with 
whom they had made the alliance, is one thing. But 
this position the United States had refused to assume, 
and held on to the treaties ; and though, under changed 
circumstances, difficulties almost insuperable had arisen, 
and the two nations might even be driven to war, the 
United States could not claim, in view of their past 
action, and actual receipt of great advantages under the 
treaty, the right alone to pronounce the treaties annulled. 
It was, at the very least, an attempt to force a doubtful 
principle to a still more doubtful apphcation. The sec- 
ond position was even weaker ; for if this one-sided ab- 
rogation was in itself void, no constitutional necessity 
of domestic government could make it valid, and the 
French government had no concern with the internal 
embarrassments of the United States government, re- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 215 

suiting from the illegitimate and illogical action of their 
own legislature. The French negotiators were there- 
fore enabled to place the American ministers in a most 
distressing dilemma, which they did, with great ingenu- 
ity and success. 

On the 11th of August, 1800, they handed in their 
official reply, in which they repeated their objections to 
the principle offered by the American ministers, as the 
basis of their negotiation. But they added that they 
were prepared to admit the importance to America of 
avoiding the exclusive privileges of the old treaties. 
They were willing, therefore, to meet the wishes of the 
United States, as far as they consistently could. They 
would, therefore, consent to the abrogation of the old 
treaties ; but as such an abrogation could only be the 
result of war, they were obliged to consider the action 
of the United States preceding, as equivalent to war, 
and a new treaty, in necessary consequence, as a treaty 
of peace. In such case, the question of indemnity must 
be laid aside, because a war extinguished all mutual 
obligation ; each party had taken the remedy of com- 
plaints in their own hands, and a treaty of peace was a 
fresh start, upon such a new basis as their respective posi- 
tions warranted them in proposing. And therefore they 
offered to the American ministers, either the abrogation 
of the old treaties without indemnity, or indemnity with 
the old treaties. And they added, that, in any new 
treaty, while France would cheerfully abandon her priv- 



216 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ilege of exclusive asylum, she would not consent to oc- 
cupy an inferior position to any other nation. 

At this point, the American negotiators very cor- 
rectly informed the Secretary of State that they were 
obliged to abandon either the negotiation or their in- 
structions. They resolved upon the latter course ; and 
as they could not procure the abrogation of the treaties 
and indemnity, they endeavored to obtain indemnity, 
and then to relinquish that indemnity as an equivalent, 
to purchase the abrogation of the two stipulations in the 
old treaties gi-anting the exclusive asylum, and guar- 
anteeing the French American possessions. There was 
some difference as to the equivalent to be offered in 
exchange for the guarantee ; but the chief and the in- 
superable difficulty was the priority accruing to the 
English treaty, in consequence of the act of Congress 
of July annulling the French treaty. France declared 
she was willing to give up her exclusive privilege in 
deference to the wishes, and in furtherance of the inter- 
ests, of her old ally ; but she could not and would not 
consent to have this privilege yielded to any other 
power, least of all to England, her constant and bitter- 
est enemy. Indeed, Joseph Bonaparte, the chief of the 
French commission, declared, that, even if his govern- 
ment authorized such a concession, he would resign 
rather than sign the treaty which contained it. But the 
United States could not refuse this privilege to Eng- 
land, as it necessarily followed from their own act of 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 217 

abrogation ; and again the negotiation came to a dead 
halt. The fact was, that the French government could 
not, and did not intend to, pay the indemnity that 
would have resulted from the treaty ; and the action of 
the United States in complicating their relations by the 
act of abrogation afforded a means of escape, which 
the French negotiators used with consummate skill 
and complete success. 

Upon this unfortunate termination of the second 
stage of their negotiations, it only remained for the 
American plenipotentiaries either to demand their pass- 
ports, or to change entirely the character of their nego- 
tiations. Considering, justly, that a peremptory con- 
clusion of amicable discussion would be an inevitable 
declaration of war, they, after much reflection, deter- 
mined upon the milder, and, as events proved, the wiser, 
course ; and they resolved " to attempt a temporary 
arrangement, which would extricate the United States 
from the war, or that peculiar state of hostility in which 
they were at present involved, save the immense 
amount of property of our citizens now depending 
before the council of prizes, and secure, as far as pos- 
sible, our commerce against the abuses of capture dur- 
ing the present war." 

With this view, they proposed to the Frenqh nego- 
tiators a temporary convention, based on the four follow- 
ing principles : — 

1. That the parties, not being able at present to agree 
respecting the former treaties and indemnity,, these sub- 
19 



218 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

jects should be postponed for further negotiation, and, in 
the mean time, that the said treaties should have no 
operation. 

2. The parties shall abstain from all unfriendly acts, 
their commerce shall be free, and debts shall be recover- 
able in the same manner as if no misunderstanding had 
intervened. 

3. Property captured, and not yet definitely con- 
demned, or which may be captured before the exchange 
of ratifications, shall be mutually restored. Proofs of 
ownership to be specified in the convention. 

4. Some provisional regulations to be made, to pre- 
vent abuses and disputes in future cases of capture. 

Upon this basis, and after some little discussion, the 
plenipotentiaries arrived at a mutual understanding. 
But before the convention which embodied the result 
of their deliberations was signed, another difficulty 
arose, which, although of minor importance to the dif- 
ficulties they had failed to surmount, was yet irritat- 
ing enough. On the 29th of September, 1800, the 
French envoys addi'essed a note to the American min- 
isters, in which they said : — 

" The ministers of France insist, in relation to the 
treaty, upon one of three things : — 

" Either that the treaty shall be signed in the French 
language only, without any reservation, — the mode 
pursued by the consular convention of 1788 between 
France and the United States, and by the treaty of 
1786 between France and England ; 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 219 

" Or, that it shall be signed in the French language 
only, and that a separate article (similar to the one at 
the close of the treaty of 1783 between France and 
England) shall stipulate, that the French language used 
in the treaty shall not constitute a precedent, nor oper- 
ate to the prejudice of either of the contracting parties. 

" Or, finally, that it shall be signed in the French 
and English languages, accompanied by the following 
declaration, conforming to the one at the end of the 
treaty of alliance and the treaty of commerce of 1788 : 
' In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have 
signed the above articles, both in the French and Eng- 
lish languages ; declaring, nevertheless, that the present 
treaty was originally written and concluded in the 
French language.' " 

The American ministers, as they informed their gov- 
ernment, " finally, but with great reluctance, agreed to 
the signing in the form of the treaty of 1778 ; " and on 
the 30th of September, 1800, the convention was 
signed by the plenipotentiaries of both nations. 

The convention was very general in its provisions ; 
— it contained certain regulations to avoid abuses in 
cases of capture ; relinquished on the part of France 
the demand for a role cVequipage, which had caused so 
much injustice and irritation ; recognized the right of 
convoy ; placed France upon a footing with the most 
friendly nation as to the right of asylum for privateers ; 
repeated the principle of free ships free goods ; and pro- 



220 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

vided for the exchange of consuls. It ditrei-ed very httle, 
in points outside of the recent controversy, from the 
provisions of the treaty of commerce of 1778 ; and the 
second article declared expressly : — 

" The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties, 
not being able to agree at present respecting the treaty 
of alliance of February 6, 1778, and the treaty of amity 
and commerce of the same date, and the convention of 
the 14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities 
mutually due and claimed, the parties will negotiate 
further on these subjects at a convenient time, and 
until they may have agreed upon these points, the said 
treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the 
relation of the two countries shall be regulated as fol- 
lows." 

When this convention was submitted to the Senate 
of the United States for ratification, they expunged the 
second article, and limited the duration of the treaty to 
eight years. With these very important modifications, 
the French government accepted the ratification ; but 
the First Consul added to the instrument of ratification, 
on the part of France, a declaratory clause, providing, 
" that by this retrenchment, the two states renounce the 
respective pretensions which are the objects of the said 
article." The effect of this anomalous procedure will 
be discussed hereafter. At present, it is only necessary 
to state, that Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State in 
the administration which had just (March 4, 1801) sue- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 221 

ceeded Mr. Adams, wrote to Mr. Livingston, minister 
to France, on the 18th of December, 1801 : — 

" I am authorized to say that the President does not 
regard the declaratory clause as more than a legitimate 
inference from the rejection by the Senate of the second 
article." 

Mr. Jefferson, however, deemed it proper to submit 
the convention thus ratified anew to the Senate, when 
that body declared by resolution, that they considered 
the ratification as already perfected, and returned it to 
the President for the usual publication. 

Such was the convention ; and such as it was, it could 
not, either in its argument or its result, be claimed as a 
diplomatic triumph. The history of its consequences 
belongs to another period ; but, like the English treaty, 
which in many features it resembled, it was at the time 
a positive advantage. It is true that it merely tempo- 
rized, but to temporize wisely is sometimes the most 
skilful policy. It unquestionably saved the United 
States from war ; for had the negotiators returned with- 
out succeeding in any arrangement, it is difficult to see 
how war could have been avoided, in face of the hostile 
preparations and energetic language of the government. 
The United States had openly prepared for war, and 
declared that this mission was its final effort at con- 
ciliation ; if that failed, the honor of the country had no 
alternative. Disastrous as such a necessity would have 
been at the outset of the mission, it would have been 
19* 



222 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

worse at its close. The campaign of 1800, illustrated 
by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, had scat- 
tered the enemies of France. The treaty of Luneville 
made her mistress of Europe. The renewal of the 
armed neutrality had detached the Northern maritime 
states from their natural alliance with England ; and but 
a very few months after the signature of the conven- 
tion, after the experience of the negotiations at Paris 
and at Lisle, where her ablest diplomatist had met with 
no better success and scarcely better treatment, than 
our own ministers. Great Britain was forced to the 
humiliating truce known as the Peace of Amiens. Had 
this state of things found the United States in open 
hostility with France, who can anticipate the result ? 
This convention avoided these difficult issues ; and it is 
a curious fact, worthy of notice, that the treaty of 
Luneville, which aggrandized to such vast extent the 
power of France, enabled her to take Louisiana from 
Spain, while our convention, forced on us by the con- 
trast of our weakness with such strength, enabled us, 
by avoiding the cost and suffering of war, to move on 
our path slowly but surely, and to purchase that very 
Louisiana from the power we could not have resisted. 
For it scarcely needs an argument to show, that a war 
with France, in 1800, would have forbidden all hope of 
the acquisition of Louisiana in 1806. Another great 
benefit resulting from this convention was, that it saved 
the necessity of an extreme policy just at a most crit- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 223 

ical time in the domestic history of the country. For if 
the ministers had come home without effecting even an 
armistice, Mr. Adams would have been going out of 
office, and in the few remaining months of his adminis- 
tration, could have pursued no vigorous line of conduct ; 
while Mr. Jefferson would not yet have assumed the 
responsibility of office, and would naturally have re- 
garded the war as an odious inheritance from an 
administration wdiose mischievous career he had been 
elected to check. Between the two parties, the inter- 
ests as well as the character of the country would have 
been in serious danger. 

This convention was, in fact, the necessary comple- 
ment to the treaty with England. They were both the 
efforts of a nation too weak to hold its own in the face 
of stronger and unscrupulous powers. The most which 
it could do was to submit witbout yielding, — to put 
certain rights in abeyance, and adjourn final principles 
to a day of more equal argument. Neutrality is scarcely 
ever a brilliant policy. It is always difficult, sometimes 
dangerous, and often demands hard sacrifices from na- 
tional pride. But in the case of the United States, their 
interests clearly required it ; it called, on the part of 
their rulers, for firmness, wisdom, and self-reliance ; and 
the manly and modest hope, expressed by the American 
ministers on closing their harassing and unsatisfactory 
labors, may be adopted as the fair verdict of history on 
their patriotic efforts. 



224 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 

" If, with the simple plea of right, unaccompanied with 
the menaces of power and unaided by events either in 
Europe or America, less is at present obtained than jus- 
tice requires, or than the policy of France should have 
granted, the undersigned trust that the sincerity and 
patience of their efforts to obtain all that their coun- 
try had a right to demand, will not be drawn in ques- 
tion." 



CHAPTER IV 

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH SPAIN AND ALGIERS. 

The condition of the negotiations between Spain 
and the United States, at the adoption of the Constitu- 
tion, has abeady been described. Both parties had ar- 
rived at that point where their differences were distinct 
and irreconcilable ; Spain having asserted a positive 
and proliibitory right to the navigation of the Missis- 
sippi, and the United States having exhausted every 
conceivable modification to which they could give even 
a qualified assent. 

Not long after Mr. Jay's return from Spain, where he 
had resided as minister during the Revolution, Mr. Car- 
michael, who remained as Charge d' Affaires, received 
from the Spanish government, what had never been 
vouchsafed to Mr. Jay, a formal recognition as the 
diplomatic representative of the United States ; and the 
recognition was accompanied by circumstances intended 
to imply, on the part of the government, its distinguished 
consideration. The negotiations were, however, trans- 
ferred from Madrid to Philadelphia, to be conducted by 
Mr. Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Don 



226 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Diego de Gardoqui, the Spanish representative. Their 
failure has been narrated in the opening chapter of this 
volume. 

In 1790, the probability of a rupture between Spain 
and England induced the government of the United 
States to send a special messenger to Mr. Carmichael, 
charged with instructions, to be used if circumstances 
permitted, suggesting that in case of war the part of 
the United States was uncertain, and would be difficult. 
Mr. Jefferson intimated, that the unsettled condition of 
our affairs with Spain might give a direction to our con- 
duct not altogether desirable ; and directed the United 
States minister, in conversation with the Spanish secre- 
tary, to "impress him thoroughly with the necessity of 
an early, and even immediate, settlement of this matter, 
and of a return to the field of negotiations for this pur- 
pose ; and though it must be done with delicacy, yet he 
must be made to understand, unequivocally, that a re- 
sumption of negotiation is not desired on our part, 
unless he can determine, in the first opening of it, to 
yield the immediate and full enjoyment of that navi- 
gation." 

Circumstances, however, did not take the favorable 
turn hoped for ; and nothing was done until the admin- 
istration received an intimation from the Spanish gov- 
ernment, that it would resume negotiations at Madiid. 
Washington accordingly nominated, in December, 1791, 
Mr. Carmichael, then Charg^ d' Affaires in Spain, and Mr. 
Short, then Charg^ d' Affaires in France, Commissioners 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 227 

Plenipotentiary, to negotiate and conclude " a conven- 
tion or treaty concerning the navigation of the river 
Mississippi by the citizens of the United States." The 
commissioners were amply and thoroughly instructed 
on three points : I. Boundary. II. The navigation of 
the Mississippi. III. Commerce. 

I. Boundary. Spain claimed certain possessions 
within the limits of the United States, as having been 
taken by force from the British during the revolutionary 
war. To this claim, the reply was, 1. That Spain had 
acted, along with Holland and France, as an associate 
of the United States in that war ; that, having a com- 
mon enemy, each sought that enemy wherever he was 
to be found ; that dislodging the British from frontier 
settlements, where they threatened the colonial posses- 
sions of Spain, and even holding such possessions by 
force to prevent the return of the British, could raise no 
right against the lawful possessors, who were acting 
with Spain against a common enemy. 2. That, even 
supposing such possession to be held as a conquest of 
the places in dispute, conquest is, in its fullest extent, 
only an inchoate title, which must afterwards be per- 
fected by treaty with the rightful possessor. Now 
either Great Britain or the United States were rightful 
possessors. The United States had never by aiiy 
treaty perfected any such title ; and Great Britain, by 
her treaty with Spain of 1783, had expressly stipulated, 
that Spain should restore all conquests without com- 



228 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

pensation, except Minorca and Majorca. And the 
United States, standing by the treaty of 1782 exactly 
in the place of Great Britain, was entitled to the ben- 
efit of this return. 3. That the Spanish government 
had expressly and voluntarily declared, through Count 
Florida Blanca, to General Lafayette, that it recog- 
nized the limits of the United States as defined in the 
treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United 
States, and authorized him so to state to the United 
States' government. 

II. The Naingation of the Mississippi. Spain claimed 
the right to prohibit the navigation of the river, from 
the 31st degree of latitude, where the southern boun- 
dary of the United States crossed, on to the Gulf, rest- 
ing her claim upon the possession of both banks. To 
this the United States replied, 1. That the navigation 
of the river had been granted by Spain to England, by 
the treaty of 1763. 2. That by the treaty of peace of 
1782, the United States were placed in the position of 
Great Britain, and that nothing had transpired during 
the war which was closed by the treaty of 1782, which 
could possibly affect the right of navigation guaranteed 
by the treaty of 1763. And 3. That by the law of 
nations, the United States, holding the upper portion of 
the river, and possessing a territory of such immense 
extent, had a right to the navigation of the river, as an 
outlet created by Providence itself. 

On the subject of the boundary and navigation, the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 229 

commissioners were to consider each and every of the 
following conditions as a sine qua non of any treaty 
between the tvvo countries. 

" 1. That our southern boundary remains established 
at the completion of 31 degrees of latitude on the Mis- 
sissippi, and so on to the ocean, as before described, 
and our western one along the middle of the channel 
of the Mississippi, however that channel may vary, as 
it is constantly varying ; and that Spain cease to occupy, 
or to exercise jurisdiction in, any part northward or 
eastward of those boundaries. 

" 2. That our right be acknowledged of navigating 
the Mississippi, in its whole breadth and length, from 
its source to the sea, as established by the treaty of 
1763. 

" 3. That neither the vessels, cargoes, or persons on 
board be stopped, visited, or subjected to the payment 
of any duty whatsoever ; or, if a visit must be permit- 
ted, that it be under such restrictions as to produce the 
least possible inconvenience. But it should be alto- 
gether avoided, as the parent of perpetual broils. 

" 4. That such conveniences be allowed us ashore as 
may render our right of navigation practicable, and 
under such regulations as may bond fide respect the 
preservation of peace and order alone, and may not 
have in object to embarrass our navigation or raise a 
revenue on it. While the substance of this article is 
made a sine qua non, the modifications of it are left 

20 



230 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

altogether to the discretion and management of the 
commissioners. 

" We might add, as a fifth sine qua non, that no 
phrase should be admitted in the treaty which could 
express or imply that we take the navigation of the 
Mississippi as a g-rant from Spain. But, however dis- 
agreeable it would be to subscribe to such a sentiment, 
yet were the conclusion of the treaty to hang on that 
single objection, it would be expedient to waive it, and 
to meet at a future day the consequences of any re- 
sumption they may pretend to make, rather than at 
present those of a separation without coming to any 
agreement." 

The commissioners were further instructed, as a con- 
sequence of the ground they were directed to take, that 
no proposition could be entertained for compensation 
in exchange for the navigation ; and in case of any 
such proposition, it was to be offset by a claim for dam- 
ages to the commerce of the United States by duties 
and detention at New Orleans for nine years. 

III. Commerce. Under this head it is unnecessary 
to recapitulate the details of the instructions. It is 
sufficient to state briefly, that the commissioners were 
authorized to negotiate only on one of two bases ; either, 
1. That of exchanging the privileges of native citizens, 
or, 2. That of the most favored nation. 

Provided with these instructions, the commissioners 
met at Madrid about the 1st of February, 1793, almost 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 231 

at the same time with the arrival of the news of the 
execution of Louis XVI. They found circumstances 
very much altered from the condition which had in- 
duced their appointment. The ministerial power of 
Spain, which had been transferred from Count Florida 
Blanca to Count d'Aranda, had again been shifted, and 
was now firmly held by Godoy. The difficulty be- 
tween Spain and England had been settled. The con- 
ciliatory, or rather deprecatory, policy which Godoy had 
adopted towards France, in the delusive hope of saving 
Louis by the intervention of a friendly diplomacy, was 
violently destroyed by the execution of that unfortunate 
prince. France soon declared war against Spain ; and 
the commissioners were thus deprived of the support 
which they had relied upon, from the only power in 
Europe able and willing to facilitate their Spanish 
negotiations. It was even worse than that; for the 
inevitable tendency of public events led to an alliance 
between Spain and the combined enemies of France, 
then, as afterwards, headed by England. The relations 
between England and the United States were of the 
most unfriendly description ; and at this very period, just 
preceding the institution of Mr. Jay's mission, war was 
considered as imminent between the two countries. In 
fact, during the negotiation — if it can be so called — 
of the commissioners, Spain concluded an alliance, of- 
fensive and defensive, with England, and its terms were 
such as could be easily applied to the contingency of 
hostilities with the United States. Well might the 



232 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

commissioners write to the Secretary, " We cannot help 
considering it unfortunate that an express commission 
should have been sent to treat here." 

Another unfavorable circumstance was the appoint- 
ment of Diego de Gardoqui as Spanish plenipotentiary. 
All the former negotiations on this subject had been 
carried on with him, and he had rejected the same con- 
clusions too often to be open to new argument ; while 
his experience of the weak and wavering character of 
the old Confederation, which he had personally studied, 
would not easily permit a conviction of the increased 
strength and efficiency of the new government. 

After much deliberation, the commissioners wisely 
determined not to press their claims. Outside of their 
instructions they could not go, and even within that 
limit, they were powerless as they stood. With great 
judgment they concluded, that, to urge claims con- 
sidered so preposterous by the Spanish court, just at 
the moment that it was negotiating a treaty with Eng- 
land, would only draw the attention of both ]:)owers 
more specially to these interests, and secure on their 
part a provision for their joint action against the rights 
of the United States. They accordingly temporized, 
and found in the dilatory spirit of Gardoqui ample 
opportunity for procrastination. 

The news of these changes in the relations of the 
European powers did not, however, make the same 
impression at home ; and the despatches which reached 
the conunissioners, after full information from Em-ope 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 233 

had reached Philadelphia, left them no alternative but 
to carry out their instructions. In the mean time, how- 
ever, they had so far improved their condition that they 
were now in direct communication with Godoy. To 
him they submitted the claims of their government, as 
well as the complaints, now become loud and angry, of 
Spanish interference with the Indian tribes on the 
western and south-western frontier. As to the great 
objects of their mission, they made no progress. Spain 
showed no disposition to recognize their claims, nor 
any profound consideration for the citations of interna- 
tional law with which they fortified their positions. 
With regard to the Indians, they were more fortunate, 
as they obtained from Godoy what might fairly be 
interpreted as a disclaimer of any intention to interfere 
between them and the United States, should the latter 
be forced into active hostilities. 

The commission was finally dissolved by the depart- 
ure of Mr. Carmichael, leaving Mr. Short accredited as 
Charg^ d'affaires. The reception of Mr. Short, in that 
character, seems to have met with some difficulty, 
which, in all probability, was meant to indicate more 
than a mere difference of etiquette. Writing under 
date of December 17, 1794, to Mr. Pinckney, in Lon- 
don, he says : " I regret exceedingly the miscarriage of 
my letter of September 24th, as it was to apologize to 
you for having so long delayed to announce to you (as 
is the general custom, and was my particular duty) 
that I had presented my credentials to H. C. M., on the 
20* 



2-34 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

7th of that month. I mentioned to you, at the same 
time, the difficulties and delays which were occasioned 
by the United States having given me a character, 
of which they had no precedent at this court, and of 
which they could find none in their archives, notwith- 
standing much time and trouble were spent in turning 
them over and over, perhaps from the beginning of the 
monarchy, and, as they assured me, during the whole of 
the Austrian and Bourbon race. I do not suppose it 
was the intention of our government to have brought 
into value old archives, forms, and etiquette, yet they 
have certainly not been so much recurred to, for half a 
century back, as in my case. Such things will often 
happen to those who leave the beaten and known track, 
in order to make new experiments for finding out a 
better. I am sorry that I should have been chosen for 
the experimental instrument in these cases ; but it has 
been the case in every commission I have had, both in 
the Hague and here, in three succeeding instances. If 
they were only my personal feelings which suffered, it 
would be less painful ; but in the two instances which 
occurred at this court, where form is the primum mobile, 
the public interests have been affected thereby, in a 
manner, of which it would be as impossible to give an 
adequate idea to a person who had not been here, as of 
color to the blind, or of sound to the deaf." * 

* T. P. MSS. Letters. That this difficulty in Mr. Short's recep- 
tion sprang from an objection to him, rather than to his rank, is 
clear from the facts of the reception of Mr. Carmichael, some time 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 235 

But another and still more important change in the 
policy of Spain was at hand. The three campaigns 
against France, after the junction of England and 
Spain, had not been fortunate, however honorable to 
the spirit and patriotism of the Spanish troops. The 
alliance against France gave sure signs of rapidly 
approaching dissolution. The combination between 
England and Spain had been a forced one, and at that 
time there was little real sympathy between the two 
countries. The internal changes in French politics 

previous, with precisely the same diplomatic grade, and from the 
language of the Spanish commissioner in the United States, quoted 
further on in the text. As it may be interesting to learn the impres- 
sion made by Godoy on those who had an opportunity of judging him 
fairly, I subjoin two extracts from Mr. Short's correspondence with 
Mr. Pinckney. 

" In the mean time, this government manage their money affairs, 
at least, with much jjrudence and success ; their finances were prob- 
ably never in a more flourishing state, and, whatever may be thought 
elsewhere of the administration of a young man without experience 
in affairs, and who is first minister in fact, it has hitherto been mild, 
prudent, and prosperous, and is every day becoming by that means 
more acceptable to the public." — San Lorenzo, October 12, 1793. 

" You will have formerly learned the progress of ministerial 
changes in this country since the spring of the year 1792, and, of 
course, you will not be surprised at the exile of Comte D'Aranda. 
He is probably too old and too much lost ever to come again on the 
carpet. The present first minister is all-powerful, and possesses many 
qualities to keep so. Besides, his manners are affable ; he is really 
obliging, and possesses that necessary quality, prudence, to a degree 
of which there are few examples." — Aranjuez, April 2, 1794. 



236 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

opened the prospect of a more stable and conservative 
government for that unhappy country ; and the peace of 
Basle, of the 5th of April, 1795, proclaimed the defec- 
tion of Prussia, the centre of the continental combina- 
tion. This state of things could not long endure. " I 
lay it down as a principle," said Mr. Pitt, soon after 
that peace, in a conference with the Spanish ambassa- 
dor, " that the distance between friends and neutrals is 
immense; it is small, on the contrary, between enemies 
and neutrals ; the slightest accident, a mere chance, the 
least mistrust, a false appearance, is enough to efface 
the distinction between them." * On the 29th of July, 
the treaty of peace was signed by the French and 
Spanish ministers ; and the Spanish ambassador in 
London soon after informed his court, that the follow- 
ing questions had been debated in a cabinet council : — 
1. To take possession of a Spanish harbor. 2. To land 
an army. 3. To renew the offer of an alliance with 
England, and compel Spain, by fair means or by force 
of arms, to renew the war against France. And in 
subsequent reports he alluded to projects, on the part of 
England, of seizing upon several points of the Spanish 
American possessions. 

It must also be remembered, that, while these events 
were transpiring, the relations between England and the 
United States were generally supposed to be growing 
more hostile, and those with France to be improving, 

* Godoy's Memoir, Vol. I. p. 468. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 237 

under the management of Mr. Monroe. In view of 
these anticipated and inevitable results, the government 
of Spain made advances to France through the Amer- 
ican minister in Paris, and also took the necessary steps 
to resume direct negotiations with the United States. 

In 1794, Diego de Gardoqui desired the intervention 
of Mr. Monroe with the French government, to obtain 
permission for a visit to certain French baths, his health 
being the ostensible motive of the journey. This cor- 
respondence Mr. Monroe submitted to the French au- 
thorities, who desired him to inform Gardoqui that his 
application must be made directly to them, and inti- 
mated that it would be favorably received. Mr. Monroe 
took advantage of this opportunity to press upon the 
French government the propriety of supporting the 
claims of the United States, and insisting upon a set- 
tlement of such points as were in dispute between 
Spain and his own government, whenever a negotiation 
should be opened for a treaty between France and 
Spain. Early in 1795, and before it was aware of the 
character of Mr. Jay's treaty, the French government 
notified Mr. Monroe of its readiness to aid the United 
States in bringing its differences with Spain to an ami- 
cable termination. And in May, 1795, Mr. Short, at 
the express request of Godoy, wrote to Mr. Monroe, 
stating that the Spanish court was anxious to adjust 
its relations with France, suggesting hints to be con- 
veyed to the French ministers, and adding, that Godoy 
would assure the settlement of the difficulties with the 



238 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

United States at the same time, and on the most favor- 
able terms.* But fortunately, before any steps could be 
taken involving the United States in any joint negotia- 
tions with France, or in any stipulations dependent 
upon the adjustment of interests foreign to themselves, 
the government, at the instance of the Spanish court, 
transferred the whole subject to Madrid, and intrusted 
its arrangement to Mr. Pinckney. It has already been 
stated, that when the Spanish court endeavored to 
sound the French government through Mr. Monroe, it 
also made a direct approach to the United States. On 
the 16th of August, 1794, Mons Jaudenes, the Spanish 
commissioner in the United States, addressed to the 
Secretary of State a communication, in which he ex- 
pressed his great regret at the little progress made in 
the negotiation between the two countries, owdng, how- 
ever, as he had repeatedly, both by letter and orally, in- 
formed Mr. Randolph's predecessor, to the fact that his 
Majesty would not treat, so long as the plenipotentiaries 
of the United States were not furnished with the am- 
plest powers, or were directed by their secret instruc- 
tions to conclude a partial, and not a general, treaty. At 
the least, his Majesty expected that the ministers ap- 
pointed by the United States should be persons of such 
character, eminent distinction, and temper, as would 
become a residence near the royal person, and were re- 

* For the correspondence of M. Gardoqui with j\Ir. Monroe, and 
Mr. Short's letter, see Mr. Monroe's " View." 



DIPLOMATIC HISTOKY. 239 

quired by the gravity of the questions under negotiation. 
That under such circumstances, Spain would be ready 
to treat on the subject of boundary, Indians, commerce, 
and whatever else might conduce to the best interests 
of the two countries. That the powers given to Messrs. 
Carmichael and Short were not ample ; that the well- 
known misconceptions of Mr. Carmichael, and the want 
of circumspection in the conduct of Mr. Short, rendered 
it impossible to conclude this negotiation with them. 
And that his Majesty hoped that some other person or 
persons would be appointed, with full powers, to settle 
this treaty, and graced with such a character as became 
the royalty to which he was accredited.* 

* As the above paragraph is rather a liberal interpretation than a 
literal translation of the Spanish letter, and as this letter, with the 
one which followed it, are referred to on several occasions, in such 
papers relating to this negotiation as have been published, while 
they themselves have never been printed, I subjoin the original let- 
ter, in Sjjanish, from among Mr. Pinckney's MSS. 

" Mui Senor mio : Con no poco sentimiento me veo en la presi- 
cion de anunciar a V. S. el ningun progreso que se ha hecho en la 
negociacion planta entre el Rey mi Amo y los Estados Unidos d, 
causa de lo que tantas vezes predixe al Antecesor de V. S. de escrito 
y de palabra relativo a que Su Majestad no entraria en tratado al- 
guno siempre que los Poderes conferidos a los Ministros de los Esta- 
dos no fuesen amplios 6 se hallasen cohartados con instruc9iones se- 
cretas que tubiesen por objeto concluir un tratado parcial y no gene- 
ral ; y amenos que los Ministros que los Estados nombrasen para el 
intento fuesen por todas suo circanstan9ias considerados por Su Ma- 
jestad como persouas de aquel carracter, esplendor, y conducta que 



240 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

Upon the receipt of this letter, Mr. Randolph desired 
an interview with Mr. Jaudenes, which took place on 
the 26th of August. Referring to the letter of the 16th, 
Mr. Randolph " desired to understand the nature of the 
objection as to the power of the commissioners not 
being ample." Mr. Jaudenes entered into a detail of the 
transaction from its commencement, in December, 1791, 
as it appears from the memoranda of Mr. Jefferson, and 
the letters between the Spanish commissioner and him ; 

corresponden para resider cerca de su Real persona y que requiere 
la gravedad de los asuntos que deben tratarse. 

" En esta atencion me manda el Rey liazer presente al Presidente 
de los Estados Unidos que Espaua esta pronta d tratar con los Esta- 
dos sobre los puntos de Limites, Indies, Comer9io, y demas que 
conduscan a la mexor amistad entre los dos Paises : peroque no si- 
endo amplios los Poderes conferidos a los S'nes Carmichael y Short, 
y notorio lo desconceptuado que se hallava el primero y que la con- 
ducta del segundo tampoco lia sido mui circunspecta, no es posible 
concluir asuntos tan importantes ; y que en consideracion a estos mo- 
tivos espera Su Majestad que los Estados Unidos embriaran otra per- 
sona o personas con plenos poderes para ajustar el tratado y ador- 
nado de aquel Caracter y prendas que pueda hazerse bien aduiitido 
por el Rey. 

" En vista do lo expuesto pido a V. S. se sirva informar al Presi- 
dente de los Estados Unidos : quien me lisonjeo se prestani gustoso 
a efectuarlo segun lo desea Su Mag'd a con la brevedad que lo exige 
el interez de ambos paises ; y suplico a V. S. me comunique las re- 
sultas para liacer las saber el Rey. 

" Me reitero, &c., &c., &c. 

" Josef de Jaudenes. 

" Nueva York, IGtli Agto., 1794. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 241 

adding, that it appeared to be Mr. Jefferson's policy to 
negotiate for the Mississippi alone, ivhereas his Catholic 
Majesty would never treat hut upon all the subjects un- 
adjusted between him and the United States. Mr. Jau- 
denes observed, that he had indeed understood that 
very comprehensive powers had been afterwards given 
to the commissioners ; but the nature of them was not 
made known to him by Mr. Jefferson. As Mi-. Jau- 
denes did not appear to have seen them, and as he laid 
much stress upon an admonition which he contends he 
frequently gave Mr. Jefferson, that the powers of the 
commissioners should be as comprehensive as those 
which ]\I. Gardoqui formerly brought with him, Mr. 
Randolph showed him the powers of the American 
commissioners. He considered them sufficiently com- 
prehensive ujX)n the face of them. Mr. Randolph 
remarked, that their comprehensiveness must have been 
known to the Spanish minister at a very early period, 
as the exchange of powers precedes every act of nego- 
tiation. This Mr. Jaudenes thought probable. Mr. 
Randolph expressed some degree of surprise, that, after 
so much time spent in the negotiation, after repeated 
recognition of its pendency, as well by the Spanish 
ministry at Madrid as the Spanish minister here, the 
progress of it shovild be checked by an objection which, 
if valid, ought to have been urged at the beginning, 
when it might have been immediately removed. To 
this, Mr. Jaudenes replied, that he was not instructed in 
the reasons of his court further than he had quoted to 
21 



242 DIPLOMATIC niSTORY. 

Mr. Randolph, in his letter of the 16th of August. 
But as the conference was free, he might conjecture 
that they were governed by considerations like these : 
that the objection to powers was never too late, if, as 
the business advanced, it was found that they were nar- 
rowed by the instructions of the commissioners, or by 
the obstinacy of their conduct, more than they appeared 
to be on the face of the papers which contained them ; 
that his CathoUc Majesty might be resolved to treat 
upon all the matters, or none, being desirous of settHng 
every controversy, and possibly seeing some connection 
between them ; that Mr. Jaudenes had expressed his 
apprehension to his court, that the Mississippi was the 
object which the negotiation had principally in view ; 
that this would naturally attract their attention, and 
induce them to sound and explore ; and if they did not 
find perfect explicitness on the occasion, they might 
suspect that the union of all the subjects was not in- 
tended by the United States. Indeed, Mr. Jaudenes 
dropped an idea that all the States were not solicitous 
for the Mississippi; that a majority of them were 
against it, and the attempt to gain it might perhaps be 
conceived as in fact rather to pacify Kentucky than 
really to obtain it. This idea Mr. Randolph denied to 
have any foundation. Mr. Jaudenes seemed to renew it 
in another form, namely, that any concession which 
might be necessary to adjust the dispute, though agree- 
able to some of the States, would be disagreeable to the 
others ; and that there was a kind of indisposition in the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 243 

States for one of them to give up any of its own advan- 
tages for the accommodation of the others. To this, 
Mr. Randolph answered, that there ought not to be a 
doubt, for a moment, that what was stipulated by the 
United States in treaty would be faithfully fulfilled. 
But it was necessary to return to the supposition above 
mentioned, of secret instructions, or the particular con- 
duct of the commissioners, restricting the powers to the 
Mississippi only. This is the second part of Mr. Jau- 
denes's letter, requiring explanation. Mr. Randolph 
inquired whether the commissioners had been interro- 
gated upon their instructions, and had answered, that 
they were restricted ? Whether they had declared that 
they would not proceed upon a new subject until the 
Mississippi was definitely settled, without relation to 
any other matter ? Mr. Jaudenes could afford no infor- 
mation, not being himself informed. He only observed, 
that the Spanish nation, being candid and sincere in its 
transactions, would quickly receive disgust if it should 
have appeared that the commissioners deviated from 
sincerity and candor on their part. 

In the third place, Mr. Randolph desired an explana- 
tion of what was meant by the requisition of a minister 
whose character, conduct, and splendor would render 
them proper, etc. etc. Mr. Jaudenes replied, that, when 
the negotiation was first talked of, Mr. Jefferson asked 
him if Mr. Carmiehael would be acceptable ; to which 
Mr. Jaudenes answered, with a reluctance which noth- 
ing but a sense of duty could overcome, that there was 



244 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

a deficiency of decorum, etc., in Mr. Carmichael. Mr. 
Jefferson then said, suppose we unite Mr. Sliort with 
him ? Mr. Jaudenes replied, that he was not per- 
sonally acquainted with Mr. Short; but he presumed 
that Mr. Jefferson would not contemplate an unfit per- 
son. Some time afterwards, Mr. Jaudenes was about 
to say to Mr. Jefferson, that Mr. Pinckney would be 
acceptable, and might probably touch at Madrid for 
that purpose ; but he was told by Mr. Jefferson that the 
President had already nominated Messrs. Carmichael 
and Short. Upon hearing this, Mr. Jaudenes consid- 
ered himself as no longer at liberty to animadvert 
upon an appointment which was consummated. But 
Mr. Jaudenes, still declaring his inability to assign any 
reasons, except those contained in his letter of August 
16, which were the whole of what had been wi'itten by 
his court, said that he might conjectm-e it to be pos- 
sible, that Mr. Short, being, as Charg^ d'affaires, the 
author of the offensive memorial which was addressed 
to Spain through the French minister at Madrid, had 
imbibed sentiments too violent, and expressed them too 
vehemently. He might, perhaps, too, (have) partaken 
too much of Mr. Carmichael's style of behavior. Mr. 
Jaudenes then explained the words, " character, con- 
duct, and splendor," thus : — By " character," he meant 
a diplomatic grade (no matter what) invested with full 
powers for all objects ; by " conduct," a proper attention 
to the court, and a proper behaviour in the manage- 
ment of the negotiation ; by " splendor," personal dig- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 245 

nity and self-respect. Splendor as the effect of honor- 
ary birth, or proceeding from any similar considera- 
tions, was not included in his requisitions. 

Mr. Randolph asked Mr. Jaudenes if the negotiation 
was at a stand. He answered that he presumed it 
was. 

Mr. Randolph, disclaiming all knowledge of what the 
President's ultimate opinion would be, but desirous of 
knowing whether, if another character was to be sent to 
Spain, the old delays would be repeated, was assured 
by Mr. Jaudenes, that, in his opinion, the business 
might be immediately settled, either by a treaty signed 
and executed, or by a statement of terms upon which a 
treaty might be concluded." * 

In consequence of these intimations, the President, in 
November, 1794, appointed General Thomas Pinckney, 
then minister at London, and whose character fulfilled 
the most fastidious requirements of his Catholic Maj- 
esty, minister plenipotentiary with full powers to con- 
clude a treaty. Before Mr. Pinckney reached Madrid, 
the Spanish commissioner addressed another communi- 
cation, on the 28th of March, 1795, to the government 
of the United States, indicating cautiously, but more 
specifically, the probable basis of the negotiation on the 
part of Spain. 

" Dear Sir : In reply to your Excellency's favor of 

* Memorandum of conference between Mr. Randolph and Mr. 
Jaudenes, 2oth of Aug. 1794. — T. P. MSS. Spanish Papers. 

21* 



246 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

the 25th instant, I must repeat, that the last despatch 
received by me from my court was under date of the 
25th of July, of the past year, with some private letters 
of the beginning of August. 

" As the channel through which the said despatch 
reached me was not to be relied on, it is confined 
merely to a suggestion of the matters about which, as 
your Excellency indicated to me, the executive power of 
the United States desired so earnestly to be informed. 

" The brevity of these suggestions has, hitherto, re- 
strained me from venturing upon propositions of so 
much delicacy, more especially as I have had reason to 
expect, from day to day, since that time, despatches ex- 
planatory of the suggestions previously communicated. 

" Still, in the spirit of directness and good understand- 
ing, which has al"ways prevailed in the correspondence 
between your Excellency and myself, I will set forth 
the basis upon which, as I understand, it is the inten- 
tion of the King, my master, to adjust with the United 
States the pending negotiation ; subject, nevertheless, 
upon the receipt of the explanatory despatches which I 
am expecting, to any modification of the following 
propositions : — 

" 1. His Majesty will enter into negotiation with the 
United States, as soon as any one shall have been 
authorized, with full powers, to attend his court for that 
purpose. This point, I flatter myself, is already cleared 
up by the nomination lately made by the executive 
power of the United States. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 247 

" 2. The King will be prepared to fix boundaries as 
favorable to the claims of the United States as may be 
compatible with his treaties with the Indians. 

" 3. His Majesty will agree to consider the navigation 
of the river Mississippi, subject to such restrictions as 
may be demanded by the interest of his subjects. 

" 4. The King expects, in return for these concessions, 
that there should be a substantial treaty of alliance, irre- 
spective of the relations growing out of the existing 
war, and a reciprocal guarantee of his own possessions 
and those of the United States. 

"5. His Majesty also hopes that questions of trade 
will likewise be arranged on a footing of reciprocity. 

" I have thus stated what I think we may presume to 
be the intention of the King, as far as I am at liberty to 
deduce it from the despatch in question, and which, 
up to this time, I have received from his highness, 
etc."* ^^ 

Mr. Pinckney arrived in Madrid about the 18th of 
June, 1795 ; and after the usual formal reception, com- 
menced his negotiation directly with the first minister, 
Godoy. He found the Spanish court still anxious for 
delay ; a very natural course, as they were in posses- 
sion of the chief subjects in controversy. In pursu- 
ance of this procrastinating policy, the Due d'Alcudia 

* T. P. MSS. Spanish Letter Book. This letter is in Spanish, and, 
with the others quoted, was sent to Mr. Pinckney from the State de- 
partment. 



248 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

(Godoy) informed Mr. Pinckney that he could come to 
no positive conclusion until he had received the answer 
of the United States to the propositions transmitted 
through Mr. Jaudenes, the Spanish Charge at Philadel- 
phia. Although unprovided with special instructions 
on this head, Mr. Pinckney first objected, that no 
definite propositions had been made, and that the 
informal suggestions, of the 24th of May, could not 
expect a formal reply ; and that, moreover, as his pres- 
ence in Madrid was the direct consequence of the sug- 
gestion of the Spanish Charg^ d'affaires, any discussion 
relating to terms of settlement should fairly be consid- 
ered as adjourned, in deference to his Spanish Majesty, 
from Philadelphia to Madrid. He further added, that, 
although unprovided with special instructions as to the 
last communication of the Spanish minister, he was 
fully authorized to say, that a mutual guarantee of the 
national possessions was impossible. Godoy also sug- 
gested, that, as the American negotiation was very 
much connected with the accommodation with France, 
they should proceed together; and proposed, that, in 
fact, there should be a triple alliance between France, 
Spain, and the United States. This proposition the 
American negotiator respectfully but decidedly put 
aside. The plenipotentiaries then proceeded to the dis- 
cussion and arrangement of the old issues between 
their governments ; and, after an interchange of notes 
and projects, it became apparent, that, without conces- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 249 

sion, they could not come to a satisfactory agreement. 
Their difference resolved itself into three important 
points : — 

1. The Spanish government refused to treat on the 
subject of commerce. Mr. Pinckney complained, justly, 
that his mission had been instituted upon the explicit 
invitation of the Spanish Charge d'affaires in Philadel- 
phia; that in August, 1794, that representative had 
stated that " his Majesty would not enter into any 
treaty, unless the powers to the minister were ample, or 
accompanied with secret instructions having for their 
object to conclude a partial, and not a general, treaty." * 

* I have quoted this languaf^e of Mr. Pinckney precisely as it is 
found in his letter to the Secretary of State. (See American State 
Papers, folio; Foreign Relations, Vol. I. page 542.) But it is 
clearly a mistranslation. To say that his Catholic Majesty would not 
treat unless the powers of the ministers of the United States were 
ample or restricted by- secret instructions, Is simply an unmeaning 
contradiction, and renders Mr. Pinckney's argument utterly unintel- 
ligible. By reference to the original letter (at page 239) referred to 
by Mr. Pinckney, it will be seen that the mistake results from trans- 
lating " siempre que " " unless," instead of " so long as," and omitting 
altogether the negative particle, " no." The correct translation is, 
" That his Majesty will not enter into any treaty so long as the 
powers conferred on the ministers of the United States are not 
ample, or are restricted by secret Instructions having for their object 
the conclusion of a partial, and not a general treaty." This not only 
makes Mr. Pinckney's objection clear, but also renders intelligible 
the conversations between Mr. Randolph and M. Jaudenes. I can- 



250 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

He had expressly added, "that Spain is ready to treat 
upon the points of limits, Indians, commerce^ and what- 
ever may conduce to the best friendship between the 
two couiitries ; " that he had therefore a right to expect 
an arrangement of the commercial interests of the two 
countries ; but as the United States were not willing to 
force themselves into connection with a reluctant peo- 
ple, he would not press what he could not but consider 
his right. 

2. As to the Mississippi, while the Spanish govern- 
ment admitted that its navigation should be free to 
both nations, it objected to the arrangement, proposed 
by the American minister, in reference to a depot for 
the commerce of the United States at New Orleans ; 
and also insisted, that the language of the article con- 
veying the right should be of a strictly exclusive char- 
acter, restricting the right of navigation to the subjects 
of Spain and to the citizens of the United States. 

3. As to reclamations, the Spanish government in- 
sisted that all captures should be divided into two 
periods, — the one preceding the 6th of April, 1795, 
in which the rule of decision should be the maritime 
regulations of Spain, then at war with France ; the 
other following that date, in which the decisions 

not see liow such a misconstruction escaped attention ; but I have 
thought it best to leave the text as in the official publication, and 
make the correction in the note. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 251 

should be upon the usual grounds of international law. 
To this division Mr. Pinckney positively refused his 
assent. 

Finding that the Spanish court held to its positions, 
Mr. Pinckney demanded his passports on the 24th of 
October. The result of this prompt determination to 
close the negotiations was a compromise of the dif- 
ficulties ; and on the 27th of October, 1795, a treaty of 
friendship, limits, and navigation was signed by Mr. 
Pinckney and Godoy, or, as he had recently been cre- 
ated. The Prince of the Peace. 

By this treaty, Spain, Art. 2, acquiesced in the 
boundaries of the United States, as described in the 
treaty of peace between the United States and Great 
Britain, and appointed a joint commission to fix the 
limits. As to the Indians, the two countries stipulated, 
Art. 5, that they would restrain hostilities on the part 
of those tribes within their respective boundaries, and 
hereafter would enter into no treaties with such tribes 
as lay without their respective limits. As to the Mis- 
sissippi, it was determined by Art. 4, as follows : — 

" It is likewise agreed that the western boundary of 
the United States, which separates them from the 
Spanish colony of Louisiana, is the middle of the chan- 
nel or bed of the river Mississippi, from the northern 
boundary of the said States to the completion of the 
thirty-first degree of latitude north of the equator. 
And his Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the 
navigation of the said river, in its whole breadth, from 



252 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

its source to the ocean, shall be free only to his sub- 
jects and the citizens of the United States, unless he 
should extend this privilege to the subjects of other 
powers by special convention." And Art. 22 further 
provided, that, " in consequence of the stipulations con- 
tained in the 4th article, his Catholic Majesty will per- 
mit the citizens of the United States, for the space of 
three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise 
and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export 
them from thence, without paying any other duty than 
a fair price for the hire of the stores ; and his Majesty 
promises, either to continue this permission, if he finds 
during that time that it is not prejudicial to the inter- 
ests of Spain, or, if he should not agree to continue it 
there, he will assign to them, on another part of the 
bank of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." 

As to the reclamations of the United States, a joint 
commission was appointed, Aii:. 21, to sit at Philadel- 
phia and pronounce upon all claims. 

Articles 12 to 18 adjusted various questions of prize 
and maritime law, declaring that free ships make free 
goods, and exempting from contraband, among other 
things, hemp, flax, tar, anchors, cables, masts, planks, 
etc. etc., and all other things proper for building or 
repairing ships. 

This treaty was all that the United States could 
have hoped for. It secured the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi, and thus opened the way for that magnificent 
internal commerce, almost fabulous in its present ex- 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 253 

tent, which has made that great river a crowded high- 
way of an unrivalled domestic trade. And it placed all 
the other questions in a fair way for solution. Its 
negotiation required rather firmness than skill, and its 
difficulties were, perhaps, more apparent than real. 
Political circumstances compelled Spain to yield ; and it 
may be inferred that she Avould have gone even further 
in the ways of concession, from the language of the 
Prince of the Peace himself, in the account of the treaty 
which he has given the world in his Memoirs. Refer-' 
ring to his course as minister of Spain, he says : — 

" I did more; I had taken to heart the treaty, which, 
unknown to us, the English cabinet had negotiated 
with the United States of America ; this treaty afforded 
great latitude to evil designs; it was possible to injure 
Spain in an indirect manner, and without risk, in her 
distant possessions. 

" I endeavored to conclude another treaty with the 
same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my 
object; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with 
sympathy, loyalty, and generous sentiments in that 
nation of republicans. 

" This was a mere treaty or alhance ; it was, moreover, 
a formal act of navigation. Independently of carefully 
providing for the common interests of both nations, we 
realized the first application of modern ideas respecting 
the equality of maritime rights, and the measures which 
humanity enjoins in order to lessen the evils of war; 
ideas hitherto recorded in books, proclaimed by the 

22 



254 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

civilization of the age, but the practical application of 
which has at all times been opposed by England. This 
creditable and successful transaction has been suffered 
to pass unnoticed, like so many important facts of my 
political life. The treaty was signed at the Escurial, 
the 27th of October, 1795, by citizen Thomas Pinckney 
and myself, without any other intervening party. The 
secret was so well kept for a whole year, that the Eng- 
lish only had knowledge of it on the 4th of September, 
1796, when it was made public, the war having been 
determined on." * 

Whatever " unexpected advantages " Godoy may 
have obtained in this treaty, and satisfied as he may 
have been that he had counteracted any mischievous 
effects of the treaty with Great Britain, it is certain 
that neither the language nor the conduct of his gov- 
ernment manifested the same satisfaction. During the 
years of Mr. Adams's administration, which followed the 
treaty, the correspondence of the two governments was 
full of mutual complaint. The commissioners ap- 
pointed under the treaty to run the boundary lines, Mr. 
Ellicott on the part of the United States, and Baron 
Carondelet on the part of Spain, could not agree ; and 
the Spanish government finally refused to withdraw its 
troops from the territory of the United States, on vari- 
ous grounds. It resolved to retain its troops until it 
was decided whether, under the treaty, the Spanish gar- 

* Godoy'j; ]^Jc)iiuirs, Vol. I. ji. 4D8-4G0. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 255 

risons were to leave their works standing or to destroy 
them, and until, by an additional article, the property of 
the inhabitants should be secured, and also until the 
Spanish officers were sure that the Indians would con- 
tinue pacific after their AAdthdrawal. To meet the first 
objection, the President left it to the discretion of the 
Spanish officers to leave or demolish their works, as they 
pleased ; and proposed to obviate the second by caus- 
ing an assurance to be jiublished, that the settlers or 
occupants of the lands in question should not be dis- 
turbed in their possession by the United States troops. 
The Spanish commander then declared his determina- 
tion to remain, as he expected an invasion from Can- 
ada on the part of the British, a pretext sufficiently 
exposed by the explicit denial of the British minister. 
To arrange these difficulties required another negotia- 
tion and treaty, the history of which, however, belongs 
to the period of Mr. Jefferson's administration. 

Besides these practical and persistent annoyances, 
the Spanish government, having entered upon a war 
with England, thought proper, in May, 1797, to make a 
formal protest and remonstrance against the ])rovisions 
of the treaty of 1794, between the United States and 
Great Britain. The Chevalier de Yrujo, the Spanish 
minister, addressed, on the 6th of May, 1797, a letter to 
the Secretary of State, in which he said : — 

" The King, my master, desirous of drawing closer 
the connections of friendship and good correspondence 
already subsisting between Spain and the United 



256 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

States, concluded with them, on the 27th of October, 
1795, a treaty dictated by the most generous princi- 
ples, opening to the Americans the navigation of the 
Mississippi to the ocean, and ceding to the United 
States a considerable portion of territory, by agreeing 
to draw a line of demarcation between the possessions 
of both parties. Equally animated by the desire of 
diminishing, for humanity's sake, the horrors of war, he 
adopted the liberal principle, that free ships make free 
goods. This stipulation was, in reality, an incalculable 
advantage for the American citizens, who, by the 
extension of their navigation, the geographical situation 
of their country, and the nature of their political con- 
nections at that epoch, promised a neutrality as advan- 
tageous as desirable. At the same time, his Majesty 
agreed, by the said treaty, that articles necessary to the 
construction and repair of vessels should not be deemed 
contraband. In a word, the concessions on the part of 
Spain, for cementing a sincere union between both 
nations, were such, that the treaty was received through- 
out the United States with enthusiasm, and with the 
most evident marks of general approbation. In these 
circumstances, the king, my master, who had so effica- 
ciously advanced the interests of America, promised 
himself, by the effect of good correspondence, as 
sacred among nations as between individuals, that the 
United States, at least, would not contribute to the 
injury of Spain. What should be the surprise of his 
Majesty on knowing that this country had contracted 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 257 

engagements with England prejudicial to his rights and 
to the interests of his subjects, nearly at the same time 
in which, with so much liberality, he was giving to the 
United States the most striking proofs of the most sin- 
cere friendship. 

" Upon the whole, the King, my master, well persuaded 
that England, in her treaty with America, had siirprised 
the good faith of the federal government, reserved to 
himself to make, on a proper opportunity, the necessary 
representations, not doubting but that the equity of the 
United States would place Spain, in relation to other 
powers, upon that footing of equality, without which 
the neutrality adopted by America would exist only in 
appearance, and be purely nominal ; but experiencing, 
since the declaration of war against Great Britain, 
injuries and evils which he had foreseen from the mo- 
ment he was informed of the English treaty, he finds 
himself under the necessity of anticipating this step, 
and, therefore, has ordered me to make to this govern- 
ment, through you, the following observations." 

It is hardly necessary to point out how utterly incon- 
sistent is this statement with the claim of Godoy, that 
he had intended this treaty as an antidote to the mis- 
chief of the English one. Referring to the 17th article 
of the British treaty, which waived the principle of free 
ships free goods, and the 18th article, which included 
the material for ship-building among the articles of 
contraband, the Spanish minister continued : — " In 
the preamble to the Spanish treaty, its object is said to 

22* 



258 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

be for the mutual advantage and reciprocal utility of 
both countries. I leave you to determine what advan- 
tages either Spain or America can derive from the 15th 
and 16th articles of their treaty, whilst those of the 17th 
and 18th of the English treaty remain in full force." 

The 4th and 22d articles of the Spanish treaty, it 
will be recollected, referred to the navigation of the 
Mississippi, and the depot at New Orleans. When he 
sent the treaty home for ratification, Mr. Pinckney had 
observed : — 

" The wording of the latter part of this article ,(4th) 
seemed objectionable, and various alterations were pro- 
posed. It required much contest to obtain any altera- 
tion from the mode first proposed by Spain, whose 
doubts were pjiucipally founded on a jealousy of our 
letting in others. The substance, however, appears to 
me not disadvantageous, when considered as connected 
with the provision in the 22d article, and the wording 
as fully authorized by my instructions." 

The Spanish minister now insisted upon the exclu- 
sive character of that article : — 

" Thus far," said he, in continuation of his remon- 
strance, " I have represented merely the injury done to 
the interests of Spain ; but I shall now state to you a 
point in which her rights are essentially concerned. I 
mean the navigation of the Mississippi. 

" The just ground upon which Spain refused to 
acknowledge the mutual and illegal cession which Eng- 
land made to the United States, in the 18th article of 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 259 

the treaty of the 3d of Septerabei', 1783, of the free 
navigation of the Mississippi to the ocean; the neces- 
sity in which America has found herself of recurring to 
a special treaty with Spain for obtaining it ; and above 
all, the tenor of the 4th article of the said treaty, in 
which it is agreed that the free navigation of the said 
river to the ocean belongs exclusively to the subjects of 
the King, and to the citizens of the United States, had 
given his Majesty reason to believe that the federal 
government, by this stipulation, annulled as illegal the 
claim which it had made with England as to this point 
in the 8th article of the treaty of 1783. But his Maj- 
esty has seen, with equal surprise, that the United 
States not only pretend to confirm that right to Eng- 
land by the 3d article of their commercial treaty, but 
that they have, since the conclusion of that with Spain, 
in which the navigation of the Mississippi is confined 
exclusively to the Spaniards and Americans, agreed to 
the explanatory article signed here by yourself, and the 
English Charge d'affaires, Mr. Bond, on the 4th of 
May, 1796, in which it is declared : Tliat no other stipu- 
lation or treaty concluded since, by either of the contract- 
ing parties, ivith any other poiver or nation, is under- 
stood in any 7nanner to derogate from the rigid to the 
free communication and commerce guaranteed by the Sd 
article of the treaty to the subjects of his Britannic Ma- 
jesty:' 

The Spanish minister then proceeded to argue that 
by the treaty of 1763, Spain ceded to England both 



260 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

banks of the Mississippi, which cession carried with it 
the navigation of the river ; 

That by the treaty of 1783, England granted that 
right to the United States, she still being mistress of 
the two banks ; 

But by a treaty of the same date, 1783, with Spain, 
England restored to Spain both banks of the Missis- 
sippi, without reserving the right of navigation. This 
right, therefore, passing away from England, with the 
possession of the banks, she could no longer cede it to 
any other power. 

Further, that if the absence of any reservation in the 
treaty of 1783 did not really deprive England of the 
right to nse the navigation, the separation of the colo- 
nies destroyed the right which, as English subjects, the 
Americans might formerly have plead. If, therefore, 
the American right could not be derived either from 
their former character as British subjects, or from the 
void grant of England in the treaty, there was but one 
other source of derivation, namely, the special treaty with 
Spain. But that treaty confined the privilege of navi- 
gation exclusively to the subjects of Spain and the citi- 
zens of the United States, and therefore gave no power 
to the United States to grant this privilege to any one 
else. 

To this remonstrance, Mr. Pickering, then Secretary 
of State, replied seriatim. The first class of com- 
plaints, springing from the difference in the principles of 
the English and the Spanish treaties, on the maxim of 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 261 

free ships free goods, and the extension of contraband, 
he disposed of summarily and effectually : — 

" 1. Free ships shall make free goods. It is impos- 
sible that the two contracting parties should ever have 
conceived that this rule, as between themselves, could 
have any operation, except when one was at war and 
the other at peace. The United States, being in the 
latter situation, have a right to carry in their vessels 
goods of the enemies of Spain, without being liable, on 
that account, to capture. On the other hand, if the 
United States were at war, and Spain at peace, her 
subjects would have a right to transport in their vessels 
the goods of our enemies, free from capture by the 
armed vessels of the United States. And thus, the 
stipulation is exactly equal on both sides. 

" 2. Ship timber and naval stores are, by the law of 
nations, contraband of war ; but the United States and 
Spain, for their mutual benefit, agreed to consider them 
as free goods, in order that either party, remaining at 
peace, might safely continue its commerce in those arti- 
cles, even by carrying them to the enemies of the other. 
And this rule will operate equally like the former. 

" You compare the liberal stipulations in these two 
articles, with those of a contrary nature in the treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain, and ask, 
what should be the surprise of his Catholic Majesty on 
knowing of the latter engagements ? After remark- 
ing, that, if these stipulations were liberal on the part 
of Spain, they were alike liberal on the part of the 



262 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

United States, seeing that they were perfectly recip- 
rocal, permit me to say, that the engagements with 
Great Britain do not appear to offer any cause for 
' surprise ' on the part of his Catholic Majesty ; because 
his Majesty had seen, during the whole course of the 
American war, how steadily Great Britain persisted, in 
opposition to the demands of all the maritime powers, 
to maintain her claims under the law of nations to cap- 
ture enemies' property and timber and naval stores as 
contraband in neutral ships. His Majesty has also 
seen, in the present war, in which he was for a time a 
party with Great Britain against France, that Great 
Britain continued to avow and practise upon the same 
principles. And, with such perfect knowledge of the 
principles and conduct of Great Britain, and while she 
was still engaged in the war with a power which she 
strenuously endeavored to deprive of timber and naval 
stores, and whose mercantile shipping was greatly 
reduced, could his Catholic Majesty expect that Great 
Britain would relinquish her legal rights to a nation (the 
United States) which abounded in material for build- 
ing and equipping ships, and whose vessels, adapted 
to the carrying trade, traversed every sea, and visited 
every quarter of the globe ? You seem to imagine 
there is more reason for ' surprise • because, as you say, 
the engagements between the United States and Great 
Britain were contracted ' nearly at the same time,' 
'almost at the same , moment,' with our stipulations 
with his Catholic Majesty. But allow me to bring 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 263 

to your recollection the periods when these different 
treaties were formed. That with Great Britain ^vas 
concluded on the 19th day of November, 1794 ; that 
with Spain, on the 27th of October, 1795. Further, the 
treaty with Great Britain was published in Philadel- 
phia on the 1st day of July, 1795, almost four months 
before the treaty with* his Catholic Majesty was con- 
cluded, and nearly ten months before it received his 
ratification, at which time (Spain and the United States 
being then at peace with all the world) it does not 
appear that his Catholic Majesty found the smallest 
difficulty in giving his final sanction to this treaty with 
the United States on account of their prior treaty with 
Great Britain." 

On the next point, the navigation of the Mississippi, 
the Secretary was not so happy. It was clear, that, if 
the premises of the Spanish minister were granted, his 
conclusions followed inevitably. As Mr. Pickering 
said : " If the right of the United States to the naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi originated in their treaty with 
Spain, which was concluded on the 27th of October, 
1795, it requires no argument to prove that they could 
not have granted the right of that navigation to Great 
Britain on the 19th of November, 1794." 

Now, the United States had always, from the begin- 
ning of this tedious negotiation to its close, denied this 
dependence of their right upon the grant of Spain. 
They had maintained it upon the laws of nations, and 
upon the fact that their separation from the mother 



264 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

country left them in independent possession of all rights 
they liad formerly claimed as British subjects. But 
the great difficulty in the way of the argument was, 
whether the language of the 4th article of the Spanish 
treaty had not waived these strong points, and had 
they not voluntarily, under that treaty, come down to 
the lower ground of Spanish permission? Mr. Picker- 
ing contended not, on two grounds, both ingenious, but, 
it must be added, of very little strength. He quoted 
the following extract from Mr. Pinckney's notes, on the 
project of a convention submitted by Godoy during the 
discussion, which project contained a stipulation, which 
would have gone to the exclusion of Great Britain from 
the Mississippi : — 

" The words ' alone ' and ' exclusively ' should be 
omitted, for Spain could scarcely confide in the good 
faith of the United States, or in the convention which 
she is about to conclude with them, if they agreed to 
an article which would be an infraction of a treaty 
previously concluded ; for, by the treaty of peace be- 
tween the United States and Great Britain, concluded 
in 1783, it is stipulated that the navigation of the river 
Mississippi shall continue free to the subjects of Great 
Britain and to the citizens of the United States." 

" Here, sir," continued the Secretary, in seeming 
triumph, " you see that the Federal government, far 
from ' giving his Catholic Majesty (as you suggest) 
reason to believe that they had annulled, as illegal, the 
claim which they made with England as to this point 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 265 

in the 8th article of the treaty of 1783, ' expressly de- 
clared that the attempt would be a violation of the 
good faith of the United States, pledged to Great 
Britain in that treaty.' Mr. Pickering does not seem to 
have realized the damaging reply to which he laid him- 
self open ; for what could he have said had the Spanish 
minister replied : " I admit the good faith of Mr. Pinck- 
ney's reasoning, and had he adhered to his note, his 
Majesty must have found some solution of this dif- 
ficulty, giving all credit to the frankness and honesty of 
the American minister. But, sir, Mr. Pinckney's notes 
on a project are not the articles of a treaty; and 
although, as you say, he undoubtedly declared that the 
insertion of such words would be bad faith to which 
he could not consent, it is equally undeniable that he 
did finally consent, and that article 4tli does contain 
words of exclusion fully equivalent to ' alone ' or ' ex- 
clusively ; ' namely, ' and his Catholic Majesty has 
likewise agreed that the navigation of the said river, 
etc. etc., shall be free only to his subjects and the citi- 
zens of the United States, unless he should extend this 
privilege to the subjects of other powers by special con- 
vention.' Now, believing as fully as you do, in the 
high character and good faith of Mr. Pinckney, I am 
justified in my conclusion, that before he consented to 
the insertion of these words, the effect of which you 
cannot dispute, he was satisfied that his Catholic Maj- 
esty was right in the pretensions that rendered their 
insertion proper; and signing the treaty with that 

23 



266 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

article, he did mean to admit its full significance. 
Otherwise you force me to suppose that he committed 
one breach of faith against England, only to provide 
the opportunity of another against Spain." 

The second ground upon which Mr. Pickering rested 
his defence was the fact, that, in article 4th, the stipula- 
tion as to the navigation was not a joint stipulation, 
but sole on the part of the Spanish king, and that it 
concerned the United States no further than as it gave 
them the freedom of the navigation. It would be dif- 
ficult to support this position in relation to a treaty 
consisting of mutual stipulations ; but, supposing it to 
be well founded, it went too far. Because, if the free 
navigation of the Mississippi was the sole stipulation 
of Spain, it could only be because she had the sole right 
to stipulate, and to admit this was to give up the whole 
argument of the United States. 

The truth was, that the face of the 4th article was 
against the United States. But that article was not 
entitled to its full significance. For, in fact, it was 
understood between the two countries, that the United 
States would accept any arrangement from Spain 
which would effect the great practical object of opening 
the navigation of the river, without a too strict scru- 
tiny of the language of the concession ; provided always, 
that it did not rest that concession expressly upon a 
grant from Spain. And this article was the result of 
such a determination. The objection to the supple- 
mentary article, signed by Mr. Bond and the Secretary 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 267 

of the United States, was simply captious, for it could 
confer no possible right, and in no way go a step beyond 
the original article in the treaty of 1783, by which the 
United States did nothing more than grant to Great 
Britain whatever right to the navigation she might pos- 
sess, — neither the original nor the supplementary arti- 
cles undertaking to express what those rights were. 

These difficulties between the two countries rendered 
another negotiation and another treaty necessary ; but 
their history belongs to the period of Mr. Jefferson's 
administration. 

The treaty with England, 1794, with Spain, 1795, 
and with France, 1800, sum up the negotiations during 
the twelve years of the administrations of Washington 
and Adams. There were resident ministers at the 
courts of Berlin, Lisbon, and at the Hague ; but their 
correspondence involved no matter of large or lasting 
political importance. The only remaining negotiation 
of sufficient importance for a detailed history is that 
with the Barbary powers, and a brief summary of its 
course and results will be amply sufficient. For a 
minute account of the pious efforts of the Order of the 
Mathurins, or a discussion of the respective influence of 
the great Jewish houses of Bassara and Bacri upon the 
Dey of Algiers, would have at present but small 
interest. 

The American trade in the Mediterranean was at 
one time not inconsiderable, employing, as it did, from 
eighty to a hundred ships annually, amounting to 



268 DIPLOMATIC HISTOKY. 

about twenty thousand tons, and navigated by about 
twelve hundred sailors. Its articles of trade comprised 
about one sixth of the wheat and flour exported from 
the United States, one fourth of the dried and pickled 
fish, and some rice. This trade was abandoned early 
in the war, and was not resumed, to any noticeable 
extent, for a long time after the peace. The necessity 
of its preservation, however, induced the old Confedera- 
tion, as early as 1784, to authorize the conclusion of 
peace with these piratical powers. In March, 1785, 
certain of the United States ministers in Europe w^ere 
empowered to send agents to negotiate such treaties. 
Their expenses were limited to eighty thousand dollars, 
and they were sent to Morocco and Algiers. A treaty 
wath Morocco was then effected at a very reasonable cost, 
about nine thousand dollars ; and even previous to the 
treaty, the Emperor of Morocco had, at the instance of 
the court of Spain, restored an American vessel which 
had been captured, and liberated the prisoners. This 
treaty was terminated by the death of the Emperor, 
and as it was not renewed with his son, owing to the 
civil commotions in Morocco which accompanied his 
succession, and as the condition of Morocco, conse- 
quent upon these internal dissensions, rendered her 
powerless for evil, the only negotiation which it is 
necessary to follow is that with Algiers. 

At the time of the appointment of the minister, 
there were no American captives; but before the com- 
mencement of any negotiation, some time in July and 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 269 

August, 1785, two American ships were taken by the 
Algerines ; and, with their cargoes and crews, amount- 
ing to about twenty-one persons, were carried into 
Algiers. Their ransom became, therefore, a necessary 
element in the negotiation, and the agent sent to 
Algiers was authorized to offer, in redemption, two 
hundred dollars per man. This offer was rejected, and 
he returned in 1786, without having effected either the 
ransom or a peace. 

Early in 1787, Mr. Jefferson, the American minister 
then in Paris, appealed to the good offices of the Gen- 
eral of the Mathurins, a religious Order of France, insti- 
tuted in ancient times for the redemption of Christian 
captives from the infidel powers, and which had been 
very successful in redeeming French captives at a very 
moderate ransom. The general of the Order promised 
every assistance in his power, although he stated the 
difficulties in the way, and the utter impossibility of 
ransoming American prisoners at the low prices ac- 
cepted for French captives. The necessary communi- 
cations between the American minister in Paris and 
his government consumed a long time ; but the assist- 
ance of the Order was finally accepted, and the general 
authorized to offer five hundred and fifty-five dollars a 
man. But in the mean time, the Spaniards, the Nea- 
politans, and the Russians had redeemed captives at 
exorbitant sums ; and the appropriation by the French 
republic of the lands and revenues of the clergy had sus- 
pended the proceedings of the Mathurins in the pur- 



270 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

poses of their institution ; and when General Wash- 
ington entered upon his administration, all hope of 
relief in that quarter had vanished. 

The policy of Algiers, moreover, was to be at peace 
only with a certain proportion of the nations trading in 
the Mediterranean at one time, in order that their 
cruisers might always have sufficient employment, and 
their piratical revenue never be altogether suspended. 
They were now at peace with France, Spain, England, 
Venice, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Den- 
mark, and at war with Russia, Austria, Portugal, Na- 
ples, Sardinia, Genoa, and Malta. And from 1786 to 
1790 the ransoms had ranged from $1,200 to $2,920 ; 
and the number of captives, from 2,200 in 1786, had 
been, by death or ransom, reduced in 1789 to 655. 

In 1792, Congress having deliberated upon the policy 
necessary under the circumstances, made the requisite 
appropriation for a mission, and General Washington 
appointed Mr. Barclay agent to Morocco, with the rank 
of consul, and Admiral Paul Jones, agent to Algiers. 
Admiral Jones died before his instructions reached him, 
and Mr. Barclay's presence not being needed at Mo- 
rocco for the reasons already stated, the powers of 
Admiral Jones were transferred to him. The instruc- 
tions were as follows : — 

" Since, then, no ransom is to take place without a 
peace, you will, of course, first take up the negotia- 
tion of peace ; or if you find it better that peace and 
ransom should be treated of together, you will take care 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 271 

that no agreement for the latter be concluded, unless the 
former be established before or in the same instant. 

" As to the conditions, it is understood that no peace 
can be made with that government but for a larger 
sum of money, to be paid at once, for the whole time of 
its duration, or for a smaller one, to be annually paid. 
The former plan we entirely refuse, and adopt the lat- 
ter. We have also understood that peace might be 
bought cheaper with naval stores than with money ; 
but we will not furnish them with naval stores, because 
we think it is not right to furnish them the means 
•which we know they will employ to do wrong, and 
because there might be no economy in it as to our- 
selves in the end, as it would increase the expense of 
that coercion which we may in future be obliged to 
practise towards them. The only question then is, 
what sum of money will we agree to pay them annually 
for peace ? . . . You will, of course, use your best 
endeavors to get it at the lowest sum practicable ; 
whereupon I shall only say, that we should be pleased 
with $10,000, contented with $15,000, think $20,000 a 
very hard bargain ; yet go as far as $25,000, if it be 
impossible to get it for less ; but not a copper further, 
this being fixed by law as the utmost limit. These are 
meant as annual sums. If you can put off the first 
annual payment to the end of the first year, you may 
employ any sums not exceeding that in presents, to 
be paid down ; but if the first payment is to be made 



272 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

in hand, that and the presents cannot by law exceed 
25,000 dollars." 

On the subject of the ransom of the prisoners, thir- 
teen in number, the Secretary said : — 

" It has been a fixed principle with Congress to 
establish the rate of ransom of American captives with 
the Barbary States at as low a point as possible, that 
it may not be the interest of these States to go in quest 
of our citizens in preference to those of other countries. 
Had it not been for the danger it would have brought 
on the residue of our seamen, by exciting the cupidity 
of these rovers against them, our citizens now in Al- 
giers would have been long ago redeemed, without 
regard to price. The mere money for this particular 
redemption neither has been, nor is, an object with 
anybody here. It is from the same regard to the safety 
of our seamen at large, that they have now restrained 
us from any ransom unaccompanied with peace; this 
being secured, we are led to consent to terms of ransom 
to which, otherwise, our government would never have 
consented. . . . You will consider this sum, therefore, 
say $27,000, as your ultimate limit, including ransom, 
duties, and gratifications of every kind." 

]VIr. Barclay had scarcely received these instructions, 
and was preparing to start for Algiers, when he died at 
Lisbon, in January, 1793. Colonel Humphreys, the 
minister of the United States resident at Lisbon, was 
then authorized to conduct the negotiation. Before, 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 273 

however, he could effect any thing, a truce was most 
unexpectedly arranged between Portugal and Algiers, 
which, by withdrawing the Portuguese fleet, left Ameri- 
can commerce very much exposed ; and which was so 
sudden that it gave the Algerines an opportunity, 
which they improved so well that the number of Ameri- 
can captives was raised from thirteen to between one 
and two hundred.* Colonel Humphreys was finally 

* As this very unexpected truce was effected through the agency 
of the Bi-itish consul at Algiers, it gave rise to a very angry sus- 
picion, on the part of the United States, that it was a deliberate 
effort by the British government to injure our commerce by with- 
di'awing the protection of the Portuguese fleet, and exposing us to 
the Algerine cruisers. Mr. Pinckney communicated these suspicions 
to Lord Granville, and the following letter records their conversa- 
tion : — 

" His Lordship, in answer to what I had advanced, stated, that 
with i-espect to the truce between the Portuguese and Algerines, this 
country had not the least intention or a thought of injuring us 
thereby ; that they had been appealed to by their friend and ally, the 
court of Portugal, to procure a peace for them with the Algerines, 
and that Mr. Logic had been instructed to use his best endeavors to 
effect this purpose ; that he, finding the arrangements for a peace 
could not immediately take place, had concluded the truce ; that in 
this they conceived they had done no more than their friendshij) for 
a good ally required of them ; but that the measure was particularly 
advantageous to themselves, as they wanted the cooperation of the 
Portuguese fleet to act against their common enemy, which it was at 
liberty to do, when no longer employed in blocking up the Algerine 
fleet. As I had stated that the Court of Portugal had promised a 
convoy to the American vessels then in their harbors, he assured me 



274 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

authorized to purchase peace with $800,000, on the 
same principles as the former instructions, if possible ; 
if not, he was to arrange the distribution of the money 
as he thought best. In the latter part of 1795, he suc- 
ceeded, through the agency of Mr. Donaldson, recently 
appointed consal to Tunis and Tripoh, and the Danish 
consul at Algiers, in effecting a treaty, by which the 
prisoners were ransomed and a peace granted, in con- 
sideration of the further sum of 12,000 sequins, to be 
paid annually in naval stores. The ransom money 
stipulated not having been paid punctually as it came 
due, the Dey threatened to annul the treaty, and was 
only induced to lengthen the time for payment by the 
offer of a thirty-six gun ship. The annual payment in 
naval stores, as stipulated in detail, was found to be 
considerably larger than the amount specified in money, 
and the final appropriation for this treaty, including the 
annual payment for two years, made it cost, up to that 
date, nine hundred and ninety odd thousand dollars. 

tliat they would give no opposition to that measure." — T. P. MSS. 
Letter Book, Vol, I. p. 474, 475. 



CHAPTER V. 



CONCLUSION. 



The chief feature of the foreign policy of the United 
States throughout this period — the twelve years com- 
prised in the administrations of Washington and Adams 
— was its negative character. Its great object was to 
prevent, rather than to accomplish. It is true that it 
had important and positive results. By the treaty with 
England, the frontier posts were restored, and the ter- 
ritory of the United States freed from British occupa- 
tion ; by the treaty with Spain, their southern boun- 
daries were defined, and the navigation of the Missis- 
sippi secured ; by the treaty with France, they were 
released from the unprofitable and dangerous guarantee 
of the French possessions. But beyond these ques- 
tions — indeed, to a large extent, involving them in a 
wider and more general decision — lay the perplexed 
field of our foreign relations. Had we really an inde- 
pendent place in the world's history, or was our posi- 
tion in the political system of Christendom to be deter- 
mined by the logic of European interests, and enforced 
by the power of European arms ? 



276 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

At the declaration of American independence, the 
European balance of power had more nearly amved at 
perfection in its details than at any period since the 
peace of Westphalia. The termination of the Revolu- 
tionary war had restored to France much of the conse- 
quence which had been diminished by the peace of 
1763, while neither Russia on the one side, nor the 
immense maritime and colonial development of Eng- 
land on the other, had become permanent disturbers of 
the political equation. And although there were, as 
before and afterwards, national interests and national 
jealousies, there was a certain dynastic and cabinet 
sympathy among the monarchies of Europe, which 
assimilated their policies to one common type. When, 
therefore, France effectually assisted at the separation 
of the colonies from England, and introduced a new 
power into the council-chamber of history, few reahzed 
the full consequences of this action, and those few were 
rather far-seeing thinkers than active politicians. The 
European statesmen generally considered it as little 
more than the substitution of one influence for another, 
and considered it rather in its consequences upon the 
strength of an European power, than as an important 
and independent fact. There was, therefore, a mani- 
fest intention to use the young republic as one of the 
small weights, to be shifted, by diplomatic manipula- 
tion, from one scale to the other, according to the polit- 
ical necessities of the European balance. And, had the 
general condition of things remained as before, the 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 277 

United States could scarcely have prevented such a 
destiny ; for against the united diplomacy and strength 
of Europe, they could have accomplished nothing. 
But before the various interests of Europe could adjust 
themselves for this new relation, the French Revolution 
broke to pieces the old system, scattered the elaborate 
calculations of the old diplomacy, and, by involving all 
Europe in a war for existence, left the United States 
comparatively undisturbed, to mature their own inter- 
ests into an independent system. Washington and 
Adams found themselves just in this transition period, 
w^hen the traditionary pohcy of Europe was destroyed, 
and every state was in the uncertainty of panic, seek- 
ing its own interests and safety, and before the strife 
had been concentrated into that absorbing struggle for 
national existence which lasted through the first fifteen 
years of the present century. With three of the great 
European powers they had questions of direct concern. 
Besides this complication, they had endeavored, in such 
treaties as they had already negotiated, to introduce the 
mild principles of a humane and liberal system of 
neutral rights, and they had succeeded in establishing 
stipulations of this character in their relations with sev- 
eral European powers. But in the general and con- 
fused hostility which followed upon the outbreak of the 
French Revolution, not only these principles could not 
be enforced, but their existence complicated the rela- 
tions of the United States with those allies who, as 
regarded themselves, were mutual and bitter enemies. 

24 



278 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

The position of the United States, therefore, as far as 
their immediate interests were concerned, was most 
unfortunate. They could not obtain an impartial hear- 
ing at any court in Europe ; and they had not the 
strength to force from greater powers that respect to 
which their national and independent interests were 
fairly entitled. But embarrassing as was this position, 
the causes that produced it, corrected, in their develop- 
ment, the very difficulties which they had created. The 
uncertain and conflicting interests of the European 
powers induced a jealous watchfulness of each other's 
policy ; and, by a skilful use of their various and chang- 
ing relations, the United States were enabled to obtain, 
at different periods, concessions from each, granted, it is 
true, rather from a selfish instinct in the special policy 
of each state, but not the less important on that ac- 
count in their results upon American interests. Thus, 
the treaty with England was yielded to the necessities 
of the condition of hostility between England and 
France ; the treaty with Spain was the result of the 
changed attitude of that power toward England on the 
one side, and France on the other ; and the treaty with 
France depended upon the special relation which 
France at the moment wished to assume, for her own 
purposes, towards the other powers of Europe. Not 
one of these treaties was based upon any honest regard 
for the interests or rights of the United States ; and it 
thus literally and providentially happened, that the 
French Revolution, which at one time threatened to 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 279 

absorb the interests of the United States as the neces- 
sary but inferior consequences of European policy, did 
finally play a most important, though unforeseen, part 
in accomplishing that very independence, which, at the 
outset, it so seriously compromised. 

Another embarrassment under which the government 
labored, was the want of an efficient and experienced 
diplomatic corps. The character and ability of the 
diplomatic representatives of the United States were of 
the highest class ; but no natural excellence could en- 
tirely supersede the necessity of that familiarity with the 
details of European policy, which was, perhaps, more 
important at this period than at any other in our his- 
tory, for our policy was in great measure dependent on 
the contingent relations of other powers. Added to 
this, the time necessary for communication, at that day, 
between Europe and America, and the uncertainty of 
even this dilatory communication, owing to the chances 
of capture from both belligerents, rendered an exchange 
of despatches almost idle. Months elapsed between 
the most important letters ; papers, absolutely necessary 
to pending negotiations, wandered away from their 
direction; and in the archives of that period, the place 
of more than one important document is supplied by 
the notice, " never received." The critical combination, 
in the midst of which a minister wrote for instructions, 
was passed long before his letters reached Philadelphia ; 
and the state of affairs to which his home correspond- 



280 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

ence related had been wellnigh forgotten before he fully 
comprehended its details. Our foreign ministers, there- 
fore, were not only subjected to great difficulty in the 
discharge of their duties, but their real and unaflected 
ignorance of what was going on at home diminished 
their consideration in the eyes of the practised diplo- 
matists with whom they were dealing. 

" I believe," says one of them, who had enjoyed con- 
siderable experience, " that the members of no corps 
diplomatique whatever, in any country or at any time, 
have been furnished with so little or so irregular infor- 
mation of the important occurrences of their own coun- 
try, or of others, as those from America have ever been. 
I know not how this may affect others, but as to myself, 
I have often felt, though never so much as lately, that 
it adds cruelly to the distrust and embarrassment which 
are experienced in those cases which are inevitable, and 
which force to the adoption of one of several lines of 
conduct, which may lead to different, and even to 
opposite, ends. Under these circumstances, it is impos- 
sible not to be subject to constant error, unless one is 
endowed with the spirit of divination, to which I have 
no pretensions. I have been led to these reflections 
from what I have seen myself, and learned from other 
foreign agents of the United States, and which would 
seem to show, from this system having been practised 
under the successive administrations of our country, 
that it was considered there as the proper one. If 



DITLOMATIC HISTORY. 281 

SO, I am persuaded time and experience will change 
it." * 

But not only had the government to contend with 
difficulties like these ; it had to meet at home an ex- 
cited and powerful opposition. For, unfortunately, on 
the foreign policy of the country, public opinion was 
widely and passionately divided. Not only did parties 
see the interests of the country in different lights, but 
they became, as the controversy grew warmer, active 
partisans of the foreign influences which attempted to 
control our policy for their own ends. The contest be- 
came one of sentiment rather than opinion, and roused 
into unscrupulous activity all the bitterness that had 
been engendered in the Seven Years' war. Confounding 
the principles of our own Revolution with the elements 
of civil strife at work in France, the great popular mind 
was deceived by its own highest and most honest sym- 
pathies, while the party which supported the adminis- 
tration became, in the heat of the long and angry argu- 
ment, less tolerant of opposition than was either just or 
politic. The truest patriots mistrusted each other, and, 
misinterpreting each other's motives with the acute- 
ness of excited and jealous suspicion, their opposition 
threatened to render any moderate policy impracti- 
cable. Without a fixed policy, with a limited and 
enemy-bounded territory, and enfeebled by radical po- 
litical dissension at home, it is now almost impos- 

* T. P. MSS. Letter from Mr. Short, Oct. 12, 1793. 



282 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 

sible to realize the extent of our peril. And had foreign 
powers been allowed to obtain commanding influence 
in the national councils, the character of the country- 
would have been diminished, its interests mutilated, 
and our national existence must have dragged its slow 
way from a crippled and sickly infancy to a maimed 
and dependent manhood. Fortunately for us, how- 
ever, sustained by wise, informed, and firm counsellors, 
Washington succeeded, even against a strongly excited 
popular prejudice, in establishing the perfect national 
independence of the country. And to have effected 
this, as they did, without war, and in face of the dif- 
ficulties, both foreign and domestic, of the new govern- 
ment, is the crowning glory of those great men, whose 
arms enfranchised an empire, whose wisdom created a 
constitution, and whose steadfast sagacity inaugurated 
a national life of unbroken and almost fabulous pros- 
perity. They differed, as men will do, sometimes in 
ignorance, sometimes in passion ; but in their labors, 
they were joined together, and in their fame, they should 
not be divided. Honored be their memories, — the 
severe simplicity of Jay's antique virtue, the subtle 
and eloquent reasoning of Jefferson's wonderful intel- 
lect, the broad and ample sweep of Hamilton's na- 
tional pride, the impetuous and abounding patriotism 
of the elder Adams, the varied excellency of Pinckney 
and iMorris and Monroe, but above all, the calm, sure 
judgment of him in whose majestic presence even these 
men bowed. With feeble means, they achieved great 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. 283 

ends ; in doubt and difficulty, they never faltered in a 
great purpose. They were men true and brave and 
elevated ; their tempers chastened by a long and patient 
experience, their ambitions tempered by a wise forbear- 
ance, and their abilities quickened by a devoted patriot- 
ism, which gave vigor and purpose to their policy. 
But the student of the world's fortunes, who looks down 
upon this mighty empire, with its tributary oceans, and 
sees its vast extent gemmed with the civilized beauty 
of a thousand cities, peopled with untiring millions, by 
whose energy its rivers roll down gold, its forests van- 
ish, and its fields burst into luxuriant harvests, while 
arts and science, laws and commerce, direct, protect, 
and refine the objects of their unstinted labors, — be- 
holds but a portion of their work. 

For, in the darkest hours of their perplexity, they 
trusted with a grave and beautiful simplicity to Truth. 
And the success of their policy thus afforded to the 
science of history another of those rare observations, by 
which we learn, that, beyond our obscure and cloudy 
prospect, the eternal laws of a Divine morality are at 
work, aiid that witli_nations, as with men, the laSLJ^f 
progress is the rule of right. __- —- " 



END . 



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